In September 2014, a healthy male child was born in Sweden following a successful uterine transplantation (UTx). The event brought hope to many women without functional uteruses around the world. Having a child with a transplanted uterus is now possible, and as knowledge of the procedure proliferates and interest in UTx grows, it is important to begin thinking about how a scarce supply of uteruses will be allocated. This article represents a first discussion of the range of factors that must be considered in answering the allocation question. The primary issues addressed are (1) the motivation to seek treatment, (2) allocation by age, (3) child-rearing capacity, and (4) the amount of infertility treatment required. A set of eligibility and ranking criteria are presented. These criteria are not exhaustive but are intended to spark discussion about how uteruses can be allocated in a just manner.

This article discusses the suggestion of having the notion of solidarity as the foundational value for welfare scheme reforms. Solidarity is an emerging concept in bioethical deliberations emphasizing the need for value-oriented discussion in revising healthcare structures, and the notion has been contrasted with liberal justice and rights. I suggest that this contrast is unnecessary, flawed, and potentially counterproductive. As necessary as the sense of solidarity is in a society, it is an insufficient concept to secure the goals related to social responsibility. The discussion on solidarity is also based on a questionable sense of nostalgia. Furthermore, solidarity and liberal justice share essential objectives concerning welfare schemes; therefore, the question arises whether the proper comparison should in the first place be within justice and solidarity.

The American College of Physicians in its ethics manual endorsed the idea that physicians ought to improve their ability to provide care to their patients more parsimoniously. This elicited a critical backlash; critics essentially claimed that what was being endorsed was a renamed form of rationing. In a recent article, Tilburt and Cassel argued that parsimonious care and rationing are ethically distinct practices. In this essay I critically assess that claim. I argue that in practice there is considerable overlap between what they term parsimonious care and what they define as rationing. The same is true of the Choosing Wisely campaign endorsed by the American Board of Internal Medicine. In both cases, if the goal is to control healthcare costs by reducing the use of marginally beneficial care that is not cost effective, then a public conversation about the justness of specific choices is essential.

In the 2015 David Kopf Lecture on Neuroethics of the Society for Neuroscience, Dr. Joseph Fins presents his work on neuroethics and disorders of consciousness through the experience of Maggie and Nancy Worthen, a young woman who sustained a severe brain injury and her mother who cared for her. The central protagonists in his book, Rights Come to Mind: Brain Injury, Ethics and the Struggle for Consciousness (Cambridge University Press, 2015), their experience is emblematic of the challenges faced by families touched by severe brain injury and the possibility for improved diagnosis and treatment offered by progress in neuroscience. By telling their story, and those of other families interviewed as part of the research for Rights Come to Mind, Fins calls for improved care for this population arguing that this is both an access to care issue and a civil and disability rights issue worthy of greater societal attention.

This article analyzes the criteria for the distribution of healthcare services through different justice theories such as utilitarianism and liberalism, pointing out the problems that arise when providing services to a culturally diverse population. The international epidemiological setting is a favorable one for discussing personal responsibility and luck egalitarianism; however, some provisions have to be made so that healthcare institutions do not treat ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic minorities unfairly. The article concludes by proposing that accommodations and culturally sensible attention should be provided when possible, without affecting the equal opportunity of others to access these services.

Consciousness defines us as persons. It allows us to have both pleasurable and painful experiences. I present four neurological conditions in the clinical setting to explore how consciousness can be beneficial or harmful to patients: intraoperative awareness, prolonged disorders of consciousness, locked-in syndrome, and the effects of narcotics and sedation on terminally ill patients. The ethical significance of consciousness for patients in these conditions depends on two factors: the content of one’s experience and whether one can report this content to others. I argue that the value or disvalue of phenomenal consciousness, what it is like to be aware, may depend on its relation to access consciousness, the ability to report or communicate the content of awareness. Phenomenal consciousness can have disvalue when one wants or expects to be unconscious. It can also have disvalue in the absence of access consciousness because it can allow the patient to experience pain and suffer. Technology that enabled neurologically compromised patients to reliably communicate their experience and wishes could benefit and prevent harm to them. More generally, the neurological conditions I discuss raise the question of when and in what respects consciousness is preferable to unconsciousness.

The Criminal Code of Canada prohibits persons from aiding or abetting suicide and consenting to have death inflicted on them. Together, these provisions have prohibited physicians from assisting patients to die. On February 6, 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada declared void these provisions insofar as they “prohibit physician-assisted death for a competent adult person who (1) clearly consents to the termination of life and (2) has a grievous and irremediable medical condition (including an illness, disease or disability) that causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances of his or her condition.” This declaration of invalidity was scheduled to take effect one year (later extended by six months) after the ruling, to give the government time to put legislation in place. We trace the history of this decision, discuss how it has forever changed the debate on physician-assisted dying, and identify the issues that must be resolved to write the legislation. Of special importance here are the topics of access, safeguards, and conscientious objection.

What is in the best interests of a child, and could that ever include interventions that we might regard as prima facie detrimental to a child’s physical well-being? This question is raised a fortiori by growth attenuation treatments in children with severe neurological disorders causing extreme developmental delay. I argue that two principles that provide guidance in generating a conception of best interests for each individual child yield the right results in such cases. The principles are as follows: the potentiality principle, whereby every child should be able to develop its potential and is entitled to receive certain help in doing so, and the principle of psychosomatic harmony, whereby every human being is entitled to treatment that is appropriate to or enables a life in which mind and body are in tune with each other. These principles indicate a certain response to what we can call Ashley-type cases and admit certain caveats.