The threat of GNSS interference poses a great danger to many critical infrastructure systems including air navigation. With a focus on mitigating this threat, this paper proposes a methodology for detecting GNSS interference. The methodology utilises the quality indicator NACp transmitted in ADS-B messages and GPS almanac data for interference detection. The NACp indicator enables estimation of the position error derived from GPS, which is compared with the HDOP value of the GPS satellite constellation. Based on this comparison, the developed detection algorithm determines whether the aircraft is affected by jamming. The detection methodology is evaluated on datasets obtained during deliberate experiments with GPS jamming. The proposed methodology provides a way to detect GNSS interference, facilitating mitigation of its impact on air traffic operation.

The variability in ground manoeuvre occurrences for aircraft landing gear is intrinsically linked to the airport geometries served by aircraft in-service and consequently, the cyclic loads that landing gear carry are driven by the route network and characteristics of aircraft operators. Currently, assumptions must be made when deriving fatigue load spectra for aircraft landing gear, which may fail to capture the operator characteristics, potentially leading to design conservatism. This paper presents the enhanced characterisation of ground turning manoeuvres within the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) trajectories for six narrow-body aircraft across a full-service carrier (FSC) and a low-cost carrier (LCC) fleet. The methodology presented within this paper employs ADS-B latitude and longitude information to overcome limitations of previous approaches, increasing the rate of correct manoeuvre identification within ADS-B trajectories to 77% of flights from the 50% rate achieved previously. When characterising the ground manoeuvres across 3,000 flights, significant differences in manoeuvre occurrences were observed between individual aircraft within the LCC fleet and between the FSC and LCC fleets. The occurrence of tight and pivot turns were shown to vary across the six aircraft with six and eight fatigue-critical turns being performed by the FSC and LCC fleet for every 10 flights performed. In addition, it was observed that the direction of fatigue critical turns is biased in specific directions, suggesting that individual main landing gear assemblies will accumulate fatigue damage at an increased rate, leading to greater justification for operator-specific spectra and structural health monitoring of aircraft landing gear.

This paper investigates the operational patterns and techniques of aerial fire fighting. It is demonstrated that manoeuvrability and endurance are the main characteristics when choosing air tactical aircraft; focus is on load capability for helicopters and air tankers. Water tank filling and deployment techniques are evaluated. Aircraft using pressure deployment systems are found to produce more uniform and heavy coverage in comparison with gravity systems. ADS-B open source data of flight operations and performance was collected. Operational patterns are found to be independent on the size of particular aircraft category (non-amphibious and amphibious air tanker, helicopter, air-tactical aircraft). Effectiveness and cost are modelled using the retardant dropped per operation and the average number of daily missions. The largest aircraft, Type-I helicopters and very large air tankers (VLAT) are found to be the most effective water- and retardant-dropping aircraft. The best cost-to-litre-dropped ratio for water-dropping aircraft is attributed to Type-III helicopters and amphibious Type-III aircraft; for retardant-dropping aircraft, VLAT are most effective. To maximise fire fighting effectiveness, Type-I helicopters and VLAT should be used as far as possible, with pressure deployment systems.

Space-based automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) receivers can cover thousands of aircraft, each transmitting 6 ⋅ 2 signals per second. As a result, ADS-B signals are very prone to overlap. When the number of aircraft covered by a receiver reaches 3,000, about 90 % of the signals will be overlapping. Overlapped signals can reduce the decoding accuracy of receivers, so that aircraft information cannot be accurately transmitted to the air traffic control (ATC) surveillance system, hence threatening aviation flight safety. It is necessary to propose signal separation algorithms for space-based ADS-B systems. An orthogonal projection linear constrained minimum variance (OPLCMV) algorithm is proposed, which can separate two signals simultaneously based on the linearly constrained minimum variance algorithm by exploiting the characteristics of overlapped signals. Compared with the state-of-the-art extended projection algorithm and the fast independent component analysis algorithm, the OPLCMV method has a higher decoding accuracy for multiple overlapping signals with a small direction difference of arrival or frequency shift. Moreover, the OPLCMV algorithm has a low computational complexity when the number of overlapped signal sources is less than seven.

Landing gear are exposed to cyclic loads from the ground manoeuvres that aircraft perform in-service. Variability is observed in the loading magnitude associated with ground manoeuvres, along with the per-flight variability in ground manoeuvre occurrence and sequencing. Whilst loading magnitude variability has been widely characterised, significant assumptions are required regarding manoeuvre occurrence and sequencing when constructing landing gear load spectra for fatigue design. These assumptions are required due to the limited availability of data concerning ground manoeuvre occurrence and sequencing relating to aircraft in-service and require validation to facilitate the design of more efficient components. ‘Big-Data’ approaches, employing Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) transponder data, enable aircraft ground tracks to be identified. This paper presents a methodology to characterise the variability in ground manoeuvre occurrence and sequencing using ADS-B data sourced from Flightradar24® for a wide-body aircraft fleet. Using statistics generated for the fleet, it was identified that significant variability exists in the occurrence and sequencing of turning and braking manoeuvres. The statistics also validate existing assumptions, including that the proportional share of left and right turning manoeuvres is equal. Finally, this paper discusses the utility of ADS-B datasets for constructing landing gear load spectra and monitoring of landing gear in-service.

The satellite constellation with automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast on-board is of great importance for air traffic surveillance due to its multiple advantages compared with traditional methods. Although some research has been conducted on satellite constellation design based on coverage performance, the findings cannot entirely satisfy all the requirements of air traffic surveillance owing to the lack of analysis on inter-satellite links and network transmission. This paper presents a novel design of a low earth orbit satellite constellation network to solve this problem. Based on the requirements of space-based surveillance, an evaluation model of constellation performance is proposed concerning coverage, link and transmission. The simulation results show that the evaluation model can reflect the performance of a satellite constellation network designed for a space-based surveillance system, and a 55-satellite constellation design scheme with fairly good performance can fulfil the function of global real-time air traffic surveillance.

