Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-vdxz6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T20:16:38.408Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Axioms and postulates: Finding the right match through logical inference

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2022

Niccolò Negro Open the ORCID record for Niccolò Negro [Opens in a new window]
Niccolò Negro*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Monash University, Clayton, VIC3800, Australia. [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Merker et al. argue that integrated information theory (IIT) is not a theory of consciousness because the IIT formalism does not match phenomenology. I argue that the authors ultimately fail to articulate the problem of the inference of the postulates from the axioms. I suggest a different version of this problem, and argue that this can help rethink IIT's potential for consciousness science.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e56
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Bayne, T. (2018). On the axiomatic foundations of the integrated information theory of consciousness. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2018(1), niy007. doi:10.1093/nc/niy007CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Block, N. (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18(2), 227–247.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Block, N. (2007). Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30(5-6), 481–499. doi:10.1017/S0140525X07002786CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Hanson, J. R., & Walker, S. I. (2021). On the Non-uniqueness Problem in Integrated Information Theory. bioRxiv, 2021.2004.2007.438793. doi:10.1101/2021.04.07.438793CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haun, A., & Tononi, G. (2019). Why does space feel the way it does? Towards a principled account of spatial experience. Entropy, 21(12), 1160.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Koch, C. (2019). The feeling of life itself: why consciousness is widespread but can't be computed. MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Overgaard, M., & Fazekas, P. (2016). Can no-report paradigms extract true correlates of consciousness? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 20(4), 241–242. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2016.01.004CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Tsuchiya, N., Wilke, M., Frässle, S., & Lamme, V. A. F. (2015). No-report paradigms: extracting the true neural correlates of consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 19(12), 757–770. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.10.002CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed