In the first part of this paper, we consider several natural axioms in urelement set theory, including the Collection Principle, the Reflection Principle, the Dependent Choice scheme and its generalizations, as well as other axioms specifically concerning urelements. We prove that these axioms form a hierarchy over $\text {ZFCU}_{\text {R}}$ (ZFC with urelements formulated with Replacement) in terms of direct implication. The second part of the paper studies forcing over countable transitive models of $\text {ZFU}_{\text {R}}$. We propose a new definition of ${\mathbb P}$-names to address an issue with the existing approach. We then prove the fundamental theorem of forcing with urelements regarding axiom preservation. Moreover, we show that forcing can destroy and recover certain axioms within the previously established hierarchy. Finally, we demonstrate how ground model definability may fail when the ground model contains a proper class of urelements.

A partition is finitary if all its members are finite. For a set A, $\mathscr {B}(A)$ denotes the set of all finitary partitions of A. It is shown consistent with $\mathsf {ZF}$ (without the axiom of choice) that there exist an infinite set A and a surjection from A onto $\mathscr {B}(A)$. On the other hand, we prove in $\mathsf {ZF}$ some theorems concerning $\mathscr {B}(A)$ for infinite sets A, among which are the following:

1. (1) If there is a finitary partition of A without singleton blocks, then there are no surjections from A onto $\mathscr {B}(A)$ and no finite-to-one functions from $\mathscr {B}(A)$ to A.

2. (2) For all $n\in \omega $, $|A^n|<|\mathscr {B}(A)|$.

3. (3) $|\mathscr {B}(A)|\neq |\mathrm {seq}(A)|$, where $\mathrm {seq}(A)$ is the set of all finite sequences of elements of A.

Consider a variant of the usual story about the iterative conception of sets. As usual, at every stage, you find all the (bland) sets of objects which you found earlier. But you also find the result of tapping any earlier-found object with any magic wand (from a given stock of magic wands).

By varying the number and behaviour of the wands, we can flesh out this idea in many different ways. This paper's main Theorem is that any loosely constructive way of fleshing out this idea is synonymous with a ZF-like theory.

This Theorem has rich applications; it realizes John Conway's (1976) Mathematicians' Liberation Movement; and it connects with a lovely idea due to Alonzo Church (1974).

On the basis of Poincaré and Weyl’s view of predicativity as invariance, we develop an extensive framework for predicative, type-free first-order set theory in which $\Gamma _0$ and much bigger ordinals can be defined as von Neumann ordinals. This refutes the accepted view of $\Gamma _0$ as the “limit of predicativity”.

After reviewing various natural bi-interpretations in urelement set theory, including second-order set theories with urelements, we explore the strength of second-order reflection in these contexts. Ultimately, we prove that second-order reflection with the abundant atom axiom is bi-interpretable and hence also equiconsistent with the existence of a supercompact cardinal. The proof relies on a reflection characterization of supercompactness, namely, a cardinal $\kappa $ is supercompact if and only if every $\Pi ^1_1$ sentence true in a structure M (of any size) containing $\kappa $ in a language of size less than $\kappa $ is also true in a substructure $m\prec M$ of size less than $\kappa $ with $m\cap \kappa \in \kappa $.

We give a new characterization of the cardinal invariant $\mathfrak {d}$ as the minimal cardinality of a family $\mathcal {D}$ of tall summable ideals such that an ultrafilter is rapid if and only if it has non-empty intersection with all the ideals in the family $\mathcal {D}$. On the other hand, we prove that in the Miller model, given any family $\mathcal {D}$ of analytic tall p-ideals such that $\vert \mathcal {D}\vert <\mathfrak {d}$, there is an ultrafilter $\mathcal {U}$ which is an $\mathscr {I}$-ultrafilter for all ideals $\mathscr {I}\in \mathcal {D}$ at the same time, yet $\mathcal {U}$ is not a rapid ultrafilter. As a corollary, we obtain that in the Miller model, given any analytic tall p-ideal $\mathscr {I}$, $\mathscr {I}$-ultrafilters are dense in the Rudin–Blass ordering, generalizing a theorem of Bartoszyński and S. Shelah, who proved that in such model, Hausdorff ultrafilters are dense in the Rudin–Blass ordering. This theorem also shows some limitations about possible generalizations of a theorem of C. Laflamme and J. Zhu.

We answer some questions about graphs that are reducts of countable models of Anti-Foundation, obtained by considering the binary relation of double-membership $x\in y\in x$ . We show that there are continuum-many such graphs, and study their connected components. We describe their complete theories and prove that each has continuum-many countable models, some of which are not reducts of models of Anti-Foundation.

We study the notion of non-trivial elementary embeddings under the assumption that V satisfies ZFC without Power Set but with the Collection Scheme. We show that no such embedding can exist under the additional assumption that it is cofinal and either is a set or that the scheme of Dependent Choices of arbitrary length holds. We then study failures of instances of Collection in symmetric submodels of class forcings.

We develop an untyped framework for the multiverse of set theory. $\mathsf {ZF}$ is extended with semantically motivated axioms utilizing the new symbols $\mathsf {Uni}(\mathcal {U})$ and $\mathsf {Mod}(\mathcal {U, \sigma })$, expressing that $\mathcal {U}$ is a universe and that $\sigma $ is true in the universe $\mathcal {U}$, respectively. Here $\sigma $ ranges over the augmented language, leading to liar-style phenomena that are analyzed. The framework is both compatible with a broad range of multiverse conceptions and suggests its own philosophically and semantically motivated multiverse principles. In particular, the framework is closely linked with a deductive rule of Necessitation expressing that the multiverse theory can only prove statements that it also proves to hold in all universes. We argue that this may be philosophically thought of as a Copernican principle that the background theory does not hold a privileged position over the theories of its internal universes. Our main mathematical result is a lemma encapsulating a technique for locally interpreting a wide variety of extensions of our basic framework in more familiar theories. We apply this to show, for a range of such semantically motivated extensions, that their consistency strength is at most slightly above that of the base theory $\mathsf {ZF}$, and thus not seriously limiting to the diversity of the set-theoretic multiverse. We end with case studies applying the framework to two multiverse conceptions of set theory: arithmetic absoluteness and Joel D. Hamkins’ multiverse theory.

