On and off the map of “the world republic of letters,” literary Beijing, from exotic configurations to multivalent self-portraits, has unfolded, historically and geopolitically, as an ancient capital of traditional China, a Republican city of new thoughts and everlasting memories, a fallen city under Japanese military control, a socialist capital of Maoist ideology, and a rejuvenated and cosmopolitan megacity in the post-Cold War era and the new millennium. This chapter situates Beijing writing in the intertwined contexts of Chinese literature and World Literature in terms of evidenced influences, implicit connections, and paralleled representations. The methods of imagining Beijing have formed in the multilayered city-texts by writers across different historical times, which entailed variegated genres, ideas and trends, places and spaces, emotions and materiality, and cultural chronotopes. Entangled with Beijing narratives created by authors across the globe, the city’s imageries in Chinese literature prompt intriguing dialogues, in both visible and invisible ways, with World Literature. Together, this tapestry of urban writing encodes and decodes Beijing as a real, imagined, mythical, metaphorical and semiotic city surviving barbarianism, exoticism, Orientalism, (mis)understanding, (over)interpretation, and (un)translatability.

The 1964 Peking Science Symposium and 1966 Summer Physics Colloquium were the two largest-scale international science congresses hosted by Mao’s China. Chapter 4 delves into the inner workings of these events, which brought hundreds of visitors to the People's Republic of China from throughout Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Oceania. From planning through to post-conference tours organised for participants, it examines the network of organisations and individuals at national and local levels that collectively shaped these major initiatives to bring foreign scientists to China on the cusp of the Cultural Revolution. In doing so, it shows the extent of integration and coordination between science and foreign relations systems during the Mao era.

This chapter reviews the first six years of implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a major Chinese foreign policy initiative introduced in 2013. The authors explain how China’s transition from benefactor to banker, in con- junction with its push for expanded influence on the global stage, led to the adoption of the BRI. They then consider whether and why China might choose to ‘multilateralize’ the BRI. The authors conclude that if Beijing wants to multilateralize the BRI, it will need to either comply with—or help redesign— international development finance rules and standards. At the same time, the establishment of an inclusive and revitalized development finance regime does not rest solely on the shoulders of Beijing. If OECD-DAC and multilateral donors and creditors wish to avert a crisis of confidence and relevance, they will need to rewrite international development finance rules and norms in ways that accommodate Beijing’s interests and more effectively account for the preferences of low-income and middle-income countries.

There were many alternatives to shooting unarmed civlians in Beijing. Soldiers or police could have used non-deadly force. Leaders could have ignored the protesters and waited them out. More military officials could have followed the lead of General Xu Qinxian, who refused to carry out martial law, or of He Yanran, who passively resisted on June 4, 1989, and allowed soldiers under his command to disperse. The massacre was not inevitable.

Studying the Beijing massacre from a historical distance allows for a careful accounting of the death toll, listening to the voices of a few soldiers who have spoken about their experience, and analyzing how the Peope's Liberation Army assessed its own performance, as recounted in internally published sources.

The most dangerous part of Beijing was along Fuxing Road, Fuxingmen Avenue, and West Chang’an Avenue between 10 p.m. on June 3 and 1 a.m. on June 4 as the 38th Army forced its way through barriers and crowds on its way to Tiananmen Square. After arriving at Tiananmen, the 38th Army repeatedly opened fire on civilians at Nanchizi, just east of the square. The 15th Airborne also killed civilians as it approached the square from the south, passing through the Zhushikou intersection and entering Tiananmen by way of Qianmen.

Top Communist Party officials admitted that some civilians had been wrongfully killed during the massacre, and promised that victims and their families would receive compensation. This was a tacit admission that the massacre had gone horribly wrong. If compensation came, it was meager and not systematic. While victims suffered, military officials and soldiers quietly received honors and promotions.

