In addition to representing a main source of data in linguistic research, example sentences are a core vehicle for linguists in teaching a wide range of phenomena to our students. However, the content of these sentences often reflects the biases of the researchers who construct them: referents are typically given Anglocentric proper names like John and Mary, reflecting (at least implicitly) dominant white culture and conformity to heteronormative gender roles. To support linguists in shifting these practices, we present the Diverse Names Database, a database of 78 names from a variety of languages and cultures, confirmed with native speakers. We outline the goals for the project, introduce our process of developing and adjusting the design, and present some additional issues and reflections for consideration, such as how to use the database as one component of an affirming, anti-racist, and gender-equitable linguistics pedagogy. We aim to generate meta-level discussions about disciplinary conventions and canons, and to challenge the idea that underlying linguistic structures are, or should be, the only things of relevance when constructing example sentences. How we teach linguistics is part of how we practise it, and how we do both matters to the composition and direction of the field.

Dans cet article, les injustices en matière de responsabilités de care entre les partenaires hétérosexuel.les sont problématisées comme des irresponsabilités relationnelles. D'abord, l'apport des théories du care à l'appréhension des asymétries de pouvoir liées au déséquilibre dans le travail de soin est discuté. Ensuite, les manifestations de ce déséquilibre sont illustrées dans les arrangements intimes établis par les couples. Ces conséquences injustes sont, par la suite, conceptualisées comme des « irresponsabilités relationnelles ». Enfin, une conception de la coresponsabilité relationnelle est proposée dans une perspective de plus de justice et de démocratie entre les personnes, dans le privé comme le public.

Trinity Western University’s Community Covenant has been the subject of public and legal attention with specific reference to a proposed law school. At the heart of much of the contention about the law school, opponents have expressed concern about the provisions in the Covenant that restrict the rights of LGBTQI+ students—their identities and relationships. While much of the focus has been on the potential harm for LGBTQI+ students, and the expectation that law schools uphold Charter values—the voices of queer students and allies have largely been sidelined. This article offers space for LGBTQI+ students, staff and allies to discuss their lived experiences of sexual diversity and the harm facing the queer community at Trinity Western University. As they state, the Covenant is only a part of the issue; the culture it supports is what needs to change.

This article will explore data obtained through interviews with UK family law practitioners and clients with experience of financial relief on formalised same-sex relationship breakdown. It will focus on questions around how solicitors have approached and argued their dissolution cases (and the extent to which they have drawn upon heteronormative arguments and case law), and whether both they and the clients believed that civil partnerships are, and should be, treated similarly to marriages. The discussion will examine the different understandings of ‘equality’ employed, and question the ways that the participants relied on ideas of sameness and difference. It will be argued that the solicitors placed particular stress on sameness, and that heteronormative constructs of gendered inequalities have been transplanted into same-sex cases, in a system where practitioners’ submissions are based on ‘what works.’ This is despite the fact that lesbian and gay couples do not map onto the ‘template’ under which the parties have been subjected to different gendered expectations. Conversely, the clients were less willing to take on the full legal implications associated with (heterosexual) marital breakdown and less receptive of the solicitors ‘translating’ their matters to pigeonhole them into the existing framework.

