Even though the TTIP negotiations have run aground, the reasons that motivated them and those that caused their demise can be instructive. Although the TTIP negotiations had a number of features that made them distinctive, with care, valuable lessons can be drawn for future trade negotiations. These lessons are arguably particularly relevant for the United Kingdom as it negotiates its departure from the European Union and embarks on its own trade policy agenda. By way of conclusion, therefore, this chapter identifies those key lessons.

The chapter begins by specifying the reasons for caution in drawing lessons from the TTIP negotiations and setting out why doing so is still appropriate. It then rehearses the main conclusions from the preceding chapters on the motivations for, and the impediments to, reaching an agreement. It wraps up by applying these lessons to the UK’s incipient trade policy.

Causes for care when drawing lessons

As this book has made clear, the TTIP negotiations were unique for a variety of reasons. They sought to integrate the world’s two largest economies. As a consequence, they represented the first time that either the EU or the US had negotiated a bilateral trade agreement with a nearpeer. Both had been used to negotiating with smaller trade partners, with whom they could be more confi dent about dictating terms, or at least avoiding particularly painful concessions. The prospect of meaningful concessions and the promise of improved access to a very large market raised the stakes for both the EU and the US. The aspiration to agree rules that would become global benchmarks only heightened the salience of the negotiations. The TTIP negotiations, therefore, had far more riding on them than any other bilateral trade negotiations and many plurilateral talks.

A second distinctive feature of the TTIP negotiations was that they were motivated by the unusually high degree of interpenetration between the two economies. As discussed in Chapter 2, the transatlantic economic relationship is built on FDI as much as, or more than, on trade.

Aims of the lecture

• 1. To draw attention to the impact of “popular” writers who used political economy to further public debate on policy issues relating to free trade, protection and fiscal reform, rather than develop political economy as theory.

• 2. To emphasize that “free trade” and “protection” were not in the mid-nineteenth century alternative options that could be clearly identified with any one point on the political spectrum; hence many of the popular arguments about national and international economic development made in the nineteenth century resonate with today’s responses to globalization and neoliberalism.

• 3. To suggest that contemporary popular economics sometimes recycles ideas that were “popular” a very long time ago.

Bibliography

All of the authors dealt with in this lecture wrote for a new reading public; political journalism flourished in the nineteenth century, and it became possible to write popular works on political economy that would sell in significant numbers. These writers are, however, often viewed today as producers of derivative, non-canonical works, and there has been little serious engagement with their writing. Furthermore, this marginal status in the commentary has in turn encouraged low-grade modern commentary from those seeking to recruit these writers as precursors to this or that ideological project. Bastiat, in particular, is very popular today among American libertarians, as any search of the Internet will show; but none of the sources that can be found are especially interested in serious historical evaluation of Bastiat’s significance as a writer in the mid-nineteenth century. The use of Bastiat by libertarians tells us more about libertarians than about Bastiat, and here we are interested in Bastiat – and Carey, and List, and George.

The only account of Friedrich List that fully takes account of the importance of American political economy to his arguments is Keith Tribe, “Die Vernunft des List: National Economy and the Critique of Cosmopolitical Economy”, in Keith Tribe, Strategies of Economic Order: German Economic Discourse 1750–1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995/2007), chapter 3.

Henry Carey was a major figure and was much written about at the time. A survey of early American political economy can be found in Paul Conkin, Prophets of Prosperity: America’s First Political Economists (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980).

Aims of the lecture

• 1. To provide an outline biography of Adam Smith and the development of his work.

• 2. To show how biography helps us also understand the context for his writings.

• 3. To outline the reception of these writings, and the various approaches taken to them by modern commentary.

