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Scientific intuitions about the mind are wrong, misled by consciousness
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 June 2016
Abstract
Logic is a fundamental reason why computational accounts of the mind have failed. Combinatorial complexity preventing computational accounts is equivalent to the Gödelian incompleteness of logic. The mind is not logical, but only logical states and processes in the mind are accessible to subjective consciousness. For this reason, intuitions of psychologists, cognitive scientists, and mathematicians modeling the mind are biased toward logic. This is also true about the changes proposed in After Phrenology (Anderson 2014).
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016
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Target article
Précis of After Phrenology: Neural Reuse and the Interactive Brain
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Author response
Reply to reviewers: Reuse, embodied interactivity, and the emerging paradigm shift in the human neurosciences