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Grounding responsibility in something (more) solid

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2018

William Hirstein  and
Katrina Sifferd
William Hirstein
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Elmhurst College, Elmhurst, IL 60126. [email protected]@elmhurst.edu
Katrina Sifferd
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Elmhurst College, Elmhurst, IL 60126. [email protected]@elmhurst.edu
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Abstract

The cases that Doris chronicles of confabulation are similar to perceptual illusions in that, while they show the interstices of our perceptual or cognitive system, they fail to establish that our everyday perception or cognition is not for the most part correct. Doris's account in general lacks the resources to make synchronic assessments of responsibility, partially because it fails to make use of knowledge now available to us about what is happening in the brains of agents.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e47
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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References

Doris, J. M. (2015b). Talking to our selves: Reflection, ignorance, and agency. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hirstein, W. (2005) Brain fiction: Self-deception and the riddle of confabulation. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Hirstein, W., Sifferd, K. & Fagan, T. (2018) Responsible brains: Neuroscience and human culpability. MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar