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Are stereotypes accurate? A perspective from the cognitive science of concepts
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 March 2017
Abstract
In his 2012 book, Jussim suggests that people's beliefs about various groups (i.e., their stereotypes) are largely accurate. We unpack this claim using the distinction between generic and statistical beliefs – a distinction supported by extensive evidence in cognitive psychology, linguistics, and philosophy. Regardless of whether one understands stereotypes as generic or statistical beliefs about groups, skepticism remains about the rationality of social judgments.
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Précis of Social Perception and Social Reality: Why accuracy dominates bias and self-fulfilling prophecy
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Author response
Accuracy, bias, self-fulfilling prophecies, and scientific self-correction