The ‘Franklin expedition’ of 1845 set out to establish a ‘northwest passage’ between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans but ended with the deaths of all 129 crewmen in the grimmest of circumstances. The hypothesis that lead poisoning may have contributed to the disaster is examined by re-analysis of the bone-lead content of seven skeletons in order to model statistically the likely variation in lead burden across the whole crew. Comparison of the estimated lead burdens with present-day data that associates lead with cognitive and physical morbidity suggests that a proportion of the crew may have experienced few or no adverse effects whilst those with higher burdens may have suffered some significant debility. It is unclear whether such debility would have been incapacitating or exceptional for the lead-contaminated environment of nineteenth-century Britain. Whilst lead alone may not have caused the disaster, it is proposed that high levels of lead may have interacted with other factors including dietary insufficiencies and individual constitutional differences to render some, but not all, of the crew more vulnerable to debility in the final throes of the expedition.

Arctic sea routes have for long been of interest for shipping because of much shorter distances between the Atlantic and the Pacific. Sea ice prevented real development of significant traffic, but did not prevent research from trying to assess their economic viability. With the melting of sea ice in the Arctic, this effort at modeling the profitability of Arctic shipping routes has received a new impetus. However, the conclusions of these studies vary widely, depending on the parameters chosen and their value. What can be said of these models, from 1991 until 2013, and to what extent can a model be drawn, capitalising on twenty years of simulations?

This is a follow-up to the article ‘Could Captain Scott have been saved? Revisiting Scott's last expedition’, published in this journal in January 2012. Additional research in the expedition's primary documents reveals that there was a clear opportunity for One Ton depot to have been re-stocked with dog food in January 1912, preparatory to the final relief journey to meet the polar party that February, and that the dog driver Cecil Meares failed to follow Scott's relevant orders. The consequences will be examined in this article. All distances are given in geographical miles.

When policies are adopted, it seems reasonable to assume that they address a certain issue and provide means to mitigate specific problems. This seems the case with the EU's regime on trade in seal products, but it becomes evident that the goal formulation in this case is blurry and unclear. Taking animal welfare, the so-called ‘Inuit exemption’, and internal market harmonisation into account, this article examines the goals of the seal products trade regime and how they are applied. It becomes clear that the attainment of goals bears consequences that are unprecedented due to conceptual and formulation difficulties. Given the indistinct goal formulation during the policy-shaping process and the goal formulation in the policy itself, it seems fair to say that the regime does not aim to improve animal welfare standards in the commercial seal hunt, but rather aims to shut down the commercial hunt completely. This, however, affects Inuit and non-Inuit seal hunters equally and is inconsistent with secondary goals that are formulated in the EU's documents relating to the Arctic. Therefore, the seal products trade regime has consequences that challenge the EU's ambitions in the north.

In recent years, a decline in the consumption of local foods (kalaalimernit) can be observed in Greenland. However, its appreciation and symbolisation is increasing and kalaalimernit are a powerful contemporary symbol for being Greenlandic. The present article argues that kalaalimernit, as a specifically Greenlandic taste, are suited to marking and maintaining a cultural boundary in relation to the Danish people living in the country, a boundary constructed through identity politics. As the empirical findings from fieldwork conducted in the Greenlandic capital Nuuk and the small coastal settlement Oqaatsut demonstrate, this construction is subject to social change. Greenlanders advocate two different narrative patterns regarding how kalaalimernit are to be understood that stem from contemporary definitional struggles over what kind of cultural boundary is deemed important to demarcate. The struggle illustrates two different perceptions of Greenland as either an indigenous people and/or a small Nordic nation.

This study examines how climatic extremes during winter 2010–2011 affected the traditional food system in Iqaluit, Nunavut. This winter was anomalous throughout the Canadian Arctic, and manifested itself locally by warmer temperatures and decreased ice coverage. Drawing upon in-depth interviews with hunters (n = 25), a fixed question survey with public housing residents (n = 100), as well as analysis of remotely sensed sea-ice charts and temperature data from the Iqaluit weather station, this work identifies and characterises the extreme climatic conditions experienced, their subsequent effects on Iqaluit's traditional food system, and coping strategies used for dealing with food-related stresses. The results show increased environmental stress on the traditional food system compared to previous years. Freeze up occurred 59 days later than the average for the 1982–2010 period, while mean annual temperatures were 4.9ºC higher than the climatological mean, which negatively impacted hunters’ harvests and residents’ food supplies. Coping strategies alleviated some stresses, but adaptability was limited for financially insecure households reliant on income support. The study shows that when challenging socioeconomic conditions, such as those associated with public housing, are coupled with significant environmental stress, such as experienced during that winter, the vulnerability of the traditional food system is exacerbated. We suggest that winter 2010–2011 can be used as an analogue for exploring future food system vulnerabilities, with climate models projecting similar conditions in the coming decades.

A recently-discovered financial balance sheet, accounting for the first four years’ transactions of the Hull Whale Fishery Company (1754–1757), adds detail to present knowledge of British Arctic whaling economics during the early years of the industry. This article summarises previously-known information on the Company and its four ships, and provides transcripts of the balance sheet covering the profits and losses of the early voyages. Based on tabulated details from the transcripts, and additional data from Customs records and muster rolls, it discusses ships, crews, voyages, catches and expenses, the products of oil and baleen, and the profits derived from them. It makes brief comparisons with similar data from Bristol and Exeter in the formative years of the industry, and draws attention to the key significance of the 40 shilling (£2) bounty during the early years.

This note concerns the little known sub-Arctic operations in the Russo-Japanese war, 1904–1905. Apart from a slightly farcical ‘invasion’ of the Kamchatka peninsula by a group of Japanese fishermen, and a naval engagement off the coast of southern Sakhalin, the main operations related to the efficiently conducted Japanese invasion of the sub–Arctic island of Sakhalin itself. This was the only occupation of Russian territory during the war and was intended to strengthen the Japanese position in the peace negotiations, held at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, that brought the war to a close.