Justice can be approached from many angles in ethical and political debates, including those involving healthcare, biomedical research, and well-being. The main doctrines of justice are liberal egalitarianism, libertarianism, luck egalitarianism, socialism, utilitarianism, capability approach, communitarianism, and care ethics. These can be further elaborated in the light of traditional moral and social theories, values, ideals, and interests, and there are distinct dimensions of justice that are captured better by some tactics than by others. In this article, questions surrounding these matters are approached with the hermeneutic idea of a distinction between “American” and “European” ways of thinking.

This article looks at what anarchism has to offer in debates concerning health and healthcare. I present the case that anarchism’s interest in supporting the poor, sick, and marginalized, and rejection of state and corporate power, places it in a good position to offer creative ways to address health problems. I maintain that anarchistic values of autonomy, responsibility, solidarity, and community are central to this endeavor. Rather than presenting a case that follows one particular anarchist theory, my main goal is to raise issues and initiate debate in this underresearched field in mainstream bioethics.

This article provides a critique of the monolithic accounts that define justice in terms of a single and often inappropriate goal. By providing an array of real examples, I argue that there is no simple definition of justice, because allocations that express justice are governed by a variety of reasons that reasonable people endorse for their saliency. In making difficult choices about ranking priorities, different considerations have different importance in different kinds of situations. In this sense, justice is a conclusion about whether an allocation reflects the human interests and priorities that are at stake. The article describes how several principles of justice have a legitimate place in medical allocations. To achieve justice within medical practice, professionals should focus on the human interests and compelling reasons for prioritizing specific principles within their specific medical domain.

Appeals to social justice that argue medicine and healthcare should have certain priorities and not others are common. It is an obvious question to ask: What does social justice demand of the new genetic technologies? However, it is important to note that there are many theories and sub-theories of justice. There are utilitarian theories, libertarian theories, and egalitarian theories. There are so-called luck egalitarians, equality-as-fairness thinkers, and capability theorists, with each having his or her own distinctive approach to the distribution of medical goods and technologies, and to healthcare priorities. This article argues that the discussion surrounding this question is potentially hampered by an implicit assumption that if one theory of justice is applicable in one context, then it must also be applicable in others. Instead, it is proposed that one adopt the stance, influenced by Michael Waltzer, that different theories with their opposing principles may be applicable to different questions regarding justice and genetics. The specific view advanced is that to answer questions about what justice requires regarding the therapeutic and enhancement use of genetic techniques, a method of reflective equilibrium can show how intuitions, in context, may support different theories of justice. When particular pre-theoretic ethical judgments are balanced against the theories that might explain or justify them, and are in accord with what seems emotionally acceptable, then it can be seen how different general theories may be applicable in the different contexts in which questions of justice and genetics arise.

Why is it that humanitarianism and theories of global justice seem to have relatively little engagement with each other? This article discusses some of the reasons for this being the case, and argues that instead of seeing these two fields as separate or adversarial they should be viewed as complementary. The article begins with a brief overview of humanitarianism, in order to argue for the relevance of justice in humanitarianism. The second section focuses on analyzing selected theories of justice— those of Peter Singer, John Kekes, and Thomas Pogge—through a particular lens, that of the question of responsibility for global well-being. The article concludes by arguing that theories of global justice can be beneficial for humanitarian causes, not in a comprehensive and consistent “all-or-nothing” manner, but rather on a case-by-case basis and through selective application of particular arguments.

Meeting healthcare needs is a matter of social justice. Healthcare needs are virtually limitless; however, resources, such as money, for meeting those needs, are limited. How then should we (just and caring citizens and policymakers in such a society) decide which needs must be met as a matter of justice with those limited resources? One reasonable response would be that we should use cost effectiveness as our primary criterion for making those choices. This article argues instead that cost-effectiveness considerations must be constrained by considerations of healthcare justice. The goal of this article will be to provide a preliminary account of how we might distinguish just from unjust or insufficiently just applications of cost-effectiveness analysis to some healthcare rationing problems; specifically, problems related to extraordinarily expensive targeted cancer therapies. Unconstrained compassionate appeals for resources for the medically least well-off cancer patients will be neither just nor cost effective.

Given that a properly formed utilitarian response to healthcare distribution issues should evaluate cost effectiveness against the total utility increase, it follows that any utilitarian cost-effectiveness metric should be sensitive to increases in both individual and social utility afforded by a given intervention. Quality adjusted life year (QALY) based decisionmaking in healthcare cannot track increases in social utility, and as a result, the QALY cannot be considered a strict utilitarian response to issues of healthcare distribution. This article considers arguments against, and a possible defence of, the QALY as a utilitarian concept; in response, the article offers a similar — but properly formed — utilitarian metric called the (IALY). This article also advances a tool called the ‘glee factor’ (GF) on which the IALY may lean in a similar way to which the QALY leans on the Rosser Index.

The lack of sleep is a significant problem in the modern world. The structure of the economy means that 24 hour working is required from some of us, sometimes because we are expected to be able to respond to share-price fluctuations on the other side of the planet, sometimes because we are expected to serve kebabs to people leaving nightclubs, and sometimes because lives depend on it. The immediate effect is that we feel groggy; but there may be much more sinister long-term effects of persistent sleep deprivation and disruption, the evidence for which is significant, and worth taking seriously. If sleeplessness has a serious impact on health, it represents a notable public health problem. In this article, I sketch that problem, and look at how exploiting the pharmacopoeia (or a possible future pharmacopoeia) might allow us to tackle it. I also suggest that using drugs to mitigate or militate against sleeplessness is potentially morally and politically fraught, with implications for social justice. Hence, whatever reasons we have to use drugs to deal with the problems of sleeplessness, we ought to be careful.

Modern work life is characterized by constant change, reorganizations, and requirements of efficiency, which make the distribution of resources and obligations, as well as justice in decisionmaking, highly important. In the work life context, it is a question not only of distributing resources and obligations, but also of the procedures and rules that guide the decisionmaking in the organization. Studies of these rules and procedures have provided the basis for a new line of research that evaluates leadership and social relationships in working communities; that is, distributive, procedural, and relational justice. This review follows the development of research on organizational justice from its origins in early social and motivational psychological theories to its establishment as a major line of research in modern work and organizational psychology. The adverse consequences of injustice include poor team climate, reduced productivity and well-being, and work-related illnesses.

A new generation of implantable brain–computer interfaces (BCI) devices have been tested for the first time in a human clinical trial, with significant success. These intelligent implants detect specific neuronal activity patterns, such as an epileptic seizure, and provide information to help patients to respond to the upcoming neuronal events. By forecasting a seizure, the technology keeps patients in the decisional loop; the device gives control to patients on how to respond and decide on a therapeutic course ahead of time. Being kept in the decisional loop can positively increase patients’ quality of life; however, doing so does not come free of ethical concerns. There is currently a lack of evidence concerning the various impacts of closed-loop system BCIs on patients’ decisionmaking processes, especially how being in the decisional loop impacts patients’ sense of autonomy. This article addresses these gaps by providing data that we obtained from a first-in-human clinical trial involving patients implanted with advisory brain devices. This article explores ethical issues related to the risks involved in being kept in the decisional loop.

The aim of this section is to expand and accelerate advances in curriculum developments and in methods of teaching bioethics.

This section focuses on the ethical, legal, social, and policy questions arising from research involving human and animal subjects.