Bibliography

The standard edition of all Adam Smith’s writings and correspondence is the Glasgow edition published by Oxford University Press from 1976 onwards; this is also available in a cheap but well-produced paperback from Liberty Press. Unfortunately, no electronic version of this edition is currently available: this was taken down from the Library of Liberty site in February 2014 and replaced with a digitized version of the 1904 Cannan edition of Wealth of Nations, and there is no ebook version of the Glasgow edition. While Cannan’s edition has been superseded by the Glasgow edition, it does remain usable; since the Liberty Press paperback version is so cheap, however, there is no reason to refer to any of the many other editions of Wealth of Nations that are available. The Glasgow edition numbers paragraphs, and so the standard form of reference is not by page but generally as [Work] [Book].[Chapter].[Paragraph], e.g. WN IV.ix.3.

The Glasgow edition is in six volumes, each referred to below by initials as follows.

• I. The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759, based on the sixth edition of 1790) [TMS].

• II. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776, based on the third edition of 1784) [WN].

• III. Essays on Philosophical Subjects (1795) [EPS].

• IV. Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (first published 1963) [LRBL].

• V. Lectures on Jurisprudence (first part-published 1896) [LJ].

• VI. Correspondence of Adam Smith (1977) [Correspondence].

Adam Smith was a reluctant correspondent, and almost all his papers were destroyed on his instruction after his death; the principal source for most of what we know of his life and teaching is Dugald Stewart’s “Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith, L.L.D.” (EPS: 263–351). All subsequent biographies have built upon this in one way or another. The most accessible of these is Nicholas Phillipson’s Adam Smith: An Enlightened Life (London: Penguin, 2011).

Aims of the lecture

• 1. To demonstrate that the English political economy developed by Robert Malthus and David Ricardo in the early 1800s radically truncated the framework laid out by Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, reducing political economy to a set of abstract principles about value, price and distribution.

• 2. To show that the analytical framework constructed in the early 1800s was in part a response to the dual shocks of war and population increase in a predominantly agrarian economy.

• 3. To show that the more coherent this analytical framework became, the less useful it was as a means of accounting for developments in the contemporary economy; and that attention was increasingly directed to the former rather than the latter.

Bibliography

E. A. Wrigley, Poverty, Progress and Population (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), especially chapters 6 and 8, is the most useful starting point for our purposes here in understanding the economic transformation of Britain in the later-eighteenth/early-nineteenth century. Rather than focus on an “Industrial Revolution” that often involves an overestimation of the nature and rate of change from an agrarian to an industrial economy, Wrigley emphasizes developments in population, subsistence and energy use.

Much commentary on English political economy tends to overlook its discontinuity with previous arguments about land, labour and wealth, and sometimes imputes a consistency to it borrowed from twentieth-century economic methodology. The best introduction to English political economy remains therefore Edwin Cannan’s Theories of Production and Distribution in English Political Economy from 1776 to 1848 (London: P. S. King & Son, 1893). Cannan wrote in opposition to Alfred Marshall’s tendency to emphasize the continuity of his thinking with Ricardo; the result is a bracingly sceptical account of political economy, founded on Cannan’s wide reading of French and English economic literature from the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

John Pullen’s Oxford Dictionary of National Biography entry is the most reliable point from which to start with Malthus, while for his various writings, The Works of Thomas Robert Malthus, eight volumes, E. A. Wrigley and David Souden (eds) (London: Pickering, 1986) is the most convenient source.

Aims of the lecture

• 1. To explain how the way economists thought about macroeconomic problems changed in the decade after The General Theory.

• 2. To show that this question is not the same as assessing what was novel about The General Theory, or what Keynes believed he was doing, and that insofar as Keynes’s book had a big effect, this may have been due to other factors operating at the same time.

• 3. To point out the complexity of the phenomenon known as the Keynesian revolution.

Bibliography

D. Laidler’s Fabricating the Keynesian Revolution: Studies of the Interwar Literature on Money, the Cycle and Unemployment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) makes the argument that the Keynesian revolution gave economists a model (IS-LM) that summed up key points that had been developed in the preceding years. It is the best available, and most thorough, account of macroeconomic problems in the interwar period.

