Along with the exploding attention to globalization, issues of global justice have become central elements in political philosophy. After decades in which debates were dominated by a state-centric paradigm, current debates in political philosophy also address issues of global inequality, global poverty, and the moral foundations of international law. As recent events have demonstrated, these issues also play an important role in the practice of international law. In fields such as peace and security, economic integration, environmental law, and human rights, international lawyers are constantly confronted with questions of global justice and international legitimacy. This special issue contains four papers which address an important element of this emerging debate on cosmopolitan global justice, with much relevance for international law: the principle of sovereign equality, global economic inequality, and environmental law.

Judges are at the very centre of Anne-Marie Slaughter's influential liberal theory of international law. More than a century after liberal internationalists were making bold plans for a permanent international court, Slaughter's theory offers an alternative liberal account of the constitution of a global community of law. For Slaughter, domestic courts are responsible for enforcing a ‘new’ transnational legal order established by the interactions between citizens, corporations, and governmental agencies of increasingly disaggregated and porous states. This article challenges the role of adjudication in Slaughter's theory by unpacking the normativity inherent in her ostensibly descriptive liberalism, and identifying problems with the values and commitments at its foundation.

The multiplication of legal orders is characteristic of what one could call an age of globalization and counter-hegemonic globalization. In this age, the relationship between international law and other normative orders is increasingly important. The dominant disciplinary frameworks that provide explanations of such a relationship are focused on compliance with and/or the effectiveness of international norms in domestic legal orders and are derived from international relations. In this article, I examine the limits and possibilities of such approaches through a case study of the use of law (at multiple levels) by one of India's most prominent social movements, the Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save the Narmada). The article argues that the use of law by a social movement is a concrete instance of counter-hegemonic globalization in which international law is one of many different legal orders, a situation of global legal pluralism, in which it is impossible to tell in advance which normative order will best advance cosmopolitan goals such as human rights.

A war crimes trial embodies a combination of representational and presentational drama. The contemporary war crimes trial owes equal inspiration to the ‘realism’ of Henrik Ibsen and the ‘theatrics’ of Bertolt Brecht. The question for scholars is whether the trial is but a stylized presentation of the ‘real’ events, or a realistic medium through which to eavesdrop on history. This essay explores this question of war crimes and dramatization in the context of Director of Public Prosecutions v. Polyukhovich, the one war crimes case ever taken to trial under Australia's War Crimes Amendment Act of 1988.

Since its publication in 2000, Hardt and Negri's book Empire has been at the centre of significant debates within international relations (IR) and international law (IL) communities, both academic and other. Hardt and Negri's recently published Multitude (2004) is likely to add momentum to these debates. Outlining the importance of both Multitude and Empire for legal scholarship and practice, this contribution sets out to give a brief overview of the core issues that are to be distinguished in the debates amongst IR and IL academics, and includes a number of criticisms that could be levelled at Hardt and Negri's work. The focus of the paper, however, is on the ambiguities that mark Hardt and Negri's flawed attempt to deal with the issue of the boundary of Empire and the liminality of (the) multitude. Indeed, this contribution maintains that precisely this rather fundamental flaw in Hardt and Negri's work is why their intellectual ‘tour de force’ is ultimately unconvincing.

This article engages with the current internationalist debate about the ‘linkage’ or the proper relationship of trade and human rights law. The debate, as played out in activist commentary, scholarly journals and the reports of international institutions, is largely concerned with the substantive obligations or normative commitments involved in the two fields. This article seeks to address instead the forms of law (the patterns of relations and subject positions) that transmit, frame or accompany these obligations and commitments. It suggests that focusing on this question of the forms of law is helpful, perhaps even necessary, in developing an understanding of the political effects of appealing to democratic participation as a counter to the excesses of economic globalization. The particular focus of the article is on WTO agreements that pursue the goal of regulatory harmonization as a means of achieving greater market access and economic integration. It explores the relationship between the form of law mandated by these harmonization agreements (the form of sacrifice), and the form of law envisaged in an appeal to democratic political participation (the form of abandonment).

How should liberal societies respond to nonliberal ones? In this paper I examine John Rawls's conception of international toleration against what is sometimes called a cosmopolitan one. Rawls holds that a just international order should recognize certain nonliberal societies, to which he refers as decent peoples, as equal members in good standing in a just society of peoples. It would be a violation of liberalism's own principle of toleration to deny the international legitimacy of decent peoples who, among other things, affirm human rights and accept peaceful coexistence with other societies. According to the cosmopolitan idea of international toleration, on the contrary, only societies that are liberal in character meet the criteria for toleration. I suggest that, against the Rawlsian conception of international toleration, the cosmopolitan idea is more consistent with the fundamentals of liberal political morality. I then clarify the ways in which cosmopolitan toleration is not worryingly interventionist even as it is not altogether toothless; and I end with some reflections on why cosmopolitism is not morally imperialistic.

