Book contents
- The Culture of Military Organizations
- The Culture of Military Organizations
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Part I Theoretical Frameworks
- Part II Land Forces
- 3 Ulysses S. Grant and the Culture of the Union Army of the Tennessee
- 4 “Playing a Very Bold Game”
- 5 German Army Culture, 1871–1945
- 6 The Culture of the Indian Army, 1900–1947
- 7 An Army Apart
- 8 The Culture of the British Army, 1914–1945
- 9 Imperial Japanese Army Culture, 1918–1945
- 10 Military Culture, Military Efficiency, and the Red Army, 1917–1945
- 11 An Army Like No Other
- 12 The Weight of the Shadow of the Past
- 13 US Army Culture, 1973–2017
- Part III Maritime Forces
- Part IV Air Forces
- Conclusion
- Index
12 - The Weight of the Shadow of the Past
The Organizational Culture of the Iraqi Army, 1921–2003
from Part II - Land Forces
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 October 2019
- The Culture of Military Organizations
- The Culture of Military Organizations
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Part I Theoretical Frameworks
- Part II Land Forces
- 3 Ulysses S. Grant and the Culture of the Union Army of the Tennessee
- 4 “Playing a Very Bold Game”
- 5 German Army Culture, 1871–1945
- 6 The Culture of the Indian Army, 1900–1947
- 7 An Army Apart
- 8 The Culture of the British Army, 1914–1945
- 9 Imperial Japanese Army Culture, 1918–1945
- 10 Military Culture, Military Efficiency, and the Red Army, 1917–1945
- 11 An Army Like No Other
- 12 The Weight of the Shadow of the Past
- 13 US Army Culture, 1973–2017
- Part III Maritime Forces
- Part IV Air Forces
- Conclusion
- Index
Summary
This chapter explores the organizational culture of Iraq’s army between its founding in 1921 and its collapse by the time of the American invasion in 2003. During this eighty-two-year history, the organizational culture of the Iraqi Army moved from the face of a foreign occupation in the 1920s, to a political tool of internal social and political coercion, to “probably the most potent military ever wielded by an Arab government.” However, by the time American troops pulled down the statue of Saddam in Baghdad’s Firdos Square, the army’s organizational culture was but a faint echo of not only its Iran-Iraq War pinnacle but also its historic norm. Saddam’s role was the critical factor in this change. Saddam needed professional military officers competent in developing and employing a large modern armed force, but he preferred the counsel of “violent and ignorant personalities.” Saddam could never reconcile the fundamental difference between what he called tribal and civilized (or state) warfare and the professional elements of the Iraqi armed forces could not survive in his shadow.
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- The Culture of Military Organizations , pp. 272 - 298Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019