No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Questioning the nature and origins of the “social agent” concept
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 June 2024
Abstract
Spelke posits that the concept of “social agent,” who performs object-directed actions to fulfill social goals, is the first noncore concept that infants acquire as they begin to learn their native language. We question this proposal on empirical grounds and theoretical grounds, and propose instead that the representation of object-mediated interactions may be supported by a dedicated prelinguistic mechanism.
- Type
- Open Peer Commentary
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
Aktipis, A., Cronk, L., Alcock, J., Ayers, J. D., Baciu, C., Balliet, D., … Winfrey, P. (2018). Understanding cooperation through fitness interdependence. Nature Human Behaviour, 2(7), 429–431.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Barrett, H. C. (2005). Cognitive development and the understanding of animal behavior. In Eliis, B. J. & Bjorklund, D. F. (Eds.), Origins of the social mind: Evolutionary psychology and child development (pp. 438–467). Guilford.Google Scholar
Begus, K., Curioni, A., Knoblich, G., & Gergely, G. (2020). Infants understand collaboration: Neural evidence for 9-month-olds’ attribution of shared goals to coordinated joint actions. Social Neuroscience, 15(6), 655–667.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Buyukozer Dawkins, M., Sloane, S., & Baillargeon, R. (2019). Do infants in the first year of life expect equal resource allocations?. Frontiers in Psychology, 10, 116.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Fiske, A. P. (1992). The four elementary forms of sociality: Framework for a unified theory of social relations. Psychological Review, 99(4), 689.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Frankenhuis, W. E., & Barrett, H. C. (2013). Design for learning: The case of chasing. In Rutherford, M. D. & Kuhlmeier, V. A. (Eds.), Social perception. Detection and interpretation of animacy, agency, and intention (pp. 171–198). MIT.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Geraci, A., & Surian, L. (2023). Intention-based evaluations of distributive actions by 4-month-olds. Infant Behavior and Development, 70, 101797.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Hamlin, J. K., Wynn, K., & Bloom, P. (2007). Social evaluation by preverbal infants. Nature, 450(7169), 557–559.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Jaeggi, A. V., & Gurven, M. (2013). Natural cooperators: Food sharing in humans and other primates. Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews, 22(4), 186–195.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Jaeggi, A. V., & Van Schaik, C. P. (2011). The evolution of food sharing in primates. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 65, 2125–2140.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kanakogi, Y., Inoue, Y., Matsuda, G., Butler, D., Hiraki, K., & Myowa-Yamakoshi, M. (2017). Preverbal infants affirm third-party interventions that protect victims from aggressors. Nature Human Behaviour, 1(2), 37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mascaro, O., & Csibra, G. (2012). Representation of stable social dominance relations by human infants. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 109(18), 6862–6867.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Newman, J. (1996). Give: A cognitive linguistic study (No. 7). Walter de Gruyter.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Okumura, Y., Kanakogi, Y., Kobayashi, T., & Itakura, S. (2020). Ostension affects infant learning more than attention. Cognition, 195, 104082.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Powell, L. J. (2022). Adopted utility calculus: Origins of a concept of social affiliation. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 17(5), 1215–1233.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Powell, L. J., & Spelke, E. S. (2018). Third-party preferences for imitators in preverbal infants. Open Mind, 2(2), 61–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pun, A., Birch, S. A., & Baron, A. S. (2016). Infants use relative numerical group size to infer social dominance. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 113(9), 2376–2381.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Revencu, B., & Csibra, G. (2023). The missing link between core knowledge and language: Review of Elizabeth Spelke's What Babies Know, Volume 1 (2022). Mind & Language, 38(5), 1314–1322. doi: 10.1111/mila.12482CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scheid, C., Schmidt, J., & Noë, R. (2008). Distinct patterns of food offering and co-feeding in rooks. Animal Behaviour, 76(5), 1701–1707.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schlingloff-Nemecz, L., Tatone, D., & Csibra, G. (2023). The representation of third-party helping interactions in infancy. Annual Review of Developmental Psychology, 5, 67–88. doi: 10.1146/annurev-devpsych-120321-033548CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Spelke, E. S. (2022). What babies know: Core knowledge and composition. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tatone, D. (2022). More than one way to skin a cat: Addressing the arbitration problem in developmental science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 45, e123.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Tatone, D., & Csibra, G. (2020). Infants infer different types of social relations from giving and taking actions. In Denison, M. L., Mack, M. L., Xu, Y., & Armstrong, B. (Eds.), Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 2981–2987). Cognitive Science Society.Google Scholar
Tatone, D., Geraci, A., & Csibra, G. (2015). Giving and taking: Representational building blocks of active resource-transfer events in human infants. Cognition, 137, 47–62.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Tatone, D., Hernik, M., & Csibra, G. (2019). Minimal cues of possession transfer compel infants to ascribe the goal of giving. Open Mind, 3, 31–40.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Thiele, M., Hepach, R., Michel, C., & Haun, D. (2021). Observing others’ joint attention increases 9-month-old infants’ object encoding. Developmental Psychology, 57(6), 837.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Yin, J., Csibra, G., & Tatone, D. (2022). Structural asymmetries in the representation of giving and taking events. Cognition, 229, 105248.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Yin, J., Tatone, D., & Csibra, G. (2020). Giving, but not taking, actions are spontaneously represented as social interactions: Evidence from modulation of lower alpha oscillations. Neuropsychologia, 139, 107363.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Target article
Précis of What Babies Know
Related commentaries (25)
Concepts, core knowledge, and the rationalism–empiricism debate
Core knowledge and its role in explaining uniquely human cognition: Some questions
Core knowledge as a neuro-ethologist views it
Core knowledge, visual illusions, and the discovery of the self
Developmental origin of a language–cognition interface in infants: Gateway to advancing core knowledge?
Divisive language
Early pragmatic expectations in human infancy
Evidence for core social goal understanding (and, perhaps, core morality) in preverbal infants
How do babies come to know what babies know?
How important is it to learn language rather than create it?
Investigating infant knowledge with representational similarity analysis
Is core knowledge a natural subdivision of infant cognition?
Is there only one innate modular system for spatial navigation?
Learning in the social being system
More than language is needed to represent and combine different core knowledge components
Not all core knowledge systems are created equal, and they are subject to revision in both children and adults
Perceptual (roots of) core knowledge
Questioning the nature and origins of the “social agent” concept
Substances as a core domain
The brain origins of early social cognition
The key to understanding core knowledge resides in the fetus
The role of language in transcending core knowledge
What we don't know about what babies know: Reconsidering psychophysics, exploration, and infant behavior
Where is the baby in core knowledge?
Wired for society? From ego-logy to eco-logy
Author response
Response to commentaries on What Babies Know