This chapter traces British American cities as distinctive political spaces that helped pioneer the concept of citizenship, a term that originally meant a city resident, and stood at the forefront of much of the political protest leading to the war for independence. However, from their inception, most American cities were subordinated to their provincial legislatures which were dominated by rural interests. Meanwhile the concept of citizenship came to be associated more with a set of actions rather than a place people lived. All the largest cities were occupied during the war, forcing residents to make difficult decisions and heightening the distrust leveled against them after the war. After the war, most urban residents remained minorities subordinated to the interests of mostly rural polities. Once the cradles of citizenship, most cities were not further empowered as polities by the American Revolution, but continued to be or were more sharply constrained by rural elites after the war concluded.

This chapter explores the organizational culture of Iraq’s army between its founding in 1921 and its collapse by the time of the American invasion in 2003. During this eighty-two-year history, the organizational culture of the Iraqi Army moved from the face of a foreign occupation in the 1920s, to a political tool of internal social and political coercion, to “probably the most potent military ever wielded by an Arab government.” However, by the time American troops pulled down the statue of Saddam in Baghdad’s Firdos Square, the army’s organizational culture was but a faint echo of not only its Iran-Iraq War pinnacle but also its historic norm. Saddam’s role was the critical factor in this change. Saddam needed professional military officers competent in developing and employing a large modern armed force, but he preferred the counsel of “violent and ignorant personalities.” Saddam could never reconcile the fundamental difference between what he called tribal and civilized (or state) warfare and the professional elements of the Iraqi armed forces could not survive in his shadow.

The American Civil War presented an exceptional state of affairs in modern warfare, because strong personalities could embed their own command philosophies into field armies, due to the miniscule size of the prior US military establishment. The effectiveness of the Union Army of the Tennessee stemmed in large part from the strong influence of Ulysses S. Grant, who as early as the fall of 1861 imbued in the organization an aggressive mind-set. However, Grant’s command culture went beyond simple aggressiveness – it included an emphasis on suppressing internal rivalries among sometimes prideful officers for the sake of winning victories. In the winter of 1861 and the spring of 1862, the Army of the Tennessee was organized and consolidated into a single force, and, despite deficits in trained personnel as compared to other Union field armies, Grant established important precedents for both his soldiers and officers that would resonate even after his departure to the east. The capture of Vicksburg the following summer represented the culminating triumph of that army, cementing the self-confident force that would later capture Atlanta and win the war in the western theater.

Chapter 3 explores the French government’s quest to appease its recalcitrant white planter elite in the Îles du Vent between the Seven Years War and the French Revolution and the unexpected consequences of these efforts. In 1759, the crown created three chambres mi-parties d’agriculture et de commerce in its Caribbean colonies in which planter elites could discuss the means and obstacles to French colonial prosperity. Additionally, it invited a colonial deputy from each chamber to join metropolitan deputes in the Royal Council of Commerce in Paris. The chapter argues that this reform moved the main French sugar colonies closer to the status of an overseas province. It further reveals how reform generated opportunities for the colonial elite to develop a creole political economic discourse with which to promote their own economic interests against the metropole. Focusing on Martinique’s chambre mi-partie d’agriculture et de commerce and its successor institutions, it exposes planters’ eclectic appropriation of economic ideas in circulation – including those of the Physiocrats – to defend their fiscal, commercial, and legal colonial interests. Years of rehearsing their creole perspective would stand them in good stead when French revolutionaries gave white planters a voice within the new French National Assembly in 1789.