Protocol 15 inserts a new recital into the Preamble of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) which affirms the primacy of national authorities in securing the effective realization of Convention rights. The article discusses the context for Protocol 15, notably the Brighton Declaration, and the democratic principles it engages. A selective retreat from substantive supranational review towards systemic supranational review in political expression cases may be occurring. The article questions the emerging pattern by which newer and transitional democracies remain subject to strict levels of supranational scrutiny, whilst their more established counterparts look set to be the main beneficiaries.

In recent years there has been a trend towards independent and more transparent ethical regulation for sitting judges, which is said to promote public confidence in the judicial institution, and reflect a move towards accountability and transparency as judicial values. However, regimes governing sitting judges largely fall away when the judge retires from the bench. Increasing longevity and rising numbers of former judges raise complex ethical regulation questions. Drawing on judicial ethics regimes in England and Wales, Australia, the United States and New Zealand, and instances where the conduct of former judges has reflected poorly on the integrity of the judiciary, this article argues that there are strong reasons for extending ethics regulation beyond judicial retirement. By reference to the principles that inform the rules regulating the conduct of sitting judges, we investigate the extent to which misconduct and disciplining regimes should extend to former judges, and whether there is a stronger role for soft instruments and more formalized processes for regulating former judges. In doing so, we propose a model for the development of ethical regulation for former judges.

With the resurgence of the field of international criminal justice in recent decades, expectations have increasingly been placed on international criminal courts to construct consistent and authoritative historical narratives about the mass atrocity situations that fall within their purview. Taking this expectation as its focus, this article seeks to illuminate the historical narrative pluralism that can arise both within and beyond the international criminal courtroom. Within the courtroom, two types of narrative pluralism are identified: first, inter-court narrative pluralism, which arises when different courts examine the same mass atrocity situation from different perspectives; and second, intra-court narrative pluralism, which emerges when narratives constructed within an international criminal judgment are revisited in later cases adjudicated by the same court. Beyond the courtroom, it is contended that even when international criminal courts manage to achieve inter-court and intra-court narrative consistency, in practice a range of social psychological and practical factors tend to generate a gap between the intended meaning of such narratives and their public or social meaning amongst different audiences. By illuminating the historical narrative pluralism that can arise both within and beyond the international criminal courtroom, this article calls for greater critical awareness of the constructed nature of the historical narratives rendered within international criminal judgments, as well as a sobering of the expectations that are typically placed on international criminal courts both with respect to the construction of narratives within the courtroom and their reception beyond it.

The protection of foreign investment by treaties often clashes with the State's sovereign right to investigate economic crimes committed by investors. This article examines the different approaches taken by tribunals to questions concerning admissibility and jurisdiction, applicable law, the standard of review, the burden and standard of proof and deference to actions taken by domestic courts and regulators related to economic crimes. It concludes that investors should not automatically be deprived of treaty protections and their access to investment arbitration blocked. The arbitration agreement, being autonomous from the main contract (or the relevant treaty), should, as a rule, remain valid even if the conduct of investors is tainted by economic crimes. The article calls on investment tribunals to reflect in their awards on the contributory fault of the parties when representatives of States and investors are both complicit in economic crimes. To achieve greater legal certainty and procedural efficiency, a new generation of investment treaties and the practice of investment tribunals should draw on not only applicable domestic law but also existing sources of international law concerning economic crimes or national best practice.

The United Kingdom remains one of the world's last industrialized nations not to have adopted the CISG. The UK CISG debate has endured for decades, with existing analysis largely focusing on competition, assessing the relative merits of the CISG and English law. This article's analysis is complementary; focusing instead on coherence, and the private international law implications of UK accession. This article assesses contractual interpretation, and commodity sales, within an overarching private international law framework. Recognizing the necessity of existing competitive analyses, it makes the case for UK CISG accession on the basis of its complementary coherency perspective.

The technical and legal challenges of attribution in cyberspace prevent the meaningful operation of the international law framework of State responsibility. Despite the anticipation surrounding its publication, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 went no further than its predecessor in offering a cogent legal solution to this problem. Instead, the Manual confined its analysis of attribution to the well-known provisions of the International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility. This article departs from the Tallinn Manual 2.0 in arguing that the due diligence principle offers a preferable and appropriate standard of attribution in cyberspace.

Article 51 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption sets forth the return of assets diverted through corruption as a fundamental principle of the Convention. This raises the question of whether the State where the stolen assets are located is entitled to refuse their repatriation or subject it to certain conditions. This article analyses the Convention and the policy considerations behind it and argues that such a State has a wider discretion over the return of stolen assets than is often thought. Furthermore, the article argues that the rule of law may be better served if States take vigorous action to confiscate the proceeds of corruption regardless of whether they are ultimately repatriated.

While ‘global anti-money laundering (AML)’ regulations aim to detect and deter corrupt ‘politically exposed persons (PEPs)’, they have caused tremendous collateral damage to many innocent PEPs, particularly foreign PEPs. Due to the significant compliance costs of identifying and managing accounts of foreign PEPs coupled with an increased risk of serious fines against compliance failures, financial institutions have voluntarily terminated the accounts of foreign PEPs. Global AML regulations could avoid the collateral damage while maximising the deterrence of corruption if high degrees of coordination along two dimensions are satisfied, namely, transborder coordination and coordination between public enforcement entities and private actors. This study illustrates a cornerstone change made in 2012 to fulfil the first dimension and offers policy recommendations to build on this cornerstone by pursuing coordination along the second dimension.

This article critically examines the role of the Immovable Property Commission, established in 2005 by the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ under pressure from the European Court of Human Rights, to redress losses sustained by Greek Cypriots who fled south when the island was partitioned in the mid-1970s. While the Commission has been a modest success, proceedings have been lengthy, its decisions lack transparency, there have been difficulties with restitution and exchange, and the payment of compensation has often been delayed. Corporate ownership and encumbrances, such as mortgages, have also proved problematic. But, whether it contributes negatively or positively to full resolution of the Cyprus problem, or makes no contribution at all, remains to be seen.