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ADS-B System Failure Modes and Models

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 June 2014

Busyairah Syd Ali ,
Washington Ochieng ,
Arnab Majumdar ,
Wolfgang Schuster  and
Thiam Kian Chiew
Busyairah Syd Ali*
Affiliation:
(Imperial College London)
Washington Ochieng
Affiliation:
(Imperial College London)
Arnab Majumdar
Affiliation:
(Imperial College London)
Wolfgang Schuster
Affiliation:
(Imperial College London)
Thiam Kian Chiew
Affiliation:
(University of Malaya, Malaysia)
*
(E-mail: [email protected])
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Abstract

Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) is envisioned to support seamless aircraft surveillance and enhanced air-to-air and air-to-ground applications. ADS-B is an integrated system, dependent on on board navigation systems to obtain aircraft state information as well as a communication data link to broadcast this information to Air Traffic Control (ATC) on the ground and other ADS-B equipped aircraft. To quantify system safety, a good understanding of the potential failure modes of the system is vital. ADS-B system failure modes include those from the communication and navigation systems and human and environmental factors, as well as ADS-B-specific components. In this paper, potential failure modes of the ADS-B system are identified using an approach developed in this paper. The end output of the approach is an ADS-B failure mode register. However, the approach is transferable to other ATC surveillance systems. The paper further provides the failure classification and modelling, and also analyses the failure modes' impact on ATC operations and finally proposes potential mitigations. It is important to note that the work carried out in this paper is based on the assumption that the ADS-B operates as the primary surveillance source for the ATC.

Keywords

ADS-BFailure modeFailure model
Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Navigation , Volume 67 , Issue 6 , November 2014 , pp. 995 - 1017
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Navigation 2014 

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References

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