R. E. Backhouse and D. Laidler’s “What Was Lost with ISLM?” in The IS-LM Model: Its Rise, Fall, and Strange Persistence, M. De Vroey and K. D. Hoover (eds), Annual Supplement to History of Political Economy 36 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), argues that important ideas, mostly connected with the role of time, were lost with IS-LM, and hence as a result of the Keynesian revolution. As the volume’s title implies, it contains other papers on the history of the IS-LM model. W. Young’s Interpreting Mr. Keynes (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987) gives an account of the early history of the IS-LM model.

Different perspectives on the Keynesian revolution are given in the following references: R. E. Backhouse and B. W. Bateman (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Keynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), which includes chapters by R. E. Backhouse, “The Keynesian Revolution”, D. Laidler, “Keynes and the Birth of Modern Macroeconomics”, and B. W. Bateman, “Keynes and Keynesianism”; and D. Laidler’s “The Keynesian Revolution” and R. E. Backhouse and B. W. Bateman’s “Keynesianism”, both of which appear in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, second edition (London: Macmillan, 2008), available online at www.dictionaryofeconomics.com.

Aims of the lecture

• 1. To explain what happened to ideas about markets, the firm and welfare after Marshall.

• 2. To distinguish between British and American approaches to problems of markets and industrial structure, relating that discussion to the different histories of the two countries.

• 3. To provide the context for discussions of Lionel Robbins and the rise of mathematical economics that come in later lectures.

Bibliography

The following books are the key texts discussed in this lecture, in varying levels of detail. The first four deal with the theory of the firm, while the last three deal with welfare economics: F. H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1921); J. M. Clark, The Economics of Overhead Costs (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1923); E. H. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933); J. Robinson, Economics of Imperfect Competition (London: Macmillan, 1933); A. C. Pigou, Wealth and Welfare (London: Macmillan, 1912); A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, four editions (London: Macmillan, 1920–32); and J. A. Hobson, Work and Wealth (London: Macmillan, 1914).

M. Morgan’s “Competing Notions of ‘Competition’ in Late Nineteenth-Century American Economics”, History of Political Economy 25 (1993), 563–604, discusses the variety of approaches to competition found in late-nineteenth-century American economics, making clear the contrast with British approaches to the subject.

N. Aslanbeigui and G. Oakes’s Arthur Cecil Pigou (London: Macmillan, 2015) is an account of Pigou’s economics that goes into far greater depth on both his theory of economic policy and his position in the cost controversy than is possible here.

I. Kumekawa’s The First Serious Optimist: A. C. Pigou and the Birth of Welfare Economics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017) is a very new biography of Pigou (published too late to be taken into account in writing this lecture) that nicely complements the previous account of Pigou’s work.

E. H. Chamberlin’s “The Origin and Early Development of Monopolistic Competition Theory”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 75 (1961), 515–43, is a retrospective account of the origins of Chamberlin’s own theory, making clear the differences between himself on the one hand, and Robinson and participants in the British cost controversy on the other.

Aims of the lecture

In 1932 Lionel Robbins provided what has become the most commonly cited definition of economics. The aims of this lecture are as follows.

• 1. To explain the arguments Robbins made in the book in which he provided this definition;

• 2. To trace the way in which that definition of economics became the standard definition of the subject and the controversies that it elicited on the way.

• 3. To explore some of the possible consequences of the definition for the problems economists have chosen to tackle and the way that they have chosen to tackle them.

Because Robbins’s definition has connections with several other topics (e.g. welfare economics, microeconomics and mathematical economics), this lecture inevitably refers to material covered later in the course.

Bibliography

L. C. Robbins’s An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science (London: Macmillan, 1932), available as a free download from https://mises.org/library/essay-nature-and-significance-economic-science (accessed 26 October 2017), provides his now-famous definition of economics, and his explanation of the conclusions he drew from it concerning how economics should be practised. A second edition was published in 1935; though this was revised significantly, the main arguments, including the ones discussed in this lecture, did not change, and either edition could be used.

S. Howson’s Lionel Robbins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) provides a definitive account of the author, although very little of this book is on the Essay. Howson’s “The Origins of Lionel Robbins’s Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science”, History of Political Economy 36:4 (2004), 413–43, however, gives an account of how Robbins came to write the book.

