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The inherence heuristic: A basis for psychological essentialism?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2014

Susan A. Gelman  and
Meredith Meyer
Susan A. Gelman
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI [email protected]://sitemaker.umich.edu/gelman.lab/home
Meredith Meyer
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, Otterbein University, Westerville, OH 43081-2004. [email protected]
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Abstract

Cimpian & Salomon (C&S) provide evidence that psychological essentialism rests on a domain-general attention to inherent causes. We suggest that the inherence heuristic may itself be undergirded by a more foundational cognitive bias, namely, a realist assumption about environmental regularities. In contrast, when considering specific representations, people may be more likely to activate attention to non-inherent, contingent, and historical links.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 37 , Issue 5 , October 2014 , pp. 490
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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