The failure of the Supreme Court of Canada to give more than lip service to “context” when considering claims under s. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms arises largely from the Court's analytic framework, which resists recognizing the social relations of power inherent in complex cases of oppression. The precise nature of the flaws in the Court's analysis is demonstrated in a number of thoughtful feminist critiques that received recognition in the recent decision in R. v. Kapp. While it is too soon to tell whether the Court intends to depart completely from the past decade of s. 15 jurisprudence, equality-seeking groups now have greater opportunities to advance alternative theoretical frameworks for Charter interpretation. This article discusses one such framework, multidimensionality theory, which focuses on the interaction of systems of oppression, conceptualized as an invisible matrix—a vast network of complex, overlapping, interactive, and mutually reinforcing systems. The operation of the systems obscures their effects, and their complexity renders outcomes difficult to predict when they interconnect at sites of subordination and privilege. One can expose the operation of the systems by looking at particular sites of oppression/privilege and considering the contradictions or “inexplicability” of the circumstances based on one system alone. The author argues that the failure of the Charter claim at the heart of the Supreme Court's decision in Native Women's Association of Canada v. Canada demonstrates the need for courts to employ multidimensionality theory in cases of complex oppression. In NWAC, multidimensionality theory reveals that the “dominant” Aboriginal groups were involved in the negotiation/performance of hegemonic masculinities within a racial/colonial context that provided them with justification to suppress NWAC's independent promotion of the interests of Aboriginal women in constitutional negotiations with the government, and that the government was complicit in this performance. By framing the freedom of expression issue as whether NWAC had a “special” right to a speaking platform, and the equality issue as exclusively one of determining whether NWAC could prove the other groups were “male dominated,” the Court fragmented considerations of patriarchy from those of racism and colonization, distorting the synergistic effect of the systems of oppression and reinforcing colonial ideology.

The public use of the niqab and other religious face coverings is a source of considerable debate in Western nations. The veiled Muslim woman is often constructed as “other,” reviled as backward, represented as in need of rescue, or associated with Islamic extremism. Despite widespread racist attitudes, officially, Canadians purport to support multiculturalism and the equality of all people under the law as guaranteed under section 15 of the Charter. In a recent Supreme Court of Canada decision, R v NS, the Court had to consider the right of a Muslim woman to wear her niqab while testifying in a sexual assault trial. In “balancing” the conflict between the religious rights of NS and the section 7 rights of the accused to a full and fair defense, the Court ignored the security of the person and equality rights of NS. The Court instead legitimated anti-Muslim stereotypes and reiterated rape myths that had ostensibly been overturned.

This article analyzes women’s contemporary use of rights to mobilize and pursue claims for gender equality and gender justice in the United Kingdom. Empirically, the paper explores the growth of rights discourse and activity against the backdrop of a stronger constitutionalization of women’s rights at national, European, and international levels. It does this through an exploration of individual and collective lobbying and litigation strategies in relation to violence against women. The paper first examines this in the context of the right to bodily integrity through examples of the ways in which sexual violence and domestic abuse are addressed within the criminal justice system. The paper then addresses the right to be free from violence for women seeking refuge and asylum. The research reveals the need for varied strategies that target all aspects of the legal and political systems in order to ameliorate the protection and implementation of women’s rights.

Conventional wisdom about civil litigation, both among scholars and political actors, holds that abuse of the legal process is common, that there is too much litigation, that it is “all about the money”, and that “a bad settlement is better than a good trial”. This constellation of attitudes that emphasize the economic function of law suggests that courts are an expensive conflict resolution mechanism of last resort and that their use would be minimized in a healthy market-based democracy. In this paper we apply a new sociological framework to understand the meaning and function of civil litigation in a democratic society. We focus in particular on the democratic function of the informational characteristics of litigation that require substantial disclosure and engagement between plaintiff, defendant and third parties. Instead we examine the role courts play in the maintenance and attainment of a social information order – norms and legal rules governing the sharing and withholding of information that depend on and constitute particular status relationships between actors (Ryan 2006). Using interviews and surveys of family members of victims of 9/11 we develop a theory of the lived experience of entitlement to information in Anglo-American legal settings with suggestions of how these ideas might translate to civil law systems.

This paper focuses on the increasing significance of flexibility arguments to UK employment equality law. It makes use of the well-evidenced legal and governmental preoccupation with working time to investigate the production and circulation of concepts of flexibility through equality law case reports from the period 2001–2010. With case reports as my main focus, I trace how flexibility emerges through legal documental networks, so as to work out the contours of our collectively imagined “efficient” and “well-balanced” working practices. Human actors and significant non-human actors combine within and across case reports to produce and support a general set of understandings about legal flexibility. These understandings, as we have seen, suggest that flexibility is just as much a matter of organic or physical capabilities as it is of time. Concepts of elasticity, adaptability, and balance, therefore, force us to reconsider the meanings and motivations of governmental and oppositional constructions of work-life dilemmas.