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Is there only one innate modular system for spatial navigation?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 June 2024
Abstract
Spelke convincingly argues that we should posit six innate modular systems beyond the periphery (i.e., beyond low-level perception and motor control). I focus on the case of spatial navigation (Ch. 3) to claim that there remain powerful considerations in favor of positing additional innate, nonperipheral modules. This opens the door to stronger forms of nativism and nonperipheral modularism than Spelke's.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
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