Although it is of importance for any understanding of the Peronist regime as a whole, little is known in detail about the social character of the popular support upon which the regime was based. This state of affairs is not as paradoxical as it might at first seem. In part it is a reflection of the fact that the continued political importance of the Peronist movement has meant that until recently the debate over Peronism has been polemical in nature and that opportunities for dispassionate analysis have been correspondingly restricted. For example, to apologists for Peronism, the popular support that it enjoyed is evidence merely that it represented a profound revolution in social and economic priorities which was fully understood and appreciated by the people themselves. To its detractors it is evidence of little more than the manipulation of the ignorant, corruption of the venal, and coercion of the educated. To both groups it has been a premise for further argument rather than an object worthy of study in its own right.

A review of the popular and even scholarly literature dealing with the Catholic Church in Latin America during the last decade will leave the reader confused. The books, articles, and media coverage in comparison with each other are ambiguous and at times contradictory. If on the one hand the Church is described as the fastest-changing institution on the continent, there is on the other hand ample proof put forth that the institution is stagnant and in many cases apparently bankrupt. While some students point to the emergence of militant clergy groups such as the Golconda movement in Colombia or Priests of the Third World in Argentina, others as easily argue that these movements are beyond the institution and without significance in the larger society. And for every time the Church is shown siding with the poor and oppressed, two instances are held up in which words are not followed by action.

Although one recent influential textbook on Latin America has characterized the decades immediately following the achievement of independence as “the long wait,” in Mexico at least, these years were marked by an intense political and ideological conflict which defined the direction of its future (Halperín Donghi, 1969: 134-206). The most perceptive student of the epoch, Edmundo O'Gorman (1960) traces within the confused welter of pronunciamientos and manifestos two great forces: the search for a providential leader and the desire for some form of democratic populism. An analysis of ideology cannot be separated from a consideration of society. The presidential power created by Benito Juárez and perpetuated by Porfirio Díaz operated outside the strict legal confines of the Constitution. At the same time, the failure of classic liberalism to express popular aspirations retarded social reform for over half a century. Without the sanction of theory, few such demands could be translated into law.

Ruy Barbosa, the Brazilian lawyer and legal scholar, statesman, educational reformer, journalist, politician, and spokesman for a liberal tradition, is again in the news. Lionized during a career which spanned the late Empire and early Republic, deified as a cultural monument since his death in 1923, Ruy and his once secure historical reputation are now under assault. That Barbosa could be criticized at all is shocking, especially to an older generation for whom the repeated homage to his memory in countless books, in the press, and on the hustings formed a cultural constant in their youth and helped to set their world view. For others, mostly younger Brazilians, the image of a remote, rather pedantic, and above all irrelevant Ruy has been redrawn, if not refurbished, in light of a new historical perspective.

In the literature on Latin America, any increase in the number of people attending schools is usually considered economically and socially beneficial and a sign of progress. Any increase in the population attending universities is viewed as an especially important change and bound to help economic development. Rarely will any person or group argue that an increase in the number of university students is a drag on the economy and socially pernicious.

Yet this is precisely the position taken by a small group within Brazil's Ministério de Educação e Cultura (MEC). Playing the role of a loyal but disgusted opposition, the Instituto Nacional de Estudes Pedagógicos (INEP) continuously attacked the educational policies of the federal and state governments during the 1950s, especially those relating to higher education.

During the past twenty years, the United States has been involved in three cases of armed intervention in Latin America: Guatemala in 1954, Cuba in 1961, and the Dominican Republic in 1965. In addition, there was the naval blockade and possibility of intervention in Cuba in 1962 during the missile crisis. Each of these episodes occurred in the Caribbean region (defined as including those areas either in or adjacent to the Caribbean Sea). There were no similar armed interventions elsewhere in Latin America during this period, and in fact, all of the incidents of United States armed intervention in the Twentieth Century have taken place in the Caribbean area. Therefore, in its actions in Latin America, the United States appears to distinguish between the Caribbean area and the rest of the continent. The Caribbean is treated as a special region where military intervention is apparently more justifiable than elsewhere in Latin America. Only in the area outside the Caribbean has Washington found it possible to abide by its inter-American treaty commitments to nonintervention.