The last decade marked the unprecedented increase in the importance of the role of judicial bodies in the maintenance of international legal order and their assumption of hitherto unprecedented judicial powers. The principle of consent and its implications are the issues that pose major questions on possible limitations in this process. The tension between these conflicting factors has been witnessed in the treatment by the ICJ of the disputes related to the right of convicted foreign nationals to consular notification. In LaGrand, the Court made substantial advances in terms of diminishing the role of the principle of consent as an obstacle to proper judicial enforcement of international obligations. Avena – a similar case – demonstrates that such an approach has acquired an important degree of consistency in the ICJ's jurisprudence.

Following the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Avena case, US courts have had a mixed record in applying the decision domestically. In this article, I examine the treatment by US courts of claims by criminal defendants alleging Vienna Convention violations, subsequent to the Avena judgment. First, I discuss the two limited decisions so far taken by the US Supreme Court regarding the Vienna Convention, and briefly explain several of the judicially-created rules that have prevented most US courts from reaching the merits of Vienna Convention claims. Next, I analyse the ICJ judgment in the LaGrand case, and provide an overview of the reception of that case by the US courts. After a summary of the Avena decision, I turn to the latest cases in which Vienna Convention claims based on Avena have been raised in US courts, focusing on the two most important decisions, and examining their contradictory rulings. As the US Supreme Court has now decided to hear an appeal in one of these cases, I conclude by arguing that the Supreme Court should take the opportunity to elucidate the role of the International Court of Justice in US law when the United States has consented to binding treaty interpretation by that court.

The World Trade Organization is often criticized for requiring its members to adopt policies which can detrimentally affect poor and vulnerable groups. Close analysis of the relevant provisions of WTO law, however, often reveals international trade obligations to be significantly more flexible than is commonly suggested. The author argues, however, that, on its own, detailed formal analysis of trade law paints an incomplete picture. Trade law also influences political choices by framing debates about trade policy – determining the arguments which can be made, who can make them, and in what forums they can be presented. The author illustrates this argument through a focused analysis of one controversy relating to the trade regime, namely the ‘GATS and water’ debate, and in particular the question of whether the General Agreement on Trade in Services may require the ‘privatization’ of water infrastructures.

The Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals before the ICJ again involved violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The judgment seems to be a faithful copy of the earlier LaGrand judgment, but it is much less clear. In particular the Court's consideration of diplomatic protection, the nature of Mexico's claim, and the local remedies rule pose questions with respect to the development of international law. In considering these issues, this article aims to show why the Court should have paid more attention to the legal background of the case.

In his well-written and well-argued paper ‘International Toleration: Rawlsian versus Cosmopolitan’, Kok-Chor Tan raises the important question as to where the limits of toleration are to be drawn. This is an important issue not only from the perspective of international law, but also for any domestic society. Toleration is never an automatic element or quality of any society, but has to be defended against the ever present danger of intolerance and repression. This is especially the case in the post-9/II era with regard to Islam, as it is not always easy to separate serious analysis of this religion from outright prejudices against its believers. With regard to Islamic minorities, the present attitude of some ‘Western’ majorities does not always reflect an attitude of respect, although this is not often admitted. It is not argued that Islamic minorities and other immigrants should adapt to the culture of the majorities because minorities have to give in to majorities on the basis of democracy; instead, it is claimed that Western majorities live in accordance with universal values. As Western societies have incorporated universal values formulated for the first time in the age of Enlightenment, they can rightly require from immigrants and minorities that they give up part of their values and identities without any real loss on their side. In forcing immigrants to adapt to Western values, majorities are merely liberating them from outdated particularistic codes and worldviews, thus enabling them to be free in accordance with truly universal values. This, obviously, is a peculiar way of understanding the Enlightenment, not with Kant as a perpetual challenge (‘we do not live in an enlightened age, but in an age of enlightenment’), but as something that is achieved and stably embodied in ‘our’ Western societies. Immigrants and minority members can reasonably be asked to identify with such societies. Although such a demand to assimilate might at first glance be seen as testifying to intolerance, in reality this is not the case. Why should we allow others to live in error? In the face of truth, toleration is a superfluous virtue. It goes almost without saying that this view, which is deemed by some as Enlightenment fundamentalism, contradicts the spirit with which Locke and Spinoza in the seventeenth century proclaimed the superior value of tolerance. They argued that all religions claim for themselves to be the one and only true religion and that the best attitude among the contenders of different beliefs would be one of tolerance: nobody can prove convincingly to the other side of the religious divide the truth of his own religion and the falseness of all other religions; and since ‘no man can conform his faith to the dictates of another (since) all the life and the power of true religion consists in the inward and full persuasion of the mind’ (Locke), the use of earthly powers is inappropriate and unjust.

The ICJ in its judgments on the preliminary objections in the Legality of Use of Force cases held that it had no jurisdiction to hear the claims. Despite the unanimous concurrence in that result, it is clear that there were deep divisions within the Court as to the ground on which that decision should have been reached; only a bare majority subscribed to the reasoning that the Court was required to rule on the question of its jurisdiction ratione personae in relation to Serbia and Montenegro's uncertain status within the United Nations prior to 2000. The minority judges were highly critical of the choice of that basis of decision, in particular given its apparent implications for other cases pending before the Court.