Events and people outside of Beijing shaped what happened in China's capital. Protests in Xi'an and Changsha help convince Deng Xiaoping to take a hard line against demonstrators in Beijing. Hundreds of thousands of protesters from the provinces took trains to Beijing, adding to leaders' fears of a nationwide democracy movement. Many of the leaders of student organizations in Beijing had been born and raised elsewhere in China, but they failed to build meaningful ties to protesters from other places.

PLA soldiers continued killing civilians in Beijing on June 4, 5, and 6.

Ordinary people resisted the Beijing massacre by vandalizing military vehicles and venting their rage. These young working-class men received long prison sentences; some were executed.

In late May and early June 1989, Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun, and Li Peng prepared the People's Liberation Army to enter Beijing and forcibly clear Tiananmen Square.

"Beijing massacre" is more accurate than "Tiananmen massacre" because most of the people killed by the army fell on the streets of Beijing, not inside the square. Tiananmen Square was, however, a site of death and violence: at least five students were shot and killed inside the square, and the army forcibly removed protesters from the Monument to the People's Heroes.

Details remain murky about the order for the PLA to open fire on protesters, but it is clear that there was an order. Soldiers received verbal orders permitting them to shoot as they advanced toward Tiananmen Square on June 3.

The Beijing massacre killed ordinary people as they went out to witness or block troops advancing toward Tiananmen Square. Soldiers also killed people trying to get to work, seeking medicine for their children, or hiding in their own homes.

This chapter examines the proportionality test as applied in Hong Kong’s constitutional jurisprudence. In addition to tracing the evolution of proportionality doctrine from the British colonial era to the present day, the paper advances two broad claims. First, it argues that the Hong Kong judiciary, led by the Court of Final Appeal (CFA), has gradually inserted more structure to the proportionality test, but has also become more deferential to governmental authority and expertise in constitutional rights adjudication. The CFA’s landmark judgment in Hysan Development Co Ltd v Town Planning Board (2016) is most significant in this regard, as it enabled the use of a very deferential standard of review – “manifest” unreasonableness – in a wide range of fundamental rights cases. Second, Hysan’s introduction of a fourth step to the proportionality test has had little, if any effect on subsequent judgments. The fourth step calls for courts to balance the societal benefits of an impugned law against the harm it imposes on individual rights. Thus far, however, Hong Kong courts have refrained from taking this balancing exercise seriously, even when the burden on those whose rights are affected appears to be substantial or excessive.

Chapter 6 surveys new waves of internal and external migration in the post-Mao era, arguing that they are linked phenomena. The chapter demonstrates that the larger phenomenon, the “floating population” of rural migrants in the cities of eastern, coastal China, is related to the phenomenon of “new migrants” targeting destinations beyond the borders of China. The chapter describes two important examples. The first is the simultaneous migration from some specific communities in the Wenzhou area of southern Zhejiang to Beijing and of migration from other specific communities in Wenzhou to such places as Prato, Italy. The second example consists of rural communities near the city of Wenzhou that both receive “internal” migrants from western China and send “external” migrants to such places as New York City. The chapter demonstrates the continued importance of kinship and native-place networks for the laborers and small entrepreneurs who made up the “floating population” and the “new migrants.” The chapter explores the stances and roles of various levels of government within China toward migrants. It concludes with a survey of family practices, including the reemergence of split families and the newer trends of family migration.

Zhu Di’s experience as imperial prince shaped his rule’s style and substance. He interacted with Mongolian men as subordinates, advisers, allies, negotiating partners, rivals, and traitors. He was known among them as Lord of Yan. Breaking with his father’s example, Zhu Di repeatedly campaigned in person on the steppe as emperor. There he met with steppe leaders, hosted banquets, conducted grand hunts, and organized vast military reviews. He spoke openly of his motives and objectives on the steppe, not just to audiences at home but also with Korean, Jurchen, Mongol, Moghul, and Timurid leaders. He inserted himself into a Chinggisid world as east Eurasia’s premier ruler and patron.