In a monetary model based on Lagos and Wright (2005) where unsecured credit and money are used as means-of-payments, we analyze how the cost and quality of the record-keeping technology affect welfare. Specifically, monitoring agents’ debt repayment is costly but is essential to the use of unsecured credit because of limited commitment. To finance this cost, fees on credit transactions are imposed, and the maximum credit limit that is incentive compatible depends on such fees and monitoring level. Alternatively, the use of money avoids such costs. A higher credit limit does not necessarily improve welfare, especially when the limit is high: the benefit from increased trade surpluses from a higher credit limit is offset by the increased cost of monitoring to achieve the improvement. Moreover, under the optimal arrangement, optimal credit limit decreases with the marginal cost of monitoring. When the cost is sufficiently low, a pure credit equilibrium is optimal. When the marginal cost is high, it is optimal to have a pure-currency economy. But when the cost is at an intermediate level, we show that credit is sustainable but not socially optimal. In this range, the implementable credit limit leads to a higher trade surplus than in a pure monetary economy, but owing to the cost of operating the record-keeping system, social welfare in credit equilibrium is lower than the welfare in a pure monetary equilibrium. In addition, we show that there can be a non-monotonic relationship between the optimal record-keeping level and the optimal credit limit.

We use the New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) framework and Vector Autoregressive (VAR) to investigate the usefulness and relevancy of monetary services, augmented to include credit card transaction services. We use the new credit-card-augmented Divisia monetary aggregates in the models to further the existing research on their usefulness and relevancy. In this research, we compare three different monetary aggregates within the New Keynesian framework: (1) the aggregation-theoretic “true” monetary aggregate, (2) the credit-card-augmented Divisia monetary aggregate, and (3) the simple sum monetary aggregate.

We acquire the following primary results. (1) The credit-card-augmented Divisia monetary aggregate tracks the theoretical (true) monetary aggregate, while simple sum does not. Although this result would be expected from the theory in classical economic models, the result is not an immediate implication of the theory in New Keynesian models and therefore needs empirical confirmation. (2) Under the recursive VAR framework, the credit-card-augmented Divisia monetary aggregate serves as a preferable monetary policy indicator compared to the traditional federal funds rate. (3) On theoretical grounds, we find that the separability condition for existence of a monetary aggregator function could fail, if credit card deferred payment services were excluded from the monetary services block, unless all markets are perfect.

Should the transmission of monetary policy be understood in terms of its impacts on interest rates and bond yields, or monetary aggregates? This article considers the relationship between those aggregates and inflation, both over the past and more recently. And explains how the MPC takes account of “QT” in its forecasts.

Since the global financial crisis in 2008, there has been an elevated interest in private debt and as a macroeconomic variable. In light of the lack of high-frequency data, this study presents a unique monthly time series dataset on credit from and deposits in Swedish commercial banks from 1875 to 2020, covering 1,752 monthly observations and most of Swedish commercial banking history. In a first application, the study examines to what extent money in Sweden has been exogenous, created independently of demand by the central bank, or endogenous, created in response to demand by commercial banks, during different institutional settings. The results, derived via cointegration and impulse-response functions, show that though the relationship between deposits and credit has changed over time, both theories often hold validity simultaneously. While changes in deposits often have had significant impact on credit, the opposite has also been true. There are, however, differences between different regulatory regimes, as well as for different groups of banks.

For several years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, Australia registered a public surplus, and this was generally interpreted as the result of responsible fiscal policy. However, since the outbreak of that crisis, no such fiscal balance has again been attained, giving rise to a range of explanations from the political incapacity of governments to the weak economic behaviour characterising the post-crisis era. Noteworthy in any case is that analysts have failed to cite the importance of a factor that was key to reaching pre-crisis surpluses: the vertiginous growth of private debt. This work argues that it was precisely the intense granting of bank loans and consequent increased demand from the private sector that boosted economic activity and led to the generation of public income sufficient to feed the fiscal surpluses of that period. Indeed, according to the proposals of Wynne Godley, this would have been the only way to register a public surplus in a context of current account deficits, typical of the Australian economy. This paper considers whether Australian private debt played a significant role in achieving fiscal surplus by way of a review of the Australian real estate boom and public accounts from the 1990s onward, also estimating an econometric model of autoregressive vectors to explore the link between these two variables. The results obtained appear to corroborate the hypothesis: severe private borrowing contributed to Australia’s fiscal surpluses. This finding has significant implications for budgetary policy.

