Promising somewhat more than anyone expects to be delivered remains ingrained in international agreements, clouding their expected aggregate outcomes and how to assess the Parties’ performance. This persistence is explained by systematic overpromising being predictable and, up to a point, productive. I characterize this regime and its consequences and provide an empirical application to the Kyoto Protocol. Overpromising by governments or Parties can be part of a sustainable strategy for electoral success, and varies with socio-economic determinants that characterize the group regime. Thus targets need to be adjusted for regression-predicted overpromising to reveal the rationally-expected outcomes and individual countries’ performance is best identified by deviations of outcomes from their adjusted rather than the agreed targets.

Governance has become one of the central concepts in political science, but what is absent is the question: Which modes of governance produce which policy output? This paper develops a classification scheme for modes of governance in all dimensions of public policy and then applies it empirically in four Austrian case studies concerning higher education and innovation. We extend the scholarly discussion on governance to the factor interests and argue that this analytical factor needs to be taken into account in future research in order to understand the modes of governance in policy processes.

During the 1990s, some OECD countries succeeded in reducing their budget deficits. The average public debt ratio fell from more than 70 per cent of GDP in 1996 to about 63 per cent of GDP in 2001. Up to now, researchers have mainly focused on the economic effects of these consolidation efforts. This paper answers another question: How can balanced budgets be achieved? By means of a detailed review of nine budget consolidations, the study identifies different roads to successful fiscal adjustments, starting with a critical review of the definition of budget consolidation. We find a pattern on the expenditure side that follows different worlds of the welfare state. On the revenue side however, the tax structure seems to be more path-dependent and mainly driven by long-term developments. In the last section, we show that institutional reforms constitute very important components of budget consolidations.

Why do German policymakers support some aspects of a single European pension market, but not others? This article argues that the German government’s preferences towards European Union (EU) pension directives are best explained by combining historical institutionalism (HI) and domestic discourse analysis (DA). Each approach by itself is insufficient to account for the observed variation between 1991 and 2007. Arguments based on party ideologies offer less explanatory power. HI explains why all governments – Kohl, Schröder, and Merkel – protected employer-sponsored book reserve pensions, a cornerstone of Germany’s coordinated market economy, from the scope of EU directives. DA allows us to grasp how interests were reframed. While the status quo stance of the Kohl government succeeded in delegitimizing supporters of alternative pension security concepts, the Schröder administration imposed an economically efficient pension reform without much public support. The grand coalition, in turn, abandoned Chancellor Merkel’s initial plan to expand second-tier pensions in the light of rising pressures that the Left Party posed for the Social Democratic coalition partner.