1 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013).

2 Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).

3 28 U.S.C. §1350.

4 See, e.g., Anthony J. Colangelo, Kiobel: Muddling the Distinction Between Prescriptive and Adjudicative Jurisdiction, 28MD. J. Int’L L. 65 (2013) (arguing that the Court misapplied the presumption); David L. Sloss, Kiobel and Extraterritoriality: A Rule Without a Rationale, 28 MD. J. Int’L L. 241 (2013) (discussing the presumption); see also Sarah Cleveland, Response: Plain Text, Stare Decisis, and De´ja` Vu All over Again, Scotusblog ( July 24, 2012), at http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/response-plain-text-stare-decisis-and-deja-vu-all-over-again (detailing the intent behind the Ats in a Kiobel symposium held prior to the Supreme Court decision).

5 See generally Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme Court and the Alien Tort Statute, 107 Ajil 601 (2013) (describing what remains of the Ats after Kiobel); see also Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The Door Remains Open to “Foreign Squared” Cases, Scotusblog (Apr. 18, 2013), at http://www. scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-the-door-remains-open-to-foreign-squared-cases (concluding that “‘foreign cubed’ cases … are off the table” but predicting that other claims should remain viable); Curtis A. Bradley, Supreme Court Holds That Alien Tort Statute Does Not Apply to Conduct in Foreign Countries, Asil Insights (Apr. 18, 2013), at http://www.asil.org.insights130418.cfm (noting the likely “significant reduction in international human rights litigation in U.S. courts”).

6 Christopher A. Whytock, Donald Earl Childress III & Michael D. Ramsey, Foreword: After Kiobel—International Human Rights Litigation in State Courts and Under State Law, 3 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 1, 4–6 (2013); cf. Austen L. Parrish, State Court International Human Rights Litigation: A Concerning Trend?, 3 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 25, 25–26, 39–42 (2013) (describing the difficulties of state court human rights litigation).

7 See Beth Stephens, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: Closing Avenues for Relief,Opinio Juris (Apr. 24, 2013), at http:// opiniojuris.org/2013/04/23/kiobel-insta-symposium-closing-avenues-for-relief (describing how some “are crowing about the resounding defeat of rapacious trial lawyers who used these cases to shake down virtuous multinational corporations” and noting that little supports this characterization).

8 See, e.g., Editorial,AGiant Setback forHumanRights, N.Y.Times, Apr. 18, 2013, at A26; Press Release,Human Rights First, Kiobel Ruling Undermines U.S. Leadership on Human Rights (Apr. 17, 2013), available at http:// www.humanrightsfirst.org/2013/04/17/kiobel-ruling-undermines-u-s-leadership-on-human-rights (noting that “the Supreme Court gutted the Alien Tort Statute”).

9 Developments in the Law: Extraterritoriality, 124Harv. L.Rev. 1226, 1228 (2011) (describinghowthe “exceptionalism of extraterritoriality reflects the foundational ideals of the international state system”).

10 See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1155, 1156 (2007) (“In sum, pluralism offers not only a more comprehensive descriptive account of the world we live in, but also suggests a potentially useful alternative approach to the design of procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices.”).

11 For an overview, see Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 243 (2009).

12 See e.g., Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (2010); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders (2012).

13 Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 Eur. J. Int’L L. 369, 403 (2005) (explaining how the United States “took an early lead in applying its own law to situations with little connection to itself other than a widely defined ‘effect,’ and it has succeeded in reshaping (or at least destabilizing) jurisdictional rules in this area”); see also Ruti G. Teitel, Humanity's Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics, 35 Cornell Int’L L.J. 355, 355, 360–62 (2002) (describing a “juridical paradigm shift” and how humanitarian law has extended the scope of jurisdiction beyond national borders).

14 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100Yale L.J. 2347 (1991); see Paul Schiff Berman, The New Legal Pluralism, 5 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 225, 231–32 (2009) (describing Koh's work and its relationship to global legal pluralism).

