AUSTRALIA AND THE “MOTHERLAND”

Great Britain has achieved much over the last 232 years, but one of its finest achievements has been the creation of modern Australia. Although initially established as a penal colony, Australia brought generations of migrants from the United Kingdom (including Ireland) and built a society which in many ways replicated the traditions and values of Britain.

Early Australian settlers did not see themselves as Australians in the way Australians do today, but as Britons living in Australia. It was not surprising, then, that when Great Britain went to war in South Africa at the end of the nineteenth century, Australian regiments rallied to the cause. New Zealanders similarly served in the Boer War. When the First World War broke out, Australia was there from the outset. Just before the war, the then Australian opposition leader and future prime minister, Andrew Fisher, said that his country would defend Britain to “the last man and the last shilling”. And so it did. More than 60,000 Australians were killed in the First World War, largely on the Western Front; some 8,800 were killed at Gallipoli. A further 156,000 were wounded, gassed or taken prisoner. As a proportion of the population, Australia had the second highest casualty rate of all Allied countries, although it had not introduced conscription.

It was a similar picture for New Zealand, which was also involved from the outset of the First World War. Out of a population of just over one million, more than 100,000 New Zealanders served as troops and nurses, suffering a 58 per cent casualty rate (16,697 dead), the highest of the war, and another thousand would die of their wounds after the conflict had ended.

On the day Britain declared war on Germany in September 1939, the then Australian prime minister, Robert Menzies, said that “as a consequence Australia is now at war”. And the then New Zealand prime minister, Michael Joseph Savage, similarly declared, “It is with gratitude in the past, and with confidence in the future, that we range ourselves without fear beside Britain, where she goes, we go! Where she stands, we stand!”

The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement famously featured as one of the available models in the EU chief Brexit negotiator Michel Barnier's scale of options for the UK–EU post-Brexit future relationship, sandwiched between the EU– Swiss system of bilateral agreements and the EU–Turkey Customs Union. It was selected by the European Commission in view of its comprehensive scope, covering political dialogue and coordination of foreign policy, justice and home affairs, trade, economic and social matters, as well as a considerable depth of legal commitments which, if sufficiently implemented, would offer significant opportunities to access the EU internal market. As was stated by the then European Council president, Herman Van Rompuy, at the time of its inception the EU–Ukraine Association represented the most advanced framework of relationships ever concluded between the EU and a third country.

Yet the Agreement's origins and its evolution were taking place in a markedly different political context compared with the EU enlargement history from 1973 onwards. First, from the political perspective, the EU was placing its relationship with Ukraine and other countries of the former Soviet Union on a different conceptual premise as compared with the EU pre-2004 neighbours in Central Europe, avoiding a political commitment towards their EU membership perspective, as well as taking a cautious approach towards closer trade ties and economic cooperation in the first generation of bilateral agreements, known as Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs). Only after the 2004 EU enlargement, as the success of transformations in the candidate countries was attributed to the transformative power of the pre-accession processes, did the EU start to contemplate ways of replicating the winning formula without the apparently high political, institutional and economic costs of continued expansion. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) sought to substitute the membership perspective instrument by a carefully calibrated idea of a “stake in the EU Internal Market” achievable through consistent, enforceable and verifiable processes of legislative approximation to the EU's acquis communautaire and accompanying institutional reforms in the partner countries.

In the United Kingdom's early discussions about leaving the European Union, there were many proposed new models for the country's ongoing economic configurations and policies, with much argument about possible new approaches to integration. Among the most unexpected of these was the claim that the UK could follow the model of one of the smallest, most distant, and most unusual of its ex-colonies: Singapore. On the surface, the two countries would seem to have little in common: a traditional largely Anglo-Saxon country in a long historical relationship with the European continent on the one hand, and a tiny, newly founded, largely Chinese country in a poor but bustling and populous South East Asian region on the other.

However, this unlikely comparison did not go away. Indeed, it resurfaced in various forms, as politicians and commentators argued that Singapore offered a model for Britain to follow in its Brexit negotiations. This chapter considers whether these comparisons have any economic validity. Initially I recount Singapore's modern history (both the official and unofficial versions). Then I examine the Singapore development model and look for useful comparisons to make for post-Brexit Britain.