R. E. Backhouse and S. G. Medema’s “Defining Economics: The Long Road to Acceptance of Robbins’s Definition”, Economica 76 (2009), 805–20, analyses reactions to Robbins’s definition of economics and establishes that there were always economists who did not accept it. Backhouse and Medema’s “On the Definition of Economics”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 23:1 (2009), 221–33, is a shorter account, placing the Robbins definition in the context of other definitions.

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations aspired to integrate the world’s two largest economies – the United States and the European Union (EU) – and bridge the world’s most valuable and complex economic relationship. Their emphasis on mitigating the adverse trade effects of domestic policies made them also substantively the most ambitious trade negotiations the world has yet seen.

When the negotiations were launched in June 2013, expectations were high for the swift conclusion of an ambitious agreement. United States Trade Representative (USTR) Michael Froman famously declared that he expected the negotiation to be concluded on “one tank of gas”. European officials suggested that a deal by the end of 2014 was doable.

The case for the agreement was strong. Officials on both sides of the Atlantic promoted it as a means of spurring on economic recovery in the wake of the global financial crisis; of responding to the rise of China, both by setting standards that would de facto become global standards and by boosting the competitiveness of US and European firms; and, subsequently, of bolstering the transatlantic alliance in the face of Russian aggression in Ukraine (De Gucht 2015: xvii; Froman 2014: 114–15). Despite these motivations, the negotiations dragged, and no end was in sight even before the twin blows of the UK’s vote to leave the EU and Donald Trump’s election as president of the United States. As I argue in Chapter 7, these events spelled the end of TTIP, at least in its current form. This short book explains why optimism was initially so high, and why it turned out to be misplaced. It also highlights the implications for future trade negotiations.

The initial optimism about the prospects of TTIP reflected the broad support for the agreement among transnational business interests and high-level political support, particularly in Europe. Not only did firms on both sides of the Atlantic favour an agreement, in many cases they agreed on the terms they wanted to see. There was thus an unprecedented degree of cooperation among business interests behind the agreement. In addition, labour unions were not particularly opposed to the deal.

The TTIP negotiations have provoked unprecedented engagement by civic interest groups in trade policy and unique levels of popular opposition, particularly in Europe. The vigour and breadth of this opposition caught political leaders by surprise. Their lack of preparation for such a coordinated and vocal response could hardly be considered a failing, given that previous preferential trade agreements had attracted little, if any, public attention.

The political significance of the popular opposition in Europe was amplified by the likelihood that any agreement would have to be ratified by each EU member state and, depending on the governance structure of the states, even some subnational parliaments, in addition to the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament (see Chapter 6). The European Commission countered the popular opposition by increasing transparency, enhancing consultation and modifying its negotiating position, particularly with respect to ISDS. Opposition to TTIP spilled over to threaten the EU’s agreement with Canada (CETA). In addition, the EU’s new position on ISDS in TTIP has become the template for its trade agreements with other countries, including those with Canada and Vietnam. Popular opposition to TTIP, therefore, has had far-reaching consequences.

Although public opposition to TTIP was unusually intense, it was far from uniform. Only a few EU member states witnessed intense public opposition. TTIP was also almost entirely absent from public debate in the US. Interestingly, there has been almost no opposition in Europe to the EU–Japan FTA, which has been negotiated in parallel to TTIP and and for which a political agreement was reached in July 2017. The contrast between the opposition to TTIP and that to prior and contemporary negotiations prompts the question: what was so special about TTIP?

Here I make a three-step argument: First, as developed in Chapter 3, TTIP was uniquely ambitious in its efforts to address behind-theborder measures that affect trade. These measures have more direct implications for citizens than do tariffs. Moreover, because the US and EU are near peers, neither could dictate terms to the other. This raised the prospect that each might have to modify its rules.

Aims of the lecture

• 1. To show how Marx used the political economy of the early nineteenth century to construct a critical history of the capitalist mode of production.