About USD7 trillion of quantitative easing funds has flooded emerging markets since 2008. These funds, created to stimulate a recovery in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and to stabilise financial markets, ended up mostly as emerging markets’ corporate bonds and loans (often after being leveraged into many multiples of their original value). Not for the first time, emerging markets became the financial markets of last resort. These funds were then either mainly invested (Asia) or used (as in Latin America and South Africa) for almost anything except for creating additional productive capacities. Enquiries into these issues, especially how corporations financed their investment, were subjects that fascinated economist Ajit Singh. He was the first to find out that corporations in emerging markets relied much more on external finance than those in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (where retained profits played a major role). The implication was that they were likely to be more susceptible to the vicissitudes of financial markets, and these have become even more weird since quantitative easing, as Northern ‘investors’, in search for elusive yields, have been happy to take on ever higher risks, leverage and illiquidity in the South. This is a key difference between current global financial fragilities and those at the onset of the current global financial crisis in 2007. The stakes for emerging economies and international financial markets could scarcely be higher, but unfortunately these huge new challenges occur at the worst possible time, as our social imagination has seldom been so barren.

Credit restrictions were used as a monetary policy instrument in the Netherlands from the 1960s to the early 1990s. Since these restrictions were aimed at containing money rather than credit growth, their focus was on net credit creation by the financial sector. We document the rationale of these credit restrictions and how their implementation evolved in line with the evolution of the financial system. We study the impact on the balance sheet structure of banks and other financial institutions. We find that banks mainly responded to credit restrictions by making adjustments to the liability side of their balance sheets, particularly by increasing the proportion of long-term funding. Responses on the asset side were limited, while part of the banking sector even increased lending after the adoption of a restriction. These results suggest that banks and financial institutions responded by switching to long-term funding to meet the restriction and shield their lending business. Arguably, the credit restrictions were therefore still effective in reaching their main goal. Indeed, we do find evidence of a significant effect of credit restrictions on inflation.

After Southern Italy became part of a new, national state in 1860, its financial sector was radically transformed under Piedmontese influence. This article challenges the conventional wisdom that the aggressive penetration of a Northern credit institution, the future Bank of Italy, into the South following unification harmed the local banking system and highlights instead its transformative role in modernising and deepening regional credit markets. On the basis of new statistics, banking and political records, this contribution shows that the introduction of ‘foreign’ banking from Northern Italy under the auspices of a national, constitutional government resulted in a financial revolution and a democratisation of credit supply to the advantage of the whole South. Public banking under the Bourbons had privileged the needs of an absolute government over those of the private economy and of the capital city over those of the rest of the country, retarding financial development. Credit undersupply and regional fragmentation could only be overcome through the integration of the South within a larger Italian market, in which, however, the lion's share went to a predominantly Northern institution.

Farley Grubb's recent article in the Financial History Review contains econometric results designed to support his theoretical propositions concerning the paper money of the American colonies. This comment demonstrates that some of his results are spurious and the rest are based on using incorrect testing procedures and incorrect critical values of test statistics.

Pre-industrial money supply typically consisted of multiple, often foreign currencies. Standard economic theory implies that this entails welfare loss due to transaction costs imposed by currency exchange. Through a study of novel data on Finnish nineteenth-century parish-level currency conditions, we show that individual currencies had principal areas of circulation, with extensive co-circulation restricted to the boundary regions in between. We show that trade networks, defined here through the regional co-movement of grain prices, proved crucial in determining the currency used. Market institutions and standard price mechanisms had an apparent role in the spread of different currencies and in determining the dominant currency in a given region. Our findings provide a caveat for the widely held assumption that associates multi-currency systems with negative trade externalities.

A project to build a comprehensive database of the Bank of France's published accounts covering its entire history was launched in 2001 with the support of the Bank's Mission Historique. This article introduces its main outcome: a dataset based on the weekly balance sheets – the so-called situations hebdomadaires – covering more than a century and a half of history from 1840 to 1998. After a brief outline of the historical evolution of the Bank's legal status and a description of the publication outlets for the data, the article pays special attention to the issues of transparency and accountability. For that purpose, it reconstructs on the basis of archival records the debate over the disclosure of the Bank's figures (what to publish, how frequently) that took place, both within the Bank and between the Bank and the government, at various turning points in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Finally, the article explains how the presentation of the situations changed over time, paying special attention to the impact of World Wars I and II. The full database with metadata information is attached to the electronic version of this article and downloadable as an Excel file from the FHR website, together with an extensive review of the literature on the history of the Bank of France.

Colonial Virginia's legislature introduced an inside paper money into its domestic economy that was, at that time, primarily a barter economy without any government or bank-issued inside paper monies in circulation. I decompose Virginia's paper money into its expected real-asset present value, risk discount and transaction premium. The value of Virginia's paper money was determined primarily by its real-asset present value. The transaction premium was small. Positive risk discounts occurred in years when monetary troubles were suspected, namely worries that the government would not redeem the paper money as promised. Counterfeiting, however, was not one of these worries. The legislature had the tools and used them effectively to mitigate the effects of counterfeiting on the value of its paper money. Colonial Virginia's paper money was not a fiat currency, but a barter asset, with just enough transaction premium to make it the preferred medium of exchange for local transactions. It functioned like a zero-coupon bond and traded below face value due to time-discounting, not depreciation.

