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Lab support for strong reciprocity is weak: Punishing for reputation rather than cooperation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2012

Alex Shaw  and
Laurie Santos
Alex Shaw
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511. [email protected]@yale.eduhttps://sites.google.com/site/alexshawyale/
Laurie Santos
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511. [email protected]@yale.eduhttps://sites.google.com/site/alexshawyale/
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Abstract

Strong reciprocity is not the only account that can explain costly punishment in the lab; it can also be explained by reputation-based accounts. We discuss these two accounts and suggest what kinds of evidence would support the two different alternatives. We conclude that the current evidence favors a reputation-based account of costly punishment.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 35 , Issue 1 , February 2012 , pp. 39
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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