Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-2plfb Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-26T12:22:15.142Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

What is evaluative normativity, that we (maybe) should avoid it?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

Jonathan M. Weinberg
Jonathan M. Weinberg
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721-0027. [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue that we should avoid evaluative normativity in our psychological theorizing. But there are two crucial issues lacking clarity in their presentation of evaluative normativity. One of them can be resolved through disambiguation, but the other points to a deeper problem: Evaluative normativity is too tightly-woven in our theorizing to be easily disentangled and discarded.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 5 , October 2011 , pp. 274 - 275
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Goldman, A. (1979) What is justified belief? In: Justification and knowledge, ed. Pappas, G., pp. 1–23. Reidel.Google Scholar
Kornblith, H. (2003) Knowledge and its place in nature. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Over, D. E. (2000) Ecological issues: A reply to Todd, Fiddick, and Krauss. Thinking and Reasoning 6(4):385–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weinberg, J. M. (2007) Moderate epistemic relativism and our epistemic goals. Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4(1):66–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar