The texts discussed below treat the problem of the relationship between economic and social development and the development of science and technology. The review is not proposed as exhaustive, but concentrates on the manufacturing sector; and it does not deal with specific literature concerning such important topics as agriculture, energy, transportation, and the relationship between science and technology policy and education (however, the first of these is treated in a complementary study [Albuquerque and Nascimento 1978]). Also, the description of science and technology policy measures and of the institutional apparatus that implements them is reduced to a minimum, although bibliographic sources in which more detailed descriptions can be found are indicated. Given these constraints, an attempt has been made to take into account the complexity of the topic and the variety of research that it has inspired. In this sense, contributions from noneconomists, notably sociologists and political scientists, are incorporated; we refrain, however, from any evaluation of the theoretical framework that guides such contributions.

During the National Conference on Education, Science, and Technology, held in June 1976 as part of the political campaign just prior to the change of administrations, the spokesman for the Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACYT) stated, in the presence of the incoming president of Mexico, that:

It is presently impossible to doubt the need for a policy on science and technology in Mexico. Such a policy should not base the country's scientific and technological development upon the never-ceasing imitation of the research lines and technological solutions of the advanced countries. It is necessary for us to look for our own model of scientific and technological development.

This study concerns the structure of power in Brazil during the early seventies, when economic growth, and political repression, were at their height. The objective is not to discover the power structure, as if there were serious doubt about its existence or even much mystery about its composition. For all the curiosity value of first-hand information about elites in a virtually closed political setting, there is a danger of confirming what is already known about the workings of authoritarian rule. The point of departure here is that “what everybody knows” about the Brazilian power structure is not so much wrong as it is limited and in some ways misleading. In order to understand this, it is first necessary to outline the common ground among scholars regarding interelite relations in Brazil and then to suggest how this view might be modified.

The Soviet Union has established what has become the largest, and probably the most prolific, research center devoted exclusively to Latin America. Soviet progress has been especially dramatic because the USSR was so weak in this field in 1961, when the Institute of Latin America was established in Moscow. The Institute now has one hundred full-time researchers and supports the activities of many other Latin Americanists there and in other Soviet cities. It also has maintained ties with new Latin Americanist groups in Eastern Europe, particularly in East Germany and Poland.

Traditionally, Western scholars have spoken about “the” Soviet view of this or that question—even about “the” Soviet ideology with respect to it—and hence they have considered it legitimate to draw quotations from a wide range of persons and types of sources in order to assemble a composite summary of that view. Even if it has been recognized that there must be private differences of opinion among Soviet officials and specialists, it has usually been assumed that the censorship prevents any from being expressed in public. This assumption is simply incorrect. In the words of Brezhnev, “a party and state leader. cannot consider himself the sole and indisputable authority in all areas of human activity. ” While jealously guarding their own right of ultimate decision, Soviet leaders now talk about problems being solvable only by “collective reason,” and insist that “it is necessary to listen to specialists and scholars, and, moreover, not only of one orientation or school.”

Unlike other Latin American countries, the particular mode of dependent capitalist development that has occurred in Argentina has led to the emergence of a relatively large industrial bourgeoisie. Indeed, industrialists in Argentina have constituted an extremely important pressure group, in a society where the state has not been able to control the development and activities of societal organizations. Entrepreneurial organizations both of a general type, such as chambers of commerce and industry, and of a more specialized nature, such as trade associations, began to arise autonomously by the turn of the century. The events of the Perón years were particularly important in giving impetus to entrepreneurial organization. By the early 1950s, with the passage of the Law of Professional Associations of Employers, which granted them special legitimacy and importance, such entrepreneurial organizations became the most important means by which entrepreneurs attempted to influence government policy.

Since 1973, Venezuela has had extraordinary oil revenues. These go to the government and from the government to its employees and contractors. The monies have filtered into the Venezuelan economy, where large profits have been made in selling imported goods, construction, banking, and light industry. There are opportunities for investment in Venezuela, but the affluent Venezuelan is already a participant in a multitude of businesses; thus, when Florida real estate brokers sold properties in Caracas, Venezuelans, who had been looking for places to invest monies, were obvious customers. Indeed, so great had been the number of purchases of Miami condominiums that the Venezuelan government, in November 1977, put restrictions on sellers in Venezuela of foreign land and real estate, but not on the buyers. Monies have continued to flow out of Venezuela, which (at the time of this writing) has no restrictions on the capital exporter.