Since the onset of the Federal Reserve's unconventional programme of large-scale asset purchases, known as quantitative easing (QE), some economists and financial practitioners have feared that the consequent buildup of the Fed's balance sheet could lead to a large expansion of the money supply, and that such an increase could cause a sharp rise in inflation. So far fears about induced inflation have not been validated. This article examines the basis for the original concerns about inflation in terms of the classic quantity theory of money, which holds that inflation occurs when the money supply expands more rapidly than warranted by increases in real production. The article first reviews the US experience and shows that whereas rapid money growth might have been a plausible explanation of inflation in the 1960s through the early 1980s, subsequent data have not supported such an explanation. It then shows that the quantity theory of money has not really been put to the test after the Great Recession, because a sharp increase in banks’ excess reserves and corresponding sharp decline in the ‘money multiplier’ has meant that the rise in the Federal Reserve's balance sheet has not translated into increased money available to the public in the usual fashion. The most likely aftermath of quantitative easing remains one of benign price behaviour. However, if nascent inflationary conditions materialise, the Federal Reserve will need to manage adroitly the large amounts of banks’ excess reserves that have accumulated as a consequence of QE in order to limit inflationary pressures.

This article studies the relationship between Bank and Treasury during the War of the Spanish Succession. It examines two new series of Exchequer bills implemented in 1707 and 1709. Far from being loans-for-rents contracts, the principal aim was to accommodate war-related pressures on the nation's monetary system by manufacturing a substitute for scarce specie. The article also shows there was a covert struggle within the financial community for access to the specie flows associated with the nation's system of public finance.

The collapse of the ambitious and experimental Ayr Bank (Douglas, Heron & Co.) was the central episode of the 1772–3 British credit crisis and served as a direct influence on Adam Smith's monetary analysis in the Wealth of Nations. This article identifies the issuance of redeemable annuities in response to the bank's stop of payments in June 1772 and the distressed nature of its asset liquidations afterwards as the main reasons behind the size of its losses. It furthermore uses primary manuscript evidence to reconstruct and extend the existing narrative of this famous episode, from the planning stages in 1773 while the bank was still fighting for its survival, to the retirement of its banknotes by the Edinburgh public banks in 1773–4, the legal and political manoeuvring behind the redemption of the annuities by Act of Parliament in 1774, and the over 40 years of asset unwinding that followed.

On the basis of a novel dataset, the article investigates the anatomy of financial crises in Norway from 1830 to 2010. First, nine significant crises are identified. Second, the article examines spillover effects on the real economy. We find a clear but not symmetric relationship. Third, the article investigates key patterns in credit and money volumes. Major financial crises typically occurred after substantial money and credit expansion, causing financial instability.

In 1720 Britain embarked on a project to convert a large part of the public debt into shares in the South Sea Company. Most narratives assume the Company stood to profit from an anticipated increase in the market price of its shares. Though some have noted that this assumption is incorrect, no one has yet tried to find an alternative explanation for the Company's motivation for entering into the project. In this article I argue that the Company had no need to profit directly from the conversion operation and instead saw it as an opportunity to establish dominance in the British banking industry.

La théorie de la banque centrale analyse la hiérarchisation bancaire dans le cadre du monopole d'émission de billets de banque. Or sous le régime de la liberté bancaire dans lequel les banques peuvent émettre des billets et des dépôts à vue sans restrictions quantitatives ou autres, la structure bancaire converge également vers la hiérarchisation. L'émergence d'une banque supérieure intervenant en tant que prêteur en dernier ressort est alors un phénomène spontané et constitue une innovation du système de paiement afin d'endiguer les ruées de remboursement, et non une création du législateur ou une conséquence de la réglementation. Afin d'établir un système bancaire rigoureusement décentralisé, c'est-à-dire sans banque supérieure, les chambres de compensation doivent respecter des règles très strictes leur interdisant de créer de la monnaie supérieure. Sans ces règles et sans cette intervention du législateur, la structure hiérarchisée du système bancaire est alors définitive.

We build a model of endogenous destruction with credit and labor market imperfections, represented by a matching process between financiers and entrepreneurs on one hand, and entrepreneurs and workers on the other hand. Business creation, credit opening and job destruction represent three active margins of the model. Financial imperfections lead to financial fragility. This implies the existence of a forth latent margin which may be activated in the case of repudiation of financial contracts. This paradigm is applied to the recent development of the U.S. economy. An empirical test in panel of OECD countries further suggests the importance of venture capital for macroeconomic variables.