• 2. To make clear that Capital was not only an unfinished work, it was a work that Marx either could not finish, or no longer wished to finish.

• 3. To present Marx’s political economy in its contemporary context, and so excluding subsequent interpretations of his writings.

Bibliography

Marx worked by drafting and redrafting, so besides the published work there is a much larger mass of unpublished and disorderly material that has survived and been transferred into print by the editors of the current complete works, the Marx–Engels Gesamtausgabe, a project that began in the German Democratic Republic in the 1970s and is still ongoing in the Federal Republic. The volumes of the new Gesamtausgabe were very expensive when it started, and so very few libraries outside the Soviet bloc subscribed to it. However, the collapse of the GDR and unification flooded the second-hand market with surplus collections, and individual volumes published before 1990 are now therefore available quite cheaply. This edition replaced the earlier Dietz Verlag version, which was always cheap, but marred by editorial prejudice and dogmatism. The English 50-volume Collected Works is for the most part based on the Dietz edition.

There is of course a diverse mass of commentary on Marx, mostly dated and unreliable. The ongoing work of the Gesamtausgabe has breathed new life into old controversies; much of the newer specialist writing fails to engage with current standards in intellectual history. One major exception here is Peter Ghosh, “Constructing Marx in the History of Ideas”, Global Intellectual History (forthcoming), which provides a masterly overview of Marx’s intellectual career and that of his writings. The standard biography is now Gareth Stedman Jones, Karl Marx: Greatness and Illusion (London: Allen Lane, 2016). There is also a vast literature of “Marxist economics” going back to the later nineteenth century. However, most of the issues discussed at great length in such writing are constructions upon Marx’s writings by individuals seeking to develop Marx’s “insights”.

The United States and the European Union are the world’s two largest economies. Each is the other’s most important trading partner and most important investment partner. Particularly owing to the extent of cross-FDI, the EU and US economies are highly interpenetrated. As a result, the Office of the USTR (USTR 2016: 139) characterizes their relationship as “the largest and most complex economic relationship in the world”.

The transatlantic economy is subject to the rules of the WTO, of which the EU and the US were the principal architects. The transatlantic partners have also engaged in the world’s most ambitious eff orts to mitigate the adverse trade eff ects of regulatory differences. These efforts, however, have left considerable impediments to trade across the Atlantic. Thus, the transatlantic economy is not integrated. The TTIP negotiations were intended to achieve that objective.

This chapter introduces the features of the transatlantic economic relationship that underpinned the substantive focus of the negotiations. These features also help to explain why transatlantic business cooperation was so prevalent, why traditional opposition to TTIP was largely absent, and why new actors have emerged as the principal obstacles to an agreement. The chapter also sets out the multilateral and bilateral arrangements that frame the transatlantic economic relationship. It thus describes the background to, and the point of departure for, the TTIP negotiations.

Economic importance and interpenetration

The transatlantic economy is the most valuable in the world (Hamilton & Quinlen 2016: 10; also see Table 2.1). The US is the EU’s most important export market and second most important source of imports. The EU is the US’s second most important export market and source of imports. Taking imports and exports together, each is the other’s most important trading partner (Commission 2016b: 8–9).

What really distinguishes the transatlantic economy, however, is the depth of the investment relationship. US companies’ investments in the EU accounted for about 40 per cent of their global stock of FDI in 2014.

Aims of the lecture

• 1. To show how the objective theory of value and price espoused by Malthus and Ricardo in the 1810s and 1820s transformed into a subjective theory of value by the 1870s.

• 2. To show that this shift was mediated first by James Mill’s Elements of Political Economy (1821) and then by John Stuart Mill’s Principles of Political Economy (1848).

• 3. To demonstrate that far from Millian political economy being continuous with that of Ricardo, the work of Say and Bentham was influential in detaching Mill from this “classical” framework, and that this detachment laid the foundations for the work of Stanley Jevons, Francis Edgeworth, Alfred Marshall and Philip Wicksteed, which is discussed in lectures 10 and 12.