The following bare-bones story introduces the idea of a cumulative hierarchy of pure sets: ‘Sets are arranged in stages. Every set is found at some stage. At any stage S: for any sets found before S, we find a set whose members are exactly those sets. We find nothing else at S’. Surprisingly, this story already guarantees that the sets are arranged in well-ordered levels, and suffices for quasi-categoricity. I show this by presenting Level Theory, a simplification of set theories due to Scott, Montague, Derrick, and Potter.

Potentialists think that the concept of set is importantly modal. Using tensed language as a heuristic, the following bare-bones story introduces the idea of a potential hierarchy of sets: ‘Always: for any sets that existed, there is a set whose members are exactly those sets; there are no other sets’. Surprisingly, this story already guarantees well-foundedness and persistence. Moreover, if we assume that time is linear, the ensuing modal set theory is almost definitionally equivalent with non-modal set theories; specifically, with Level Theory, as developed in Part 1.

On a very natural conception of sets, every set has an absolute complement. The ordinary cumulative hierarchy dismisses this idea outright. But we can rectify this, whilst retaining classical logic. Indeed, we can develop a boolean algebra of sets arranged in well-ordered levels. I show this by presenting Boolean Level Theory, which fuses ordinary Level Theory (from Part 1) with ideas due to Thomas Forster, Alonzo Church, and Urs Oswald. BLT neatly implement Conway’s games and surreal numbers; and a natural extension of BLT is definitionally equivalent with ZF.

We show that a $(\kappa ^{+},1)$ -simplified morass can be added by a forcing with working parts of size smaller than $\kappa $ . This answers affirmatively the question, asked independently by Shelah and Velleman in the early 1990s, of whether it is possible to do so.

Our argument use a modification of a technique of Mitchell’s for adding objects of size $\omega _2$ in which collections of models – all of equal, countable size – are used as side conditions. In our modification, whilst the individual models are, as in Mitchell’s technique, taken ad hoc from quite general classes, the collections of models are very highly structured, in a way that is somewhat different from, perhaps more stringent than, Mitchell’s original, arguably making the method more wieldy and giving the prospect of further uses with more delicate working parts.

The large-structure tools of cohomology including toposes and derived categories stay close to arithmetic in practice, yet published foundations for them go beyond ZFC in logical strength. We reduce the gap by founding all the theorems of Grothendieck’s SGA, plus derived categories, at the level of Finite-Order Arithmetic, far below ZFC. This is the weakest possible foundation for the large-structure tools because one elementary topos of sets with infinity is already this strong.

This paper consists in the formulation of a novel categorical set theory, MLCat, which is proved to be equiconsistent to New Foundations (NF), and which can be modulated to correspond to intuitionistic (denoted with an “I” on the left) or classical NF, with atoms (denoted with a “U” on the right) or not:

Almost all set theorists pay at least lip service to Cantor’s definition of a set as a collection of many things into one whole; but empty and singleton sets do not fit with it. Adapting Dana Scott’s axiomatization of the cumulative theory of types, we present a ‘Cantorian’ system which excludes these anomalous sets. We investigate the consequences of their omission, examining their claim to a place on grounds of convenience, and asking whether their absence is an obstacle to the theory’s ability to represent ordered pairs or to support the arithmetization of analysis or the development of the theory of cardinals and ordinals.

Modal structuralism promises an interpretation of set theory that avoids commitment to abstracta. This article investigates its underlying assumptions. In the first part, I start by highlighting some shortcomings of the standard axiomatisation of modal structuralism, and propose a new axiomatisation I call MSST (for Modal Structural Set Theory). The main theorem is that MSST interprets exactly Zermelo set theory plus the claim that every set is in some inaccessible rank of the cumulative hierarchy. In the second part of the article, I look at the prospects for supplementing MSST with a modal structural reflection principle, as suggested in Hellman (2015). I show that Hellman’s principle is inconsistent (Theorem 5.32), and argue that modal structural reflection principles in general are either incompatible with modal structuralism or extremely weak.

Starting points of this article are fixed point axioms for set-bounded monotone Σ1 definable operators in the context of Kripke–Platek set theory $KP$. We analyze their relationship to other principles such as maximal iterations, bounded proper injections, and Σ1 subset-bounded separation. One of our main results states that in $KP + (V\, = \,L)$ all these principles are equivalent to Σ1 separation.

Let Z2, Z3, and Z4 denote 2nd, 3rd, and 4th order arithmetic, respectively. We let Harrington’s Principle, HP, denote the statement that there is a real x such that every x-admissible ordinal is a cardinal in L. The known proofs of Harrington’s theorem “$Det\left( {{\rm{\Sigma }}_1^1} \right)$ implies 0♯ exists” are done in two steps: first show that $Det\left( {{\rm{\Sigma }}_1^1} \right)$ implies HP, and then show that HP implies 0♯ exists. The first step is provable in Z2. In this paper we show that Z2 + HP is equiconsistent with ZFC and that Z3 + HP is equiconsistent with ZFC + there exists a remarkable cardinal. As a corollary, Z3 + HP does not imply 0♯ exists, whereas Z4 + HP does. We also study strengthenings of Harrington’s Principle over 2nd and 3rd order arithmetic.