SINGAPOREAN BACKGROUND

Official histories of Singapore like to portray it as an ancient trading centre. In fact, it was little more than a swampy island at the foot of the Malay Peninsula, a tiny Malay sultanate where the harbour offered watering facilities for vessels trading between China, the East Indies Archipelago and India/the Middle East. Its key was its location: it commanded the narrow passage between the Malacca Straits and the South China Seas, the shortest route between Canton and Calcutta. Singapore was not originally a sovereign state, but rather part of a Malay sultanate, with whom Stamford Raffles contracted in 1819 to allow the East India Company to build a trading port there.

Its early role as a trading hub set the pattern of Singaporean development for the next two centuries: a small settlement that transhipped cargoes, serviced trading ships and provided fuel and provisions. It was run by a growing population of British administrators, local Malay villagers, Chinese merchants and labourers from the region.

No member state has been as influential as the United Kingdom in shaping EU policies to fight serious crime, including terrorism. Paradoxically, no country has been more effective in blocking initiatives to have the EU play a role in defence. In both domains, the effects will be felt long after the UK has left the EU. This chapter discusses the UK's chequered legacy in European security policy, and how this may affect future cooperation. Will police forces and intelligence agencies continue to act in concert to mutual advantage, or – as will be argued below – are data exchanges and mutual assistance more likely to suffer? Will European military and security cooperation benefit from the UK's departure, or will the EU's credibility and effectiveness diminish? What measures could prevent unnecessary damage to European and British security?

This chapter proceeds in three stages. First the effects of Brexit on criminal justice cooperation will be assessed. The discussion then turns to the external dimension of foreign policy, security and defence. The final section reflects on repercussions for the future.

INTERNAL SECURITY

The United Kingdom played a leading role in shaping the EU's internal and external security policies. It was the 2005 British presidency that proposed, jointly with the EU Counterterrorism Coordinator, the EU's counterterrorism strategy, which still directs EU policy. The European Commission's first two directors for criminal law and justice were British (Adrian Fortescue, 1999–2003, and Jonathan Faull, 2003–10), as was the first president of Eurojust (Michael Kennedy, 2002–7). Rob Wainwright, a former Security Service (MI5) agent, directed Europol for nearly a decade (2009–18). Claude Moraes chaired the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs (2014–19). Britain's last commissioner, Julian King (2016–20), was in charge of security. It is a record unmatched by any other member state.

Following Brexit, the UK will lose its voice in the institutions, preparatory committees and agencies that decide and implement EU security policy. It will be out of the room when the European Council, the Council, the Commission or the European Parliament set policy.

The “Norway Option” was a term that cropped up repeatedly in the UK's Brexit debates. Possibly this caused some confusion to a good number of Britons, but for many the term became a shortcut for the idea of the United Kingdom remaining in the Single Market without being a member of the EU. That is the deal that Norway and Iceland (since 1994) and Liechtenstein (since 1995) have with the EU, via their participation in the 1994 European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement. These three states are in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and are known as the EEA EFTA states. Switzerland is also in EFTA, but it is not in the EEA, having opted not to join after a referendum in 1992. Switzerland has its own very different arrangement with the EU, managed through numerous bilateral agreements, as Georges Baur describes in Chapter 4.

The EEA agreement is complex and unique. There is no other trade agreement between trading partners anywhere in the world that comes close to resembling it. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the agreement is that its negotiation is perpetual. It is never completely or finally negotiated. This is because every time the EU legislates to update and improve the Single Market, the EU and the EFTA states talk with each other to see whether and how that legislation should be incorporated into the EEA Agreement. Together, each year, the EU and the EEA EFTA states make several hundred Joint Committee Decisions (JCDs), with or without technical adaptations, to incorporate EU legal acts into the EEA Agreement. It is the only example of a dynamic trade agreement that ensures homogeneity of market conditions between the parties to the agreement. “Dynamic” and “homogenous” are central terms in EEA parlance, because they uphold the principle of a level playing field that is an essential requirement for full participation in and integration into the Single Market.

