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Presuming placeholders are relevant enables conceptual change

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2011

Christophe Heintz
Christophe Heintz
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Central European University, H-1051 Budapest, Hungary. [email protected]://christophe.heintz.free.fr/
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Abstract

Placeholders enable conceptual change only if presumed to be relevant (e.g., lead to the formation of true beliefs) even though their meaning is not yet fully understood and their cognitive function not yet specified. Humans are predisposed to make such presumptions in a communicative context. Specifying the role of the presumption of relevance in conceptual change would provide a more comprehensive account of Quinian bootstrapping.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 3 , June 2011 , pp. 131 - 132
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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