15 See Marko Milanovic´, Norm Conflict in International Law: Whither Human Rights?, 20 Duke J. Comp. & Int’L L. 69, 131 (2009) (noting that “it is quite naı¨ve to think that general international law will always prevail over fragmentationist impulses”). For an account of how human rights developed from hard-fought political struggles and strategic alliances, see Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Constructing Law out of Power: Investing in Human Rights as an Alternative Political Strategy, in Cause Lawyeringand the state in Aglobalera 354, 360 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001).

16 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).

17 Cf.Ma´ximoLanger,TheDiplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction:ThePolitical Branchesandthe Transnational Prosecution of International Crimes, 105 Ajil 1 (2011) (describing the political aspects behind universal criminal jurisdiction).

18 See Bryant G. Garth, Rebuilding International Law After the September 11th Attack: Contrasting Agendas of High Priests and Legal Realists, 4 Loy. U. Chi. Int’L L. Rev. 3, 8–9 (2006) (describing the potential of undermining the legitimacy of international norms).

19 That the ATS has been employed generally against foreigners, but not against U.S. actors, increases the appearance of exceptionalism. James C. Hathaway, America, Defenders of Democratic Legitimacy?, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 132 (2000) (noting how the “United States simultaneously asserts the right to lead, but also to be exempted from the rules it promotes”).

20 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1121–22 (1996); Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1497, 1503 (2003).

21 See Eric A. Posner, The Perils of Global Legalism 228 (2009) (suggesting that Americans only support decisions made by “American courts, which are staffed by Americans who share American values and interests”).

22 Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93MINN. L. REV. 815, 859–64 (2009).

23 Chandra Lekha Sriram, Human Rights Claims vs. the State: Is Sovereignty Really Eroding?, 1 Interdisc. J. HUM. RTS. 107, 117 (2006) (“To the degree that proceedings take place only in the courts of powerful Western states, and often in those of former colonizers, the argument that cases are selective, and even driven by imperialistic agendas, can be and has been raised.”).

24 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659, 1664–65, 1668–69 (2013) (describing foreign policy concerns of imposing sovereign will onto conduct occurring within another sovereign's territorial jurisdiction).

25 Id. at 1673–75 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Wuerth, supra note 5, at 611–12.

26 Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring).

27 Id. at 1674.

28 Id. at 1668 (majority opinion); id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring).

29 See Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets, Foreign Aff., Nov.–Dec. 2000, at 9; see also Jonathan D. Greenberg, Does Power Trump Law?, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1789, 1791 (2003) (describing the differences between realists and liberal internationalists).

30 See, e.g., Jack L.Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law 167–84, 225–26 (2005) (arguing that international law is often rhetorical and that “international law scholars exaggerate its power and significance”); Posner, supra note 21, at ix–xvi, 28–39 (criticism of the expansion of global legalism and warning on the overreliance on international law and its institutions); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law, 118 Yale L.J. 1762, 1804 (2009) (“The force of international law is thus largely an illusion … [merely] a rhetorical, political trope … .”).

31 See Austen L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court's Use of Foreign Law, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 637, 639–40, nn.8–10 (describing opposition to citation of foreign law).

32 For a more in-depth discussion, see Parrish, supra note 22, at 822–27, 841–56.

33 Cf. Lea Brilmayer, New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 40 S.W. L. Rev. 655 (2011) (discussing the Court's focus on legislative supremacy and how the presumption permits judicial creativity).

34 The Court often refuses to assume that Congress has utilized all jurisdictional power granted to it, even in the face of broad statutory language. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152–53 (1908) (interpreting the statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction to be narrower than what is constitutionally permitted); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (Marshall, C.J.) (interpreting the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction to be narrower than constitutional limits).

35 See, in this Agora, Marco Basile, The Long View on Kiobel: A Muted Victory for International Legal Norms in the United States?

36 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659, 1675 (2013).

37 See Wuerth, supra note 5, at 603, 608–13, 621 (describing cases that may remain viable).

38 Even as ATS litigation is curtailed, human rights law will continue to constrain corporate action. Peter J. Spiro, Sovereigntism's Twilight, 31 Berkeley J. INT’L L. 307, 318 (2013).

39 For a more detailed exploration, see Austen L. Parrish, Kiobel, Unilateralism, and the Retreat from Extraterritoriality, 28 MD. J. INT’L L. 208 (2013).