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The logic of moral outrage

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2012

Eric Luis Uhlmann
Eric Luis Uhlmann*
Affiliation:
Management and Human Resources Department, HEC Paris – School of Management, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France. [email protected]
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Abstract

McCullough et al.'s functionalist model of revenge is highly compatible with the person-centered approach to moral judgment, which emphasizes the adaptive manner in which social perceivers derive character information from moral acts. Evidence includes act–person dissociations in which an act is seen as less immoral than a comparison act, yet as a clearer indicator of poor moral character.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 1 , February 2013 , pp. 38
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013

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