Bibliography

Donald Winch has collected together James Mill’s principal writings as James Mill: Selected Economic Writings (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1966), although this edition is marked by the then-current idea that Mill is a “popular” version of Ricardo, whereas a close reading of Mill reveals that his version of Ricardo is in many regards a more workable version of contemporary political economy.

John Stuart Mill’s writings are available as The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, 33 volumes, J. M. Robson (ed.) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963–91); the Liberty Fund have paperbacked some titles, and all of the Toronto edition is available to download from the Library of Liberty website (http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/mill-collected-works-of-john-stuart-mill-in-33-vols (accessed 26 October 2017)).

William Thomas’s The Philosophic Radicals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) provides the essential context to the work of the young John Stuart Mill.

Joseph Persky’s The Political Economy of Progress: John Stuart Mill and Modern Radicalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016) is a reliable re-evaluation of Mill’s arguments about social and economic progress.

For an overview of discussion of political economy in nineteenth-century periodicals see Frank W. Fetter, “Economic Controversy in the British Reviews, 1802–1850”, Economica 32 (1965), 424–37.

Aims of the lecture

• 1. To broaden the perspective on the development of political economy in Continental Europe and North America during the first half of the nineteenth century.

• 2. To emphasize the role of the work of Jean-Baptiste Say in these developments.

• 3. To point up the leading role played by French political economy in the international development of political economy in the first half of the nineteenth century.

Bibliography

Schumpeter’s History of Economic Analysis is the only general text that covers early nineteenth-century Continental European political economy in any detail, although it is notable today for the scope of its coverage rather than the merits of its discussion. A preliminary overview of French and German sources can be found in Keith Tribe, “Continental Political Economy from the Physiocrats to the Marginal Revolution”, in Theodore M. Porter and Dorothy Ross (eds), Cambridge History of Science, volume 7 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 154–70. Gilbert Faccarello (ed.), Studies in the History of French Political Economy: From Bodin to Walras (London: Routledge, 1998) is the most accessible modern English-language survey of French political economy; while chapters 8 and 9 of Keith Tribe, Governing Economy: The Reformation of German Economic Discourse 1750–1830, second edition (Newbury: Threshold Press, 2017), deal in detail with the early development of Nationalökonomie and the influence of Karl Heinrich Rau through to the later nineteenth century. For the United States, the best general survey remains Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilization, five volumes (New York: Viking, 1946; new edition 1959).

Central to the story in this and the following lecture are the writings of Jean-Baptiste Say. For his biography see Evert Schoorl, Jean-Baptiste Say: Revolutionary, Entrepreneur, Economist (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013). The political background to his thinking is outlined in Richard Whatmore, Republicanism and the French Revolution: An Intellectual History of Jean-Baptiste Say’s Political Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), while Philippe Steiner, “The Structure of Say’s Economic Writings”, European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 5 (1998), 227–49, gives an overview of his political economy.

Aims of the lecture

• 1. To explain the origins of modern mathematical economics, including game theory, modern general equilibrium theory and linear modelling.

• 2. To show the importance of institutions (notably the Cowles Commission) and events (the Second World War and military funding) for the development of mathematical economics.

• 3. To show the interaction between different communities: mathematicians and economists.

• 4. To show the human dimension to developments in a highly abstract field of economics.

For many students, the mere mention of mathematics is off-putting. It is important to emphasize that this is not a mathematical economics lecture and that knowing a lot of mathematics is not necessary to understand what the lecture is about. Though it is helpful to know what game theory and general equilibrium are, and to know what a linear equation is, the lecture is not about a series of mathematical theories but about the history that lies behind mathematical economics. Politics and human personalities are central to the story. The lecture should therefore be of as much interest to students who are sceptical about mathematical economics as to those who are committed to it.

Though the bibliography gives full details of the primary sources, this is not a lecture for which you are expected to focus on original texts. While you are encouraged to look inside some of the main works to see what they look like, you are not expected to read through them; many of you would struggle to understand the technical details. But even without studying the texts, you can understand what their authors were trying to achieve, and the context and significance of what they were doing. The secondary literature cited here has been chosen with this in mind: it contains much that you should find interesting even if you do not understand the mathematical details of the works it is discussing.

