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A role for normativism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

Igor Douven
Igor Douven
Affiliation:
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, 9712 GL Groningen, The Netherlands. [email protected]/staff/i.e.j.douven/index
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Abstract

Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue against prescriptive normativism and in favor of descriptivism. I challenge the assumption, implicit in their article, that there is a choice to be made between the two approaches. While descriptivism may be the right approach for some questions, others call for a normativist approach. To illustrate the point, I briefly discuss two questions of the latter sort.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 5 , October 2011 , pp. 252 - 253
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

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