Recent years have seen a proliferation of forms of transitional justice, ranging from pure truth and reconciliation formulas to various integrated approaches, combining international or internationalized trials with alternative forms of justice. Many of these phenomena have been examined in individual case studies. However, few attempts have been made to put the various pieces of the puzzle together and to analyze the merits and pitfalls of different institutional choices of transitional justice. This essay seeks to fill this shortcoming. It looks at different institutional designs of transitional justice from a comparative and impact-based perspective. It tries to identify some of the contextual parameters which may contribute to the success or failure of specific formulas of institutional design. Moreover, this contribution seeks to establish that international and domestic models of justice are not contradictory, but interdependent forces in the process of sustainable peacemaking, in areas such as criminal trials, victim's protection and reparation. It argues that transitional justice requires pluralist and complementary approaches, combining parallel mechanisms at the domestic and the international level, in order to succeed in practice, especially after the coming into operation of the International Criminal Court.

Apart from giving a detailed account of the background and the factual findings in the Brðanin judgment of the ICTY, three legal aspects of the case are of interest for this case note: the acquittal of the accused of genocide charges, the trial chamber's dismissal of ‘joint criminal enterprise’ as a mode of liability to describe the accused's criminal responsibility, and the characterization of the accused's responsibility vis-à-vis crimes committed in camps and detention facilities as aiding and abetting by omission.

Various human rights are widely recognized in codified and customary international law. These human rights promise all human beings protection against specific severe harms that might be inflicted on them domestically or by foreigners. Yet international law also establishes and maintains institutional structures that greatly contribute to violations of these human rights: fundamental components of international law systematically obstruct the aspirations of poor populations for democratic self-government, civil rights, and minimal economic sufficiency. And central international organizations, such as the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank, are designed so that they systematically contribute to the persistence of severe poverty.

The ICTY has interpreted its Statute as a ‘treaty’. This was not the intention of the UN Secretariat and the Security Council, and is not consistent with other treatments of the Statute. While the Statute literally satisfies the definition of ‘treaty’ in the 1969 Vienna Convention, this shows only the generality of that definition. The adoption of more precise labels for the Statute and other multi-state instruments adopted by international organizations through representational mechanisms would avoid confusion and promote better understanding of the rules that govern them.

The impartial and nearly unanimous advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice in the Wall case put the role of politics and diplomacy in the settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in its proper place, within the context of the rule of law. The significance of the opinion goes far beyond the illegality of the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). The Court wisely and courageously seized the opportunity of its first direct involvement in the conflict to speak in plain legal terms about the tricky political problems that have ruined the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. It ascertained the present responsibility of the United Nations to protect Palestine's statehood. It affirmed the applicability of the prohibition of acquisition of Palestinian territory by Israel and confirmed the illegality of the Israeli settlements in the OPT. Moreover, the existence of the Palestinian people as the rightful claimant to the OPT is no longer open to question. One may only regret that the UN was not able to ask the Court to throw light on the Palestinian question at a much earlier stage.

This article focuses on the development of the crime of incitement to genocide and the prohibition of hate propaganda. It first examines the conflict which exists between these and the right to freedom of speech and concludes that a limitation of this right through prohibition of hate propaganda and criminalization of incitement to genocide is justifiable. The article then analyses how the crime of incitement to genocide and the prohibition of hate propaganda first developed historically, focusing on judgments by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the Genocide Convention, on the one hand, and on international conventions and case law by the Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights, on the other. Next, recent ICTR decisions are examined, in which the ICTR has considerably clarified and extended the concept of incitement to genocide. The tribunal has brought it closer to encompassing vicious hate propaganda by acknowledging that in order to incite individuals to commit genocide, incitement in the sense of instigation is insufficient; it requires the prior creation of a certain climate in which the commission of such crimes is possible. Hate propaganda leads to the creation of such a climate. It is argued that, for several reasons, virulent hate propaganda must be accorded the status of an international crime. Genocide could be prevented more effectively if such speech were criminalized. Several efforts to outlaw hate propaganda internationally in the past are examined. The article concludes that it can be regarded as a crime punishable under the Genocide Convention if a purposive interpretative approach is used, and that hate propagandists should be prosecuted for direct and public incitement to genocide if their hate speech is engaged in with the specific intent to commit genocide, and creates a substantial danger of genocide.

It is widely recognized that changes are occurring to the earth's climate and, further, that these changes threaten important human interests. This raises the question of who should bear the burdens of addressing global climate change. This paper aims to provide an answer to this question. To do so it focuses on the principle that those who cause the problem are morally responsible for solving it (the ‘polluter pays’ principle). It argues that while this has considerable appeal it cannot provide a complete account of who should bear the burdens of global climate change. It proposes three ways in which this principle needs to be supplemented, and compares the resulting moral theory with the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’.