Legal theorists have long debated whether law originates from a single source (the actions of state officials) or from multiple sources (including the innumerable communities and associations that constitute broader civil society). In recent years, proponents have defended polycentrism—and its critics have tried to refute it—from various moral, economic, and historical angles. But no contemporary writer has examined polycentrism from a Christian perspective. In the absence of such a study heretofore, this article attempts to evaluate legal polycentrism from a Christian theological and jurisprudential perspective. The Christian scriptures and Christian theology do not directly address whether law is polycentric or monocentric. Nevertheless, appealing to a number of biblical-theological issues—including the image of God, the Noahic covenant (Genesis 8:21–9:17), wisdom, and the purpose of civil government—I argue that Christians have good reason to regard polycentrism as a more satisfactory view of law.

Tibet is distinct within the Buddhist regions of Asia for its claims to have developed religious laws. The rulers of its early empire civilized their people by creating laws on the basis of Buddhist principles—or so it is claimed by the writers of Tibetan historical narratives. In fact, the earliest Tibetan laws were not linked in any significant way with Buddhist principles, even after the religion had been firmly established in the region. In this article I explore why and how the idea of Buddhist law first emerged, examining its development through a number of texts from the empire (sixth to ninth centuries) and the immediate postimperial period (tenth to twelfth centuries). It turns out that more ideological accounts of Buddhist law were developed only as the structures of the empire were collapsing. Nevertheless, they do seem to have resonated with at least one, tenth-century ruler. These narratives set the scene for a long series of historical accounts in which the idea that Tibetan law was based on Buddhist principles took hold—an idea that was maintained well into the twentieth century.

The practice of obeah, a term used to refer to a variety of African derived spiritual practices, remains proscribed in at least fourteen countries or territories in the Anglophone Caribbean today. This article examines the historical development of these laws and the significance of the continued prohibition of obeah. Although obeah laws were initially modeled on British statutes banning vagrancy and witchcraft, and were passed during a period when it was common for nations in the Western Hemisphere to prohibit the practice of African diaspora faiths, these statutes stand in stark contrast to the religious freedoms guaranteed in other parts of the Atlantic world in the twenty-first century. Obeah laws proscribe the mere performance of certain spiritual rituals, while other countries modified their policies in the mid-twentieth century to require evidence of intentional fraud and financial gain to convict occult practitioners. This article links the continued proscription of obeah to nineteenth century assertions that African peoples were animists and fetishists, as well as to long-standing hierarchies in the Western world placing theistic religions above those centered on spirit conjuring, divination, and the manipulation of supernatural forces.

This article looks at the ways in which the legal system of a modern European jurisdiction has engaged with a counter-cultural minority religious movement. The jurisdiction in question is England and Wales, and the religious movement is revived modern Paganism. The article seeks to cast light on the question of what a post-Christian secular state does in practice when its commitment to pluralistic values encounters a group whose self-understanding challenges the norms of both Christianity and secularity. In more general terms, it allows us to look at how the law of England and Wales has attempted to move beyond its historic confessional Protestant premises; and how this attempt has not been without its anomalies and shortcomings.

Using examples of ritual slaughter recognized by different religions in Africa, this paper examines the regulated and unregulated exercise of the right to ritual slaughter as a manifestation of the right to freedom of religion in three constitutional traditions in Africa.

This article commences with an evaluation of the existence of the right to ritual slaughter either as a freestanding right or a derivative right from the right to freedom of religion in the bills of rights of African constitutions. The article argues that the ritual slaughter at this stage of constitutional development in Africa is at best a derivative right partly anchored on the communal dimensions of the right to freedom of religion. The article closely examines the bearers and content of the right to ritual slaughter through a brief overview of the practices of ritual slaughter recognized by African traditional religion and Islam. In addition, the syncretic nature of religious practice in Africa identified as the multiple or concurrent witness to different faiths is also considered to provide a realistic account of ritual slaughter in Africa.

Since the right to ritual slaughter is identified as a derivative right from the right to freedom of religion, the article examines different constitutional traditions in Africa to determine how religion is conceived in constitutional governance that in turn affects the feasibility of the right to ritual slaughter within constitutional designs and capacity of other public interests such as animal welfare to limit the exercise of the right to ritual slaughter.

Three constitutional designs of the role of religion in constitutional governance are identified in this regard. The article concludes on a number of points, including the recognition of the importance of the articulation of the human rights that underpin animal welfare concerns and the fact that a regulated right to ritual slaughter appears feasible in a number of African countries.