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Theories or fragments?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2017

Nick Chater  and
Mike Oaksford
Nick Chater
Affiliation:
Behavioural Science Group, Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www.wbs.ac.uk/about/person/nick-chater/
Mike Oaksford
Affiliation:
Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London, London WC1E 7HX, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www.bbk.ac.uk/psychology/our-staff/mike-oaksford
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Abstract

Lake et al. argue persuasively that modelling human-like intelligence requires flexible, compositional representations in order to embody world knowledge. But human knowledge is too sparse and self-contradictory to be embedded in “intuitive theories.” We argue, instead, that knowledge is grounded in exemplar-based learning and generalization, combined with high flexible generalization, a viewpoint compatible both with non-parametric Bayesian modelling and with sub-symbolic methods such as neural networks.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 40 , 2017 , e258
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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