In Air Traffic Control (ATC), aircraft altitude data is used to keep an aircraft within a specified minimum distance vertically from other aircraft, terrain and obstacles to reduce the risk of collision. Two types of altitude data are downlinked by radar; actual flight level (Mode C) and selected altitude (Mode S). Flight level indicates pressure altitude, also known as barometric altitude used by controllers for aircraft vertical separation. ‘Selected altitude’ presents intent only, and hence cannot be used for separation purposes. The emergence of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSSs) has enabled geometric altitude on board and to the controllers via the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) system. In addition, ADS-B provides quality indicator parameters for both geometric and barometric altitudes. Availability of this information will enhance Air Traffic Management (ATM) safety. For example, incidents due to Altimetry System Error (ASE) may potentially be avoided with this information. This work investigates the use and availability of these parameters and studies the characteristics of geometric and barometric data and other data that complement the use of these altitude data in the ADS-B messages. Findings show that only 8·7% of the altitude deviation is < 245 feet (which is a requirement of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to operate in Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM) airspace). This work provides an alert/guidance for future ground or airborne applications that may utilise geometric/barometric altitude data from ADS-B, to include safety barriers that can be found or analysed from the ADS-B messages itself to ensure ATM safety.

A probabilistic methodology for separation loss probability assessments is proposed in this paper. The key focus is on the effect of uncertainties from multiple Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) systems on the separation loss probability assessment. First, a brief review of the ADS-B system and its associated uncertainty quantification metrics is discussed. It is found that most existing studies focus on the individual ADS-B uncertainty quantification for a single aircraft, which is not sufficient for separation loss probability assessment when two or more aircraft are involved. Next, a probabilistic positioning model with multiple aircraft is proposed and various types of uncertainties are included in the proposed model. Numerical simulations show that a navigation satellite fault can significantly affect separation error when individual aircraft see different satellite sets. Following this, several demonstration examples are illustrated to show the bounds for separation loss probability estimation. Finally, several conclusions and suggestions are discussed based on this study. One major finding is that the separation risk significantly increases when two nearby aircraft use different satellite sets to navigate. Real-time assessment of this risk should be performed.

We investigate a strategy to address the problem of low aircraft detection probability of space-based Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B). A nineteen-element hexagonal array and adaptive multi-beamforming method is proposed. This method aims to adjust the beam pattern dynamically to reduce signal collision and enlarge coverage. With the focus on the mission requirement of global aircraft detection by 2020, the appropriate gain and direction of beams are studied and designed in detail. Theoretical analysis and simulations show that this adaptive multi-beam antenna can greatly improve flight detection probability at an average reporting interval from 10 seconds to 5 seconds when compared with the traditional fixed multi-beam antenna. The results of this work show that the design of a 19-element antenna along with the adaptive multi-beamforming method can be considered as a building block of future space-based ADS-B.

In the effort to quantify Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) system safety, the authors have identified potential ADS-B failure modes in Syd Ali et al. (2014). Based on the findings, six potential hazards of ADS-B are identified in this paper. The authors then applied the Probabilistic Safety Assessment approach which includes Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Importance Analysis methods to quantify the system safety. FTA is applied to measure ADS-B system availability for each identified hazard while Importance Analysis is conducted to identify the most significant failure modes that may lead to the occurrence of the hazards. In addition, risk significance and safety significance of each failure mode are also identified. The result shows that the availability for the ADS-B system as a sole surveillance means is low at 0·898 in comparison to the availability of ADS-B system as supplemental or as primary means of surveillance at 0·95 and 0·999 respectively. The latter availability values are obtained from Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) for Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (DO-242A).

Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) Out supports various ground applications including Air Traffic Control (ATC) surveillance in radar airspace, non-radar airspace and on the airport surface. In addition, the capability of aircraft to receive ADS-B Out messages from other aircraft within their coverage (ADS-B In) enables enhanced airborne surveillance applications. The requirements of the application vary depending on its safety-criticality. More stringent applications will require higher levels of performance. It is therefore critical that the ADS-B system performance is measured against the most stringent application it is designed for. This paper reviews the various enhanced airborne surveillance applications and the required ADS-B information to support them. It identifies the ADS-B based applications required for Air Traffic Management (ATM) modernisation under the SESAR/NextGen programs. It discusses existing ADS-B Out versions and their capabilities. A mapping exercise is undertaken to assess the credibility of the ADS-B system performance to support the functionalities and requirements of the various enhanced airborne surveillance applications and establish those that require further research and development, highlighting some of the key challenges.

Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) is envisioned to support seamless aircraft surveillance and enhanced air-to-air and air-to-ground applications. ADS-B is an integrated system, dependent on on board navigation systems to obtain aircraft state information as well as a communication data link to broadcast this information to Air Traffic Control (ATC) on the ground and other ADS-B equipped aircraft. To quantify system safety, a good understanding of the potential failure modes of the system is vital. ADS-B system failure modes include those from the communication and navigation systems and human and environmental factors, as well as ADS-B-specific components. In this paper, potential failure modes of the ADS-B system are identified using an approach developed in this paper. The end output of the approach is an ADS-B failure mode register. However, the approach is transferable to other ATC surveillance systems. The paper further provides the failure classification and modelling, and also analyses the failure modes' impact on ATC operations and finally proposes potential mitigations. It is important to note that the work carried out in this paper is based on the assumption that the ADS-B operates as the primary surveillance source for the ATC.