WHY A EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA?

A question that has not been asked enough by participants in the Brexit debate is why the EEA Agreement came into being in the first place.

Introduction: improving upon the best

According to the economist and Nobel laureate James Heckman, investment in children produces a high return, benefiting not only the immediate family and child, but society as a whole (Center for High Impact Philanthropy 2015). In 1951 the future of Finland was predicted to be “grey and dreary”, but the Finns were tenacious (Sletholt 1951: 126). More importantly than that, they eventually chose the right route to trudge determinedly along.

Finland's postwar recovery and its capacity to establish itself as a serious country depended on the transformation of its (now world-renowned) education system. Alongside providing sufficient support for parents, good housing and high-quality healthcare, education is one of the most important investments in society that a government can make to ensure both the productivity and the well-being of future generations. Politicians such as former Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen of the National Coalition Party have emphasized the role of a highly educated society in promoting global competitiveness (Nygård 2015: 153–4). However, such aspirations may fall short if they are not accompanied by policies that also invest well in public services and education funding.

The frequency with which Finland is acclaimed as the best in the world for education does not mean that it cannot improve further, nor that some of its politicians won't squander that success in the future. Educational mobility is a measure of the degree to which the education system of a country increases or decreases the importance of parental finances and parental power in determining a child's future. Figure 4.1 shows the performance of countries in terms of the social mobility they have achieved and their levels of income inequality, with both factors shown to be influenced by levels of educational mobility within each country.

Statistics Finland produces a handy annual list of areas in which Finland is deemed to excel. It was last fully updated on 5 December 2018, although a few more items were added on 6 December 2019. The source for all the claims found below can be found in the update: http://www.stat.fi/tup/ tilastokirjasto/itsenaisyyspaiva-2019_en.html, and in the original list: http:// www.stat.fi/tup/satavuotias-suomi/suomi-maailman-karjessa_en.html.

Society

• • Finland is the most stable country in the world.

• • Finland is the safest country in the world.

• • Finland is the fourth “best” country in the world. (The Good Country Index).

• • Finland had the best governance in the world in 2018 (and ranked second best in 2019).

• • Finland's police and internal security as a whole are the second best in the world.

• • Finland has the lowest level of organized crime in the world.

• • Next to Norwegians and Icelanders, Finns are the second least insecure-feeling people in the world.

• • Finland's judicial system is the most independent in the world.

• • After the Danes, Finns’ elections are the freest and most reliable in the world.

• • Finland has the third lowest level of corruption in the world.

• • Finland is the third most prosperous country in the world.

• • Protection of property rights in Finland is the best in the world.

• • Access to official information in Finland is the best in the EU.

• • Finnish banks are the soundest in the world.

• • Finland's pension system is the third-best in the world (in a field of 34 countries).

• • Finland has the third highest levels of personal freedom and choice in the world.

In a little over half a century, Finland has become one of the most equitable countries in the world. It is the country with the best life chances for children, and the happiest people. What makes Finland so successful? To what extent is bold social policy key to that success? Or is it because of the growth of a shared belief in the well-being of everyone – and, if so, what role has its recent history played in the rise of that belief? Finland is just as subject to the vicissitudes of globalization and environmental threats as other affluent countries, but today it often confronts these problems better than almost all others and appears to be incredibly robust. We believe that it is time to take a close look at what other countries can learn from Finland.

What drawbacks might there be from so much equality? What are the downsides, if any, to Finntopia? Why haven't more countries achieved what Finland has achieved, and how many have done nearly as well as (or even better than) Finland on one or more aspects of equality – and why? If there are no great disadvantages to the Finnish system, then why don't more people move there or more countries emulate it? Why are there still far-right political parties in a country where life looks – in comparison to the reality for so many people in Britain or the United States – like paradise?

