This article studies how sudden changes in bank credit supply impact economic activity. I identify shocks to bank credit supply based on firms’ aggregate debt composition. I use a model where firms fund production with bonds and loans. In the model, bank shocks are the only type of shock that imply opposite movements in the two types of debt as firms adjust their debt composition to new credit conditions. Bank shocks account for a third of output fluctuations and are predictive of the bond spread.

Since the publication of Keynes General Theory in 1936 when Keynes developed an original Finance Circuit model which was subsequently enriched by the post-Keynesian theory of endogenous money supply, no study has undertaken Keynes Finance Circuit model complete causality tests. The present paper breaks new ground and aims at filling the above lacuna by employing Granger non-causality test for heterogeneous panel data models to investigate the above model based on a sample of 32 African countries, for the period from 1990 to 2021. Our results lend support to the complete Keynes Finance Circuit model in the short run. In the long run, all causalities are vindicated except the causal relationship running from economic growth to savings which appears insignificant. In terms of policy implication, we are encouraging policymakers to design policies that will stimulate economic growth within a post-Keynesian endogenous money supply framework.

In some classes of macroeconomic models with financial frictions, an adverse financial shock successfully explains a decrease in real activity but simultaneously induces a stock price boom. The latter theoretical result is not consistent with data from actual financial crises. This study aims to provide a theoretical explanation for both prolonged recessions and stock price declines. I develop a simple macroeconomic model featuring a banking sector, financial frictions, and R&D-based endogenous growth. Both the analytical and numerical investigations show that endogenous R&D investment and a shock hindering banks’ financial intermediary function can be key to generating both a prolonged recession and a drop in firms’ stock prices.

Over the past decade, many health care systems across the Global North have implemented elements of market mechanisms while also dealing with the consequences of the financial crisis. Although effects of these two developments have been researched separately, their combined impact on the governance of health care organizations has received less attention. The aim of this study is to understand how health care reforms and the financial crisis together shaped new roles and interactions within health care. The Netherlands – where dynamics between health care organizations and their financial stakeholders (i.e., banks and health insurers) were particularly impacted – provides an illustrative case. Through semi-structured interviews, additional document analysis and insights from institutional change theory, we show how banks intensified relationship management, increased demands on loan applications and shifted financial risks onto health care organizations, while health insurers tightened up their monitoring and accountability practices towards health care organizations. In return, health care organizations were urged to rearrange their operations and become more risk-minded. They became increasingly dependent on banks and health insurers for their existence. Moreover, with this study, we show how institutional arenas come about through both the long-term efforts of institutional agents and unpredictable implications of economic and societal crises.

Following the events of 11 September 2001, measures aimed at countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) were intensified by States. Many countries around the world adopted strict anti-money laundering and CFT regulations for the transfer of funds globally. This process increased the costs of complying with regulatory requirements and imposed high penalties on banks for non-compliance. As a result, preventive measures – often known as “de-risking” – were taken up by banks, including terminating the accounts of clients perceived as “high-risk” for money laundering or terrorist financing, and delaying transfers. These measures, however, have had negative consequences, reducing financial access for local civil society organizations in conflict-affected contexts that are deemed high-risk for terrorist activities. Drawing on five years of research to understand the impact of de-risking on conflict-affected contexts from a local perspective, this paper reflects on the local political economy of CFT, with a focus on the Middle East and North Africa. It explores two key areas of inquiry. The first of these is the politics of interpretation – how counterterrorism as a discourse and a set of practices, of which CFT is one, gets interpreted by local authorities and banks, and subsequently gets reinterpreted to the population. This also has implications for which local actors are better positioned to access funds than others, and why. The second area of inquiry is the politics of vulnerability – how the local political economy impact of CFT can increase the social and economic vulnerabilities of some groups more than others. This paper demonstrates that under the guise of “counterterrorism”, local authorities in conflict-affected contexts have used CFT to restrict the non-profit and philanthropic space and are using banking regulations to shape that space in ways that are bound to have negative medium- and long-term implications for it.

Financial abuse is a significant form of elder maltreatment and is frequently ranked in the top two most common forms of abuse perpetration. Despite this, it is under-identified, under-reported and under-prosecuted. Financial institutions, such as banks, are important environments for identifying and responding to the financial abuse of older people. Traditionally, banks have not always been part of inter-sectorial responses to financial abuse, yet are important stakeholders. The aim of this study is to explore perceptions and experiences of financial abuse in five national banks. Data were collected from 20 bank managers and five members of the National Safeguarding Committee in the Republic of Ireland. Using thematic analysis, four themes were identified: defining a vulnerable adult; cases of financial abuse of vulnerable adults; case responses to financial abuse of vulnerable adults; and contextual issues. The data demonstrate the multiplicity of manifestations and the complexity of case investigation and management. Findings point to the need to enhance banks’ responses, through additional education and training, and promote integrated inter-sectorial collaboration. In addition, a change in societal beliefs is needed regarding financial entitlement, responding to ageism, public awareness of the consequences of financial decisions and types of financial abuse, as well as ensuring such crimes are addressed within the legal system.

We hypothesize that informal bank networks influence corporate credit access in China. Our sample comprises a panel of 515 corporations listed on China's stock exchanges with a total of 1,052 firm-year observations, holding a total of 7,009 major bank loans from 183 distinct banks between 2007 and 2012. Results support the hypothesis that closure in bank networks facilitates credit access. We further show that the positive closure-performance association offers fewer advantages if financial markets and the legal infrastructure are relatively well developed. Our findings contribute to an emergent literature examining how informal networks can productively substitute weak formal institutions, and how the interplay between informal networks and network embeddedness shapes individual and corporate strategies.

In the late 1930s, the first independent Arab banks in Palestine, the Arab Bank and the Arab Agricultural Bank, sued customers who had defaulted on loans in an attempt to maintain solvency. Their indebted customers, unable to pay, fought back to prevent their lands from being foreclosed and sold to Zionist buyers. Each party claimed that its position was consistent with, indeed essential to, the anti-Zionist nationalist cause. The story of these pioneering Arab banks and their legal battles with their customers in the wake of the 1936-1939 revolt provides insight into Arab financial life in Mandate Palestine. It reveals the banks’ struggles to survive; complicates notions of Arab-Palestinian landlessness and indebtedness; and argues that political and economic exigencies, not reductive notions of collaboration or patriotism, produced the banks’ antagonistic relationship with their customers, whereby the survival of one came at the expense of the other.

Despite much commentary in the media and the popular assumption that the banking industry exerts undue influence on government policy-making, the academic literature on the role of the banks since the 2008 financial crisis remains theoretically and empirically under-specified. In particular, we argue that different forms of financial power are often conflated, while favorable policy outcomes are too-readily assumed to be evidence of regulatory capture. In short, we still know relatively little about how bank influence varies over time and in different national contexts, the extent to which banking interests are unified or divided, and the conditions under which banks are capable of producing meaningful variation in policy outcomes. This article has three objectives: 1) to explain why the debate on bank influence matters; 2) to examine the evidence of bank influence since the international financial crisis; and 3) to set out a range of conceptual tools for thinking about bank power.