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Towards a unified theory of reciprocity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2012

Alejandro Rosas
Alejandro Rosas
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia, and Konrad Lorenz Institute (KLI) for Evolution and Cognition Research, 3422 Altenberg, Austria. [email protected]://www.docentes.unal.edu.co/arosasl/
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Abstract

In a unified theory of human reciprocity, the strong and weak forms are similar because neither is biologically altruistic and both require normative motivation to support cooperation. However, strong reciprocity is necessary to support cooperation in public goods games. It involves inflicting costs on defectors; and though the costs for punishers are recouped, recouping costs requires complex institutions that would not have emerged if weak reciprocity had been enough.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 35 , Issue 1 , February 2012 , pp. 36 - 37
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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