We study the impact of capital and labor taxation in an economy where couples bargain over the intrahousehold allocation under limited commitment. In this framework more wealth improves commitment and gives rise to insurance gains within the household. Our theory motivates these gains by the empirical observation that wealth, in contrast to labor income, is a commonly held resource within households. Based on this observation we study whether eliminating capital taxes from the economy, and raising labor taxes to balance the government’s budget, may generate welfare gains to married households. We illustrate that the quantitative effects from this reform are rather small. We attribute the small effects to the life cycle pattern of wealth accumulation and to the impact of labor income taxes on household risk sharing: In particular, we show that higher labor taxes may make the limited commitment friction more severe, even though they may make the distribution of labor income more equitable within the household.

The data show that an increase in government provided old-age pensions is strongly correlated with a reduction in fertility. What type of model is consistent with this finding? We explore this question using two models of fertility, the one by Barro and Becker (1989), and the one inspired by Caldwell and developed by Boldrin and Jones (2002). In the Barro and Becker model parents have children because they perceive their children’s lives as a continuation of their own. In the Boldrin and Jones’ framework parents procreate because the children care about their old parents’ utility, and thus provide them with old age transfers. The effect of increases in government provided pensions on fertility in the Barro and Becker model is very small, and inconsistent with the empirical findings. The effect on fertility in the Boldrin and Jones model is sizeable and accounts for between 55 and 65% of the observed Europe–US fertility differences both across countries and across time and over 80% of the observed variation seen in a broad cross section of countries. Another key factor affecting fertility the Boldrin and Jones model is the access to capital markets, which can account for the other half of the observed change in fertility in developed countries over the last 70 years.

This paper provides a closed-form solution for the health capital model of health demand. The results are exploited in order to prove analytically the comparative dynamics of the model. Results are derived for the so-called pure investment model, the pure consumption model and a combination of both types of models. Given the plausible assumptions that (i) health declines with age and that (ii) the health capital stock at death is lower than the health capital stock needed for eternal life, it is shown that the optimal solution implies eternal life.

Bailey and Collins (2011) argue that Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke’s (2005) hypothesis that the baby boom was partly due to a burst of productivity in the household sector is not supported by evidence. This conclusion is based on regression results showing that appliance ownership is negatively correlated with fertility. They also argue that the Amish, who limit the use of modern technology, had a baby boom. First, it is demonstrated that a negative correlation between appliance ownership and fertility can arise naturally in Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke’s model. Second, evidence is presented casting doubt on the presumed technology phobia of the Amish.