International criminal law has made impressive strides over the past twenty years. The 1990s and 2000s saw the establishment of ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR), the coming into being of the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC), and the birth of several internationalized ‘hybrid’ jurisdictions, notably the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). However, the dynamic development of international criminal law into a new branch of public international law has also led to some problems and confusion. The rules and principles developed by the newly founded international criminal tribunals have sometimes seemed at odds with accepted views on public international law more generally – raising fears about the ‘fragmentation’ of the law. Perhaps the best-known example of this is the controversy over the ‘overall-control’ test developed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadić case to determine under which circumstances armed forces may be considered to be acting on behalf of a third state, rendering an internal armed conflict international. The Tadić test differed from the ‘effective-control’ test developed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua case and confirmed in the Bosnia Genocide case, where the ICJ specifically rejected the ICTY approach. Also more generally, the discussion on ‘fragmentation’ and international criminal law continues; recently, Elies van Sliedregt set out in these pages her vision of legal pluralism in international criminal law.

How should international law deal with the uncertainty arising from the rise of irregular forms of warfare? In the past decade, this question has been the topic of several reports produced by international groups of experts in the field of conflict and security law. The most recent examples include the study on the notion of the ‘direct participation in hostilities’ under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Tallinn Manual on cyberwarfare prepared at the invitation of NATO. In this article, we discuss the Tallinn Manual, showing how experts faced with uncertainty as to the law's precise scope and meaning construct legal interpretations, legal definitions, and institutional facts and norms that can be used to make sense of a contingent world. At the same time, we argue, this absorption of uncertainty produces new uncertainty. Consequently, the power of experts does not reside in their knowledge, but in their control and management of uncertainty and non-knowledge.

On 30 September 2011, the US citizen Anwar al-Awlaki was killed in Yemen in what has become the most controversial incident of US ‘targeted killing’, or, as its critics would prefer, of the US practice of ‘extrajudicial executions’. This controversy over wording expresses a profound disagreement over the legal status of the US drone program. Target killing suggests that the drone program may be legally regulated. Extrajudicial execution suggests that it falls outside the realm of legality. This article does not seek to settle which terminology is the most appropriate. Instead it analyses the legal expertise struggling to do so and its implications. More specifically, it focuses on the processes through which drones constitute the legal expertise that constitutes the drone program as one of targeted killings and of extrajudicial executions; that is, on a process of co-constitution. Drawing theoretical inspiration from and combining new materialist approaches (especially as articulated by Bruno Latour) with the sociological approach of Pierre Bourdieu, the article shows that drones have ‘agency’ in the ‘field’ of legal expertise pertaining to the drone program. Drones are redrawing the boundaries of legal expertise both by making associations to new forms of expertise and by generating technological expert roles. They are also renegotiating what is valuable to expertise. Drones are making both transparency and secrecy core to expertise. However, and contrary to what is often claimed, this agency does not inescapably lead to the normalization of targeted killings. The article therefore concludes that acknowledging the agency of drones is important for understanding how legal expertise is formed but especially for underscoring the continued potential for controversy and politics.

Security measures taken in the name of the ‘war on terror’ have frequently been understood to operate through a domain of exception, defined as an extra-legal space of intervention where normal rules of juridical protection and due process are suspended. Yet whilst most analyses of the exception are critically reliant on notions of legal threshold, they are largely dismissive of the potentially productive nature of legal contestation. This article inquires into the dynamic confrontation between law and exception in the context of the UN 1267 sanctions system, focusing on the Office of the Ombudsperson as an institutional experiment designed to remedy the fundamental rights deficiencies of the regime. Drawing on Agamben's analysis of the exception as a ‘hybrid space’ and Dyzenhaus's concept of the ‘legal grey hole’, our analysis of the Ombudsperson demonstrates the emergence of novel, hybrid procedures and evidentiary standards being deployed in the 1267 delisting process. First, we assess the Ombudsperson's logics of decision-making and argue that their appeals to fairness hinge on the production of a temporal chasm that legitimizes the deployment of intelligence material in listing cases. Second, we show that the Ombudsperson is in the process of carving out novel evidential standards that are more attentive to notions of inference and speculation than conventional standards of proof. These standards serve to fortify the use of sanctions as a pre-emptive security measure and do not, in principle, appear to exclude material that may be obtained by torture.

Responding to an urgent request by the authorities of Mali, France launched Operation Serval against several terrorist armed groups in January 2013. The French troops were assisted by a Chadian contingent and by forces progressively deployed by other African countries within a UNSC authorized African force (Resolution 2085). While the French and African military operations in Mali were clearly legal, they raise important questions of jus ad bellum in relation to the two legal arguments put forward to justify them: intervention by invitation, and UNSC authorization. In this paper we first discuss the general rules of international law applying to intervention by invitation. We explain that such an intervention could sometimes be contrary to the principle of self-determination and we propose a purpose-based approach. We then apply these rules to the situation in Mali and conclude that the French and Chadian interventions were legal because, on the one hand, the request was validly formulated by the internationally recognized government of Mali and, on the other hand, their legitimate purpose was to fight terrorism. The UNSC approved this legal basis and ‘helped’ France and Chad appeal validly to it by listing the enemy as ‘terrorist groups’. It gave its ‘blessing’ to these interventions, without authorizing them, and observed the events with relief. The adoption of Resolution 2100 on 25 April 2013 raises new legal questions. The Council creates a UN peace enforcement mission in Mali, MINUSMA, which has a robust use-of-force mandate. Created just a few weeks after the DRC Intervention Brigade, this force seems to indicate an ongoing evolution (revolution?) in UN peacekeeping, notwithstanding the assurances by some UNSC member states that MINUSMA will avoid ‘offensive counter-terrorism operations’. At the same time Resolution 2100 gives a restricted use-of-force mandate to France (to protect MINUSMA), without challenging the legal validity of intervention by invitation for all other tasks. The conflict in Mali might thus remain for some time yet between the latitude of UNSC authorization and the longitude of unilateral intervention by invitation.

Given the centrality of law in the creation, decision-making, and impact of the United Nations Security Council, the deliberative discourses among Security Council Members, and the necessity for China to articulate its reasons publicly for its actions within the Security Council, the roles that China plays within the Security Council illuminate and clarify its approaches to the current international legal order. This article explains how law serves as a constitutional–normative framework within which the Security Council must function, followed by a discussion of how the Security Council in turn may serve as a locus of deliberative discourses that delineate, influence, and constrain its members’ state behaviours. It challenges the view that law plays a limited role on matters of international security by exploring China's voting behaviour in the Security Council and the arguments that it has proffered. It also discusses how China may respond to a draft Security Council resolution aimed at its conduct other than simply by vetoing it, and how it has taken a proactive role in the maintenance of international peace and security through the Security Council.

On 19 November 2012, the International Court of Justice gave its judgment concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia. This judgment includes several important issues which need serious consideration, such the as legal status of maritime features, the interpretation and application of Article 121 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the methodology of maritime delimitations, the role of proportionality in maritime delimitations, and the impact of the judgment upon third states and effect of Article 59 of the ICJ Statute. Focusing on these issues, this contribution aims to analyse the judgment of 2012 from a viewpoint of the international law of the sea, in particular, the law of maritime delimitation.

This keynote address delivered to a Conference on Evidence in International Criminal Tribunals at University College Dublin in November 2011 considers how differently evidentiary issues are dealt with by international criminal tribunals from domestic tribunals. It is argued that, although there are jurisdictional differences affecting what international prosecutors have to prove before international criminal tribunals, many of the problems and difficulties that beset international tribunals are also to be found in domestic tribunals and both types of tribunal have similar duties and issues to grapple with.

This paper draws on some of the preliminary findings of a small pilot study which aimed to discover what evidentiary challenges a range of practitioners with experience of different international trials faced in the cases they were involved in, and what practices were developed to deal with these challenges. The findings in this study are based on the data collected from The Hague-based institutions, the ICC, the ICTY, the ICTY and ICTR Appeals Chamber, and the Special Tribunal for the Lebanon (STL). It is argued that professionals moving from institution to institution are engaged in a process of cross-pollination which itself influences the practices that develop, although a common understanding of certain evidentiary issues in international trials remains fragmented and at times elusive.

This article introduces some quantitative and qualitative analysis on the use of written witness statements in lieu of oral testimony at trial to assess in practice the impact of the rules on the admissibility of written witness testimony before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. It traces pieces of evidence admitted under the newer, more liberal, rules on written witness testimony from admissibility to judgment, to establish what impact, if any, these rules have had in practice and whether the critique that such rules might jeopardize fair-trial standards has been realized. The analysis illustrates that the newer rules on admissibility are used with relative infrequency in some tribunals, but that the admission of such statements could raise the question of equality of arms in others, given that the more liberal rules on written statements tend to be used more frequently by the prosecution than by the defence. It will be shown that some chambers have continued to emphasize the importance of oral testimony and have taken a very cautious approach when weighing written testimony, whilst others have suggested that written testimony that was not subject to full cross-examination should not, in principle, be given less weight than oral testimony. The ‘totality of the evidence’ approach in weighing the evidence will be analysed from a practical standpoint, and it will be shown that recent Appeals Chamber jurisprudence suggests that trial chambers may need to take a more particularized approach to pieces of evidence in the future.

The nature of international criminal trial practice is integral to the perception of the legitimacy of international criminal justice. However, our understanding of what transpires within the trial chambers of international courts and tribunals (ICTs) comes primarily from the reports of judges, lawyers, and stakeholders within the system. This article argues that, while the vast body of international criminal justice scholarship barely draws on socio-legal research, empirical work can contribute to a more objective understanding of international criminal trial practice. It examines prevailing academic approaches to the study of international trial practice as a backdrop to the assessment of data from one of the most expansive empirical studies of international trial practice, undertaken during the second mandate (1999–2003) of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The findings illustrate significant variations in how judges in different Trial Chambers chose to exercise discretion, revealing the co-existence of two distinct modalities of practice in ‘proactive’ and ‘reactive’ Trial Chambers. Quantitative and qualitative data allow for an assessment of the efficiency of these modalities, revealing the critical role of the performance of the judge in the trial process. It is argued that these findings highlight the potential for further socio-legal research to motivate ‘light-touch reform’ within the international criminal justice system.

The ICC's early history indicates that more attention must be paid to the investigative practices of the Office of the Prosecutor. The judicial record to date, and the increasing dissatisfaction amongst affected communities with the Court's work, belies the desirability of the ‘light-touch,’ low-cost approach to investigations that has hitherto been championed. Rather than positioning the ICC as a remote site of justice, the Office must locate its investigative work more thoroughly on the territories in which it is engaged. The composition of its staff has also been insufficiently reflective of the countries under investigation and its relationships with individuals and institutions on the ground poorly managed. Despite relying heavily on the knowledge that these local actors can bring, the OTP has too often employed a unilateral approach to evidence gathering, failing to integrate their concerns and priorities into the investigative process.

Hans Kelsen's vast body of work is perhaps one of the best examples of the unremarkable but important point that one's legal theory and methodological choices are intricately tied up with how one understands international law. Kelsen stands for a huge number of different positions, but chief amongst them must be his insistence on developing a ‘pure’ theory of law that accounted for the unique normativity of law, separate from empirical facts and causality on the one hand, and substantive theories of justice on the other. For Kelsen, the unique normativity of law is found within the legal system itself, in the idea of normative imputation – the ‘linking of a conditioning material fact with a conditioned consequence’. According to Kelsen, this specifically legal sense of ‘ought’ is an a priori category that allows us to correctly cognize the legal meaning of empirical data.