The institutions of industrial relations have proved to be more malleable than I expected in the mid-eighties, and the ‘system’ has, for better or for worse, been transformed.

Underlying forces conducive to change have been the economy’s exposure to external competition, related changes in the structure of industry and employment, the pervasive free market ideology and a sustained decline in union density. More fortuitous factors, such as the antipathy of an ACTU Secretary to members of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission, a Prime Minister’s entrenched hostility to the ‘system’, the Coalition’s unexpected capture of a Senate majority in 2004 and the High Court’s validation of WorkChoices, have also contributed to the present state of play.

Using data from Wave 2 of the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, this article examines how superannuation savings by women and men vary according to the numbers of children they have. The results show that for women there is a clear inverse relationship between the value of superannuation and the number of their children. Moreover, this inverse relationship persists after controlling for an extensive range of variables which may affect both number of children and superannuation. The analysis also shows that level of education, migrant status, being an employer or self-employed, marital status, age and sex are significantly related to an individual’s level of superannuation. The implications of the results for Australia’s public debate and possible policy responses are discussed.

The 1989 Green Paper Transforming Industrial Relations in New South Wales, advanced 99 recommendations across a range of concerns. Some were quite prosaic, such as the scope for legal representation in tribunal proceedings and redrafting the regulations to the enabling legislation. Other measures, such as those to do with union amalgamations, OH&S in small business, and pay equity addressed problems specific to a system that was, at that time, the least reviewed in Australia. A third group of recommendations, which are more interesting in the current Australian policy climate, addressed the key design features of how an industrial relations system could be best made fit for purpose in a competitive world.

Most of the proposed changes were implemented, either through ministerial actions or through two pieces of legislation: the Industrial Arbitration (Enterprise Agreements) Act 1990 and the Industrial Relations Act 1991. By applying a green paper process, these changes followed periods of submission taking and considerable consultation, with extensive debate.

In the light of the financial consequences of longevity, the potential for widening living standards as the population ages, and the perception of an increased burden by the working age population, recent policy changes in New Zealand appear far from ideal. For nearly twenty years, the retirement system has comprised just a universal state pension, called New Zealand Superannuation, and voluntary unsubsidised private saving. The decision in the late 1980s to promote tax neutrality for saving was critical to attaining a cost-effective, adequate, equitable and sustainable retirement income for all in an uncertain future. Nevertheless, a level playing field was only partially achieved and by the early 2000s, large imbalances in the economy were apparent. Strident calls to promote saving gradually undermined the accord around tax neutrality for retirement saving leading in 2007 to the re-introduction of tax incentives for certain types of saving, and other types of state intervention in private provision. This paper examines how the twenty year experiment with tax neutrality is coming to an end and the implications this has for the support of an aging population experiencing increased longevity.

In this brief paper, I offer some observations on what I shall call the ‘Rudd Vision of Australian Labour Law’. Before doing so, however, it is appropriate to explain how the WorkChoices laws sought to extinguish the purpose and rationale of labour law.

Australian industrial relations was a curious beast for much of the twentieth century. For many it was the institutional equivalent of a marsupial — native to the Australian environment. It developed in the economic and social circumstances of the nineteenth century. Indeed the development and elaboration of the arbitral model of Australian industrial relations was one of the major social experiments of a vibrant, young and successful Australia.

For some time, the trade union movement has been facing the challenge of repositioning itself to attract and retain members, and to remain relevant, useful, and powerful. These difficulties have been exacerbated during the recent period of intense ‘globalisation’. The political embrace of neo-liberalism, de-regulation of labour and other markets, increased capital flows, interaction between national and regional economies, and innovation and growth of information and communications technology, have created a very different, and constantly changing environment for labour. Services work in particular is increasingly mobile as a result of huge developments in information and communications technology. The white collar service sector is thus creating a particular challenge for trade unions, as the developed world increasingly buys its services off-shore. This article examines the features, extent, and effects of white collar services off-shoring, before going on to examine the responses of trade unions to this phenomenon. It looks at action taken by a number of unions in the USA, Australia, Europe and India, as well as internationally, before drawing conclusions regarding appropriate directions for unions to follow.

The goldmining town of Kalgoorlie in Western Australia has been the site of race rioting on three occasions — in 1916, 1919 and 1934. These outbursts have typically been examined as separate events, but, analysed together, they provide an opportunity to see racism, and anti-racism, as historical and social processes. In all these riots, returned soldiers, organised by a leadership often drawn from the officer class, played a significant part in harassing migrants and promoting White Australia. Through this lens, an important corrective to the dominant explanation of the White Australia policy is suggested. While most historians of Australian racism portray immigration restriction as a demand successfully won by the labour movement in defence of white workers’ jobs, the Kalgoorlie race riots expose a distinctly conservative case for employer ‘divide and rule’, anti-migrant propaganda and racist violence. Concomitantly, the local labour movement found that racial division among their ranks was a recipe for industrial defeat.

This article begins by assessing the evidence that there was, and is, a skill shortage in Australia, and notes that for some years the Howard government initially denied there was a problem of unmet demand for skilled people. It was not until late 2006 that we saw any kind of official acknowledgement of a problem. On 12 October 2006, Prime Minister Howard announced a ‘Skills for the Future’ policy that involved a commitment to spend $837 million over five years, and aimed ‘to help build a more highly skilled and responsive workforce to support Australia’s long-term economic growth’. Acknowledging that policy-making begins with the framing or constitution of a problem, assessments are offered of this federal government’s account of the ‘skill shortage’ problem. The questions posed in this article are: what policy initiatives during the Howard years were designed to address issues of training, and what was their potential for addressing the problem of an apparent shortage of skilled workers in Australia?

The Howard government’s WorkChoices legislation appeared set to irremediably remake industrial relations in Australia by prioritising individual agreement making (through AWAs) at the expense of Australia’s traditional award systems based on collective bargaining. That government explicitly intended these changes to reduce labour market rewards to, and protections for, low paid and more vulnerable employees. Yet, it also deployed a rhetoric of individual choice in advocating these changes, promoting, in particular, a notion that individual bargaining and agreement making under WorkChoices empowered individual employees by opening opportunities for integrative (mutual gains) bargaining. This article asks what these changes really meant for bargaining between individual employee and employer. We analyse crucial elements of WorkChoices to highlight how its main structural mechanisms intensified employee bargaining weakness in individual bargaining. As well, we use negotiation theory, especially in relation to integrative bargaining, to evaluate the government’s own published advice to individual employees on how to bargain for an AWA. We find that the government explicitly sought to disempower employees through WorkChoices’ additional legal and institutional impediments and also through the concerted attempt at coaching employees to choose a losing path in their AWA negotiations.

The WorkChoices legislation was controversial at the time of its introduction. The controversy has continued as to what its outcomes have been, and in whose interests it has operated. One outcome of the legislation has been a proliferation of extremely comprehensive analyses of its effects to date. This review article on those reports concludes that the overwhelming weight of evidence is that the legislation has benefited employers at the expense of employees. However, this article provides a materialist analysis of WorkChoices and the wider employer offensive which contrasts with the dominant interpretations amongst the critics of WorkChoices. The paper situates WorkChoices as part of a longer-term employer offensive designed to maintain profitability by increasing the rate of labour exploitation.

The plenary papers provide rich reflections on Australian industrial relations. Drawing on a wealth of experience, Gardner, Hancock, McCallum and Niland comprehensively cover the field of traditional industrial relations by examining those aspects that have engaged considerable scholarly attention since the 1950s: labour law; Commonwealth-State jurisdictions; wage policy; the role of tribunals; unions and industrial action. In so doing, the plenary authors recognise that industrial relations regimes generally aim to balance employeremployee power, provide conditions that enable workers to support themselves and their families, and set a reasonable safety net to protect the weakest.