This book begins by acknowledging what almost everyone first mentions: the Finnish winters. And indeed, for many months of the year in Finland, it is very cold. We show that it is not this fact, nor the small size and high homogeneity of Finland's population, that are the underlying reasons for the social equality that exists in Finland today. In the pages that follow, using a huge range of statistics and sources, we explain why it is not Finland's climate, its demographics or its ethnicity that matter. None of those factors made everything that transpired inevitable. In fact, in many cases these factors have been a hindrance to Finland's economic, social and political development.

In the following three chapters, we look at the context of Finland's achievements. The first chapter focuses on geography and climate, which are issues that invariably arise early on in any conversation about the country. Finland is often described as remote, but remoteness is relative. It very much depends on where you are looking from, and how much more easily (for the affluent at least) everywhere is now connected to everywhere else as compared to how difficult travel was even in the recent past. We begin the chapter with a map that puts Finland at its centre, showing how a large part of the world's surface looks from that vantage point.

Chapter 1 continues by showing just how warm the summers are in Finland and how cold it can be in winter, but also how clear the skies can be and how clean the air is. Outsiders are rarely aware of the large geographical variations in climate across the country. We end our introductory chapter by describing how ancient Finland is, geologically speaking, and how its landscape of lakes and forest includes places where rare elements are found in abundance. Although Finland is one of the places where the effects of global warming are likely to be the least adverse, it is also one of the countries at the forefront of initiatives to reduce, mitigate and adapt to climate change – including, controversially, the building of new nuclear power plants that are due to begin operation in 2020 (Reuters 2019).

The second chapter in this section considers the history of Finland amid the empires that surrounded it and dominated it for so long. We chart how for centuries it was the poorest of nations, and show how its towns and cities grew along with the development of transportation routes between its countless lakes; we detail its many border changes, and speculate on the impact of Finland's past as a colony on the outlook of Finns today.

Our third and final chapter in Part I gives a brief overview of the economy and the welfare system that Finland is so famous for.

Traditionally, mid-life is hard to define. When does it begin and end? In Finland currently, average life expectancy for men is 79 and for women 84, with both still increasing and the gap between them narrowing. Because of this we have decided here to define mid-life as being aged 21 to 61, the 40 years after the first 21 years of life and before what, for most people, is typically the last 21 years of their lives.

For most of us mid-life begins after the completion of studies and at the start of employment and possible career, after having left the family who brought you up, but before settling down with a family of your own. This stereotype has undergone various changes, but these key points still remain milestones in the average person's life in one way or another. A growing number of people have no children, but for the majority of Finns, mid-life ends when all your children have left home and you are on your own again. It draws to an end as the career or varied set of jobs you have been doing wind down. It ends as retirement approaches or starts and as your life begins to have more and more in common with everyone else in your age group. Equality is greatest in childhood and young adulthood, and again in old age – especially in Finland. Mid-life is a period of specialization and also the time when people tend to be most unequal.

In Finland children are born remarkably equal. As detailed above, a Finnish child's arrival is marked with a very comprehensive maternity package containing things that the baby and its parents actually need. In Finland the government, and the town or village you live in, ensures that your start in life is one of the most equitable on the planet. As explained in the previous chapter, all children in Finland have access to good schools. The influence of your parents’ income on your outcome in mid-life is minimal (when compared to their influence if you grow up anywhere else).

Finland is far away. Unless you are in Finland, in which case it is – very probably – home. Everywhere is a long way from most places. And everywhere is home to someone.

To the east of Finland lies Russia, endless Russia, Russia as far as the mind can imagine and as far as a car or a train can travel in a day, or two, or three (Figure 1.1). It feels as if it has always been Russia over there.

To the south is the rest of Europe, country after country, sea after sea, peoples and languages, so many languages all just needing to be learned and used in the places just waiting to be visited. And no more meaningful borders. Finland is in the European Union and the eurozone.

In this section there are three chapters that cover the human lifespan, discussing issues that most affect people in their youth, mid-life – which we define as ages 21 to 61 – and old age. We discuss childhood and education in the first chapter, general equality in the second, and health in the final chapter of this section.