Bibliography

Overviews of the topic are given by G. Debreu and E. R. Weintraub in their articles “Mathematical Economics” and “Mathematics and Economics”, respectively, both of which appear in New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, second edition (London: Macmillan, 2008), available online at www.dictionaryofeconomics.com.

Pascal Lamy, former European Trade Commissioner and former director general of the World Trade Organization, described TTIP as “the first show of the new world of trade” (2015: 8), in which negotiations are focused primarily on addressing the adverse trade eff ects of regulatory differences rather than removing tariffs. This emphasis set TTIP apart from all other trade negotiations.

This chapter presents the substance of the TTIP negotiations and contextualizes it. It provides an overview of the main issues in the negotiations, as more detailed accounts can be found elsewhere (see, for instance, Hamilton & Pelkmans 2015b). There were four main components to the negotiations: (1) market access; (2) regulatory cooperation; (3) the setting of global “rules”; and (4) arrangements to govern the relationship. The boundaries between these categories are sometimes blurred. These different components to the negotiations were characterized by different negotiating dynamics, had different implications for diff erent actors and engendered different patterns of political mobilization and engagement, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters. There was also a set of issues that were excluded from the negotiations, including audio-visual services, financial market regulation and data protection. Despite these exclusions, TTIP was notable for the ambition of its breadth of coverage, as well as the potential depth of its disciplines (see Figure 3.1).

Market access: I’ll let you sell into my market, if you’ll let me sell into yours

Securing improved access to a trade partner’s market, particularly for goods, has been the traditional focus of trade negotiations since the end of the Second World War. Until recently, the principal barriers to market access have been tariff s (taxes on imports) and quantitative restrictions or quotas (numerical limits on importation of particular goods). Market access negotiations are conducted on the basis of reciprocal concessions: one party offers to liberalize access to its market in some areas in exchange for its partner liberalizing access to its market in others.

In this context, relative market size is the key source of bargaining power.

Aims of the lecture

• 1. To show how the relationship of economic ideas to economic policy-making has worked out in practice over the twentieth century.

• 2. To show the complexity of the relationship between ideas and policy.

• 3. To place the Keynesian revolution in economic policy in a broader context.

Bibliography

This topic clearly overlaps with lecture 19, on the Keynesian revolution. Material such as that in Hall’s The Political Power of Economic Ideas and Stein’s The Fiscal Revolution in America (details provided in lecture 19) is clearly relevant, as is some material on Keynes in lecture 17. The reading given here steps back from Keynesianism and addresses the problem of policy-making more generally.

M. A. Bernstein’s A Perilous Progress: Economists and Public Purpose in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001) focuses on the American Economic Association and tells the story of economists’ search for influence on the policy process during the twentieth century, picking out the two world wars as the key events.

W. J. Barber’s From New Era to New Deal: Herbert Hoover, the Economists, and American Economic Policy, 1921–1933 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), which focuses on Herbert Hoover, covers policy-making in the 1920s, showing how the government’s conception of how to manage policy unravelled in 1929. Barber claims that Hoover had a better understanding of the problems that were emerging than did many economists but that his attachment to certain doctrines held him back from effective action. Barber’s Designs within Disorder: Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Economists, and the Shaping of American Economic Policy, 1933–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) gives an account of the many approaches to the problem of the Great Depression and how Roosevelt chose between them.

The generation of statistics, discussed in lecture 18, is highly relevant to the problem of economics and policy. See the references by Duncan and Shelton, Tooze, Stapleford and Vanoli in that lecture.

For international comparative studies of economics in different countries, covering policy-making and academic economics in varying proportions, see the series of volumes edited by A. W. Coats: Economists in Government (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1981); The Internationalisation of Economics since 1945, supplement to History of Political Economy, volume 28 (Durham, NC; Duke University Press, 1997); and The Development of Economics in Western Europe (London: Routledge, 2000).