This article attempts to examine the set of propositions loosely known as the dependency model of Latin American underdevelopment. The dependency model attributes such underdevelopment to the economic expansion of highly developed capitalist countries, particularly the United States. The model was first elaborated by Latin American economists and has subsequently acquired numerous adherents in the United States, especially among younger political scientists.

The basic premise of the dependency model is that the economic development of Latin America has been determined and limited by the needs of the dominant economies in the world capitalist market. Because they are thus conditioned and limited, the Latin American economies are described as “dependent.”

In today's international monetary system, a country's stock of international reserves plays a critical role in determining the nature and the extent to which it can successfully pursue policies to promote growth, development, and stability. If its reserves are insufficient, the country will generally have to sacrifice some internal economic goals, instituting policies which tend to deflate the domestic economy and to discourage international trade. Excessive reserves, on the other hand, may impart an inflationary bias on the economy; and at the same time, superfluous reserves may be a costly way of tying up national wealth, especially for poorer nations. Since the “right” amount of reserves will differ from one nation to another, it is important to understand those factors which determine the amount of reserves which a country is willing and able to hold at a particular time.

Historically, for the now economically developed countries, a strong positive correlation has normally existed between rising real output and employment levels. Among today's lessdeveloped countries (LDC's) even high growth rates can, and frequently do, fail to generate a concomitant rapid rate of employment expansion. Indeed, so acute is the failure of labor absorption to grow in step with rising incomes that a recent International Labour Organization (I.L.O.) report on Colombia (1970: 47) maintains “development strategy will become very largely employment strategy.”

The unemployment problem is in part due to the rapid population growth rates and even more rapid urban growth rates experienced by most LDC's in the postwar period, and in part it stems from the nature of their development processes (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1972: 35).

The reform of Venezuelan land tenure dates from the overthrow of Perez Jiménez in 1958. Acción Democrática, which assumed power after the elections of that year, had already promulgated an Agrarian Reform Law during its short-lived interlude between military governments, 1946-1948. In 1959, it continued its previous policy of subdividing public lands through the agency of the Instituto Agrario Nacional (IAN), established by the earlier law. But the full-scale reform began with the new “Ley de Reforma Agraria” in March 1960. It permits expropriation of lands which are not being adequately used, with the object of replacing the “latifundio system by a just system of property, land tenure and production, based on the equitable distribution of the farmlands, the proper organisation of credit, and the provision of full-scale assistance” (Instituto Agrario Nacional, 1969).

The fundamental reality of Latin America during the 1970s will be the efforts of governments to reduce their countries' dependence on the developed world and thereby increase their autonomy within the international system. A salient aspect of this effort is and will be a redefinition of the role multinational corporations play in Latin American societies. Foreign investment will continue to play an important part in the economic life of the region, but the acceptable characteristics and behaviors of multinational corporations will differ substantially from those which were prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s.

The rationale for a restructuring of the relationship of Latin American economies with the system of international trade and investment is found in the writings of “dependence theorists” such as Theotonio Dos Santos (1970) and Osvaldo Sunkel (1972). In a sense, their approach can be seen as a development of the Prebisch thesis of the 1950s, which held that Latin American economies were being systematically diverted from attaining their true potential through the workings of the international trade mechanism.

For many years the vague notion has circulated that the United States and Mexico were on the verge of war in 1927. Howard Cline (1965: 209) cited unspecified “Mexican sources” as purportedly revealing that Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg and Ambassador James R. Sheffield in Mexico City were “purposely trying to provoke some Mexican act that could be used as a pretext for American intervention.” Former Mexican President Emilio Portes Gil (1964: 396) went further and insisted that American warships had actually mobilized for intervention, only to be thwarted by an “imperturbable” President Calles. These and other such assertions have never been thoroughly analyzed on the basis of available American diplomatic and military records. This article attempts to demonstrate that intervention was highly unlikely. Moreover, circumstantial evidence and logic combine to suggest that the administration of Calvin Coolidge never seriously considered such a move and that rumors of intervention were founded more upon Mexican suspicion and mistrust than upon realities in Washington.

