This article analyses the differences in voting behaviour of the selectorate and electorate of the Italian Partito Democratico (PD) in 2013, particularly focussing on the role played by leadership, ideology, and media in affecting voting decisions. We study the different motivations underlying the decision to vote for the PD in the 2013 Italian general election or for each one of the three candidates to party leadership in the 2013 PD leadership selection race. The empirical analysis uses 2013 Italian National Election Study and 2013 Candidate & Leader Selection data. Results of the analysis show that leadership evaluation has a stronger influence on the selectorate than on the electorate and that the perceived distance between voters and the party on the left-right continuum has a stronger impact on the electorate than on the selectorate. Moreover, the analysis underlines that media are substantially not a relevant factor explaining voting behaviour of PD’s electorate and selectorate. These findings confirm the relevancy of leadership evaluation in intra-party competitions and open a new perspective to study leader selection races.

This analysis challenges the consensus that, in post-war Italy the Catholic party [Democrazia Cristiana (Dc)], actively supported by the Catholic Church, fostered a process of vote nationalization. The paper, drawing upon a more fine-grained level of analysis, different statistical measures, and within and across regional models, provides a more nuanced interpretation. According to our analysis, although the Dc effectively acted as a homogenizing agent until the late 1970s, after that decade the processes of modernization and secularization fostered the decline of religious-based politics, and of the Dc itself. Such decline opened the way for the re-emergence of a territorial cleavage and a consequent dis-homogenization of Italian electoral politics. The paper demonstrated that the impact of modernization and secularization on the vote for the Catholic party is more significant considering the five Italy’s geo-political areas rather than the country as a whole. Moreover, the divergent path in the five areas testifies the re-emergence of territory in the Italian electoral behaviour. Territorial heterogeneity, modernization, and secularization were central to the collapse of the Dc.

The 2013 Italian parliamentary election was characterized by the outstanding performance of the MoVimento Cinque Stelle, which in its first participation in a general election obtained a remarkable 25% of the national vote. Where did these votes come from? Furthermore, is it possible to observe different electoral dynamics across geographical areas of Italy? In order to address these questions, we first estimate the flow of votes between the 2008 and 2013 general elections by applying an ecological inference method – the Goodman model – to the entire Italian voting population, and then we take a closer look at the differences in the four geopolitical areas in which Italy is traditionally divided. We find that the extraordinary performance of the MoVimento 5 Stelle was largely due to its capacity of attracting similar amounts of former Partito Democratico and Popolo della Libertà supporters, as well as a considerable amount of voters from their traditional allies: Lega Nord and Italia dei Valori. The MoVimento 5 Stelle was also able to mobilize previous non-voters. We shed light on the territorial features of these dynamics.

Populism is being increasingly studied by political and social scientists. This article pays particular attention to the way in which ‘people’ can be approached and appealed to by their leaders. In particular, by undertaking a content analysis of the two most read daily newspapers in Italy, and by relying on the technique of correspondence analysis, this article shows that to fully understand the phenomenon of populism, the way in which ‘the people’ are approached by their leaders cannot be left aside. In doing so, this article empirically analyses and discusses three dimension of populism and contributes to a more granular understanding of this phenomenon in established democracies.

The article examines the content of the constitutional amendments with respect to the Senate. While symmetric bicameralism would be abolished with respect to policymaking, it would be preserved and even exacerbated with respect to constitutional revisions. The consequences of the first would be a reduction of the number of institutional veto players, which would lead to the facilitation of policy change, and an increase in the power of the government (who is the agenda setter). The content of the new policies remains unknown, as are the economic consequences of the proposed changes. Constitutional revisions would become more difficult, because the ideological distance between the Chamber of Deputies and Senate would be likely to increase (because of the mode of selection of Senators), while article 138, which specifies the requirements for amendment to the constitution, would remain the same. As a result, the role of the Italian Constitutional Court would also likely increase.