Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-vdxz6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T17:33:03.097Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Performance Measurement under Rational International Overpromising Regimes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 2008

GEORGE M. VON FURSTENBERG
Affiliation:
Economics Department, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA e-mail: [email protected]

Abstract

Promising somewhat more than anyone expects to be delivered remains ingrained in international agreements, clouding their expected aggregate outcomes and how to assess the Parties’ performance. This persistence is explained by systematic overpromising being predictable and, up to a point, productive. I characterize this regime and its consequences and provide an empirical application to the Kyoto Protocol. Overpromising by governments or Parties can be part of a sustainable strategy for electoral success, and varies with socio-economic determinants that characterize the group regime. Thus targets need to be adjusted for regression-predicted overpromising to reveal the rationally-expected outcomes and individual countries’ performance is best identified by deviations of outcomes from their adjusted rather than the agreed targets.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)