One of the more recent and interesting contributions in the field of development has been the theory of dependence. This theory seeks to explain the most pressing problems of the less-developed world in terms of the relations between the developing and developed areas. Stagnation, unemployment, income inequality, and regional disequilibria are all seen as directly related to a less-developed country's position vis-à-vis the developed and capitalist world. Unfortunately, the theory of dependence has become something of a cause célèbre. It is either eagerly accepted or scornfully rejected as a matter of faith—primarily because of its political implications and overtones. Those who accept it embrace it willfully and rally to defend it against any possible detractors. Those who reject it generally choose to ignore it as either not serious or unworthy of careful attention and consideration.

The “Tenentes” or “lieutenants” were an important factor in Brazilian politics between 1922 and the end of the government of President Castelo Branco early in 1967. They had an active and occasionally decisive role in most major political events for almost half a century. The emergence of the Tenentes in the 1920s was part of a broader movement of discontent with the Old Republic, a relatively loose confederation of states dominated by rural landed interests and the politicians associated with them. Subsequently, the Tenentes played a key part in overthrowing the Old Republic in the Revolution of 1930.

Getúlio Vargas came to power in the 1930 Revolution and stayed in the presidency for fifteen years. As provisional chief executive for more than three years, he suppressed a serious revolt against his authority by the state of Sao Paulo between July and October of 1932, and summoned the assembly that wrote the Constitution of 1934 and chose him to be the first president under it.

The movement toward regional integration is one of the more important features of international economic relations between developing nations during the past decade, and none has been more ambitious in the developing world than the attempt of the five countries of Central America to band together in the Central American Common Market (CACM). The CACM was a dominant force in Central American economic development throughout the decade of the 1960s, and sufficient data are now available to make preliminary judgments about the effects of economic integration upon the intra- and extraregional trade patterns of the isthmus.

The model used in the ensuing analysis is similar to the one postulated by Savage and Deutsch (1960) and Goodman (1963: 197), and is a useful step in preliminary analysis of flow data such as trade flows among countries. The model does not seek to explain such flows, but rather to adjust them or remove the effect of the trade-size factor.

Export-import merchants played a central role in the industrialization of Brazil. Many of the Brazilian Empire's noted entrepreneurs began as merchants, including the Barão de Mauá, perhaps the most famous of all, and the noted Bahian industrialist-philanthropist, Luís Tarquínio. Individual merchants served as cadres and furnished capital for early industrialization in both Bahia (Almeida, 1951: 14) and São Paulo (Dean, 1969: 19-33). That export-import merchants would play a prominent role in Brazilian development, particularly during the Empire, was logical. As intermediaries in an economy largely devoted to exporting and importing, merchants occupied a central position in the Empire's economic structure. Brazil's merchant elite was also a natural vehicle for modernizing influences from abroad because of its international trade connections and its cosmopolitan membership. For new enterprises, merchants were one of the few sources of capital and virtually the only source of business expertise.

UNCTAD III—the most recent United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, meeting in Santiago, Chile, during April and May 1972—provided added evidence of growing world concern about “multinational enterprise.” Expressly, numerous developing countries chose the occasion for official presentations clearly aligning themselves with earlier skeptics elsewhere. Not only did these countries question the presence, practices, and impact of multinational enterprise, but many continued on in their presentations with suggestions, direct or implied, for control measures and mechanisms. Indeed, so pervasive was the undercurrent of disillusionment and disturbance that even some developed countries saw fit to recognize the mood with assorted references, conciliatory or elaborative, in their own formal presentations.

Spanish American fiction, from its earliest moments, has emphasized the whore as a reflection of society and the basic drives of human beings. José Joaquín Fernández de Lizardi's protagonists associate with numerous prostitutes, and one of them, Don Catrín de la Fachenda, works in a whorehouse. Other nineteenth century whores include the sentimental one in Eugenio Cambaceres's Música Sentimental (1884) and the idealistic one in Mercedes Cabello de Carbonera's El Conspirador (1892).

Twentieth century Spanish American fiction is replete with man-eaters like Gallegos's Doña Bárbara, Rivera's Zoraida, Rojas González's Angustias, and with promiscuous types like the oddly named Pura, the sensual dancer of El Embrujo de Sevilla (1922). The prostitute as protagonist, however, enters the century through Augusto D'Halmar's Juana Lucero (1902) and Federico Gamboa's now classic Santa (1903). A poor, seduced, and abandoned country girl, Santa becomes first a high- and then a low-class prostitute in brothels and bordellos.