We begin by demonstrating how Finland's very high levels of income equality for older people are related to high levels of social mobility for the young; and how schools in Finland further accelerate social mobility. Social mobility is easier when the gap between top and bottom is so much narrower than it is in other countries. We show that Finland is second only to Norway in how little money is spent on private schooling and look at how Finland manages to be a world leader in education without spending more overall than many other countries. We also show how Finland has the lowest variation in school outcomes of any OECD country – which partly explains why its educational results are so good. We end by discussing Finland's work opportunities for the young, youth unemployment and higher education.

In Chapter 5, on the middle years of life, we begin by discussing data that confirm that income inequality in Finland has been low for some time and show how this contributes to high levels of social mobility. Of all the countries in the world, only in Denmark does it matter less who your parents are for your prospects in later life. We show that in the workplace Finnish employees of all grades have much greater flexibility over the hours they work than in all of the 35 other OECD countries for which there is data. This is as true for Finns without formal qualifications as for those with university degrees – employees in Finland are the most trusted to determine their own hours of work. We then discuss the paradox of Finland having one of the lowest proportions of women working in jobs that require science, technology, engineering and mathematics qualifications – despite Finland ranking joint highest on the global index of gender equality, which includes how well girls and women do at school and university in general in Finland. We end the chapter by looking at the taxation that keeps inequality low.

Introduction

In 2019, Finnish politics made international headlines twice. The first time was when the Social Democratic Party won the most votes in the April 2019 general election (The Guardian 2019; Duxbury 2019) and the second was after the prime minister and the Minister for Local Government and Ownership Steering resigned over issues involving a postal strike and his successor, Sanna Marin, became the world's youngest serving prime minister on 10 December 2019 (see Chapter 3). Her appointment meant that the country was governed by a coalition of five female-led parties.

Finland was flatteringly profiled as a hotbed of progressive politics and policies by newspapers such as The Guardian and The New York Times, and by politicians including Hillary Clinton. The hosts for the podcast for the newspaper Helsingin Sanomat, “Uutisraportti”, ended their weekly broadcast on a gleeful note about the attention Finland was attracting in the wake of Marin's appointment. It was unbelievable and exciting, they exclaimed, that William Barr, the US's Donald Trump-appointed attorney general, had asked the visiting Finnish Justice Minister, Anna-Maija Henriksson, for her views on the new prime minister (Peltomaki 2019). Barr wasn't the only American to want to know more about Henriksson's homeland: when she visited a US prison, the inmates asked her about politics in Finland.

Politics is important to the story of Finland's success because effective social policy and the welfare state were the outcome of choices and policies made by government. Of course, Finland's politicians have not always made the right decisions: as we’ve discussed in Chapter 6, lawmakers are still grappling with the thorny issue of social and healthcare reform.

The secret word

There has been a recent boom in books about how, if you live the Nordic way, you too could live longer. Hundreds of little tips essentially all boil down to an instruction to be more Swedish, more Danish, more Finnish. Each country has its own special word that signifies the secret to success. In Swedish, according to Bertil Marklund, the word is lagom, meaning “just the right amount”. However, in each case we are told that there is no exact translation, and hence an entire book on “the word” is needed for the reader to glean the secrets it holds.

In Denmark the magic word is hygge, meaning an atmosphere of cosiness, closeness and comfortable conviviality, which in turn generates feelings of greater well-being and contentment (Norway has koselig, meaning nearly the same thing, with some subtle differences.) Candles, cushions and closing the door on unwanted intrusions feature heavily in hygge, and wrapping yourself in chunky hand-knitted blankets and indulging in pastries is how the concept was presented to the outside world (Country Life 2017). Inevitably, there is no exact English translation or short definition that quite summarizes the concept correctly.

It is not just the Nordic countries that have received this treatment. In Japan the equivalent concept is ikigai. According to The Times “Forget hygge. It's all about ikigai (that's Japanese for a happy life)” (Country Life 2017; Mogi 2017). Unsurprisingly, the Japanese term also defies translation and requires an entire book to explain it. What none of these books point out are the many similarities between these countries.