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Epistemic normativity from the reasoner's viewpoint

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

Joëlle Proust
Joëlle Proust
Affiliation:
Institut Jean-Nicod (EHESS-ENS), UMR CNRS 8129, Ecole Normale Supérieure, F-75005 Paris, France. [email protected]://joelleproust.hautetfort.com/
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Abstract

Elqayam & Evans (E&E) are focused on the normative judgments used by theorists to characterize subjects' performances (e.g. in terms of logic or probability theory). They ignore the fact, however, that subjects themselves have an independent ability to evaluate their own reasoning performance, and that this ability plays a major role in controlling their first-order reasoning tasks.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 5 , October 2011 , pp. 265
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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