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Normativism versus mechanism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

Valerie A. Thompson
Valerie A. Thompson
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, S7N 5A5, Canada. http://artsandscience.usask.ca/profile/VThompson
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Abstract

Using normative correctness as a diagnostic tool reduces the outcome of complex cognitive functions to a binary classification (normative or non-normative). It also focuses attention on outcomes, rather than processes, impeding the development of good cognitive theories. Given that both normative and non-normative responses may be produced by the same process, normativity is a poor indicator of underlying processes.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 5 , October 2011 , pp. 272 - 273
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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