Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 May 2013
Although predictive coding may offer a computational principle that unifies perception and action, states with different directions of fit are involved (with indicative and imperative contents, respectively). Predictive states are adjusted to fit the world in the course of perception, but in the case of action, the corresponding states act as a fixed target towards which the agent adjusts the world. This well-recognised distinction helps side-step some problems discussed in the target article.
Target article
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
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Are we predictive engines? Perils, prospects, and the puzzle of the porous perceiver