Nowadays, a growing number of firms utilize corporate lobbying to advocate for more environmentally friendly policies and regulations, deviating from the traditional lobbying mainly used to minimize regulatory burdens. In this study, we investigate what motivates firms to engage in such an unusual type of lobbying—environmental lobbying. Focusing on the product strategy of firms, we suggest that firms with greater green product intensity are more likely to engage in environmental lobbying. When environmental lobbying raises environmental hurdles in the market, firms with an intensive focus on green products can bear adjustment costs with little effort, leaving other “less green” firms relatively disadvantaged under the newly regulated market conditions. Moreover, those firms can address demand-side issues more easily by lobbying the government to provide greater incentives for purchasing green products or to request subsidies that can be used to improve their cost structure. Our analyses based on the US light vehicle market indicate that, indeed, the more electric vehicles automakers sell relative to their total sale volumes, the more they will engage in environmental lobbying. We also find that this relationship becomes more salient when a firm has greater market share or originally comes from a foreign country with more stringent environmental regulations than the United States.

We argue that a taken-for-granted category gives way to a new category when strategic behavior becomes stigmatized. As a result, even bystander firms that have engaged in similar strategic behavior, such as lobbying, will be penalized by their association with the culpable strategic behavior. The extent of their association with the culpable behavior will determine the level of punishment they receive. However, if a trustworthy third party administers a corrective measure, the affected firms can regain their lost legitimacy. The extent of their restoration is proportional to the amount of legitimacy that was lost. We provide empirical evidence for this argument by analyzing the Jack Abramoff case, one of the most notorious corrupt lobbying cases in US history. We find that bystander firms were penalized by shareholders when the corrupt lobbying was revealed. Furthermore, the penalty was more severe for bystander firms that engaged in more lobbying activities and hired more revolving-door lobbyists. We also find that the subsequent legal remedy helped the bystander firms that were penalized the most to recover the most from their losses. We confirm the theoretical notion using the Enron case as well.

Research has examined the impact of the “entrepreneurial university” on regional socioeconomic development by focusing on the entrepreneurial intentions and performance of alumni, staff, and students. The study of impact, to date, has focused on direct and short-term mechanisms, such as alumni's entrepreneurial activities, faculty spin-outs, and active public engagement with policy agendas. Our point of departure is in conceptualizing and empirically testing a longer-term and more systemic mechanism. We theorize and empirically test how the entrepreneurial university imprints on its graduates, some of whom take on leadership positions in innovation policymaking years later. We test this relationship by employing a text-as-data approach to examine the extent to which innovation policy leaders speak about startup-centric innovation, comparing the media coverage of entrepreneurial university alumni relative to their peers. Our original dataset comprises the 485 individuals who held senior innovation policy positions in East Asia's eleven largest economies from 1998 to 2019, detailing their educational background and media coverage (10,816 documents). We conceptualize the “alumni policymaker” mechanism, which constitutes entrepreneurial university alumni shaping the future of national innovation policy by referring to startup-centric innovation three times more than their peers. Those who completed MBAs at entrepreneurial universities express an even greater preference for startup-centric innovation policy.

To lobby legislators, it is important for interest groups to signal their ability to help legislators win elections and provide them with policy-relevant information. We explore for-profit companies’ use of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) reports as a signaling device to promote their reputation to legislators and convey their ability to provide electoral and policymaking support, which is valuable for lobbying. To this end, we create a panel dataset by combining ESG reports issued by US companies and the same companies’ lobbying and campaign contribution records from 1999 to 2017. We expect companies to issue more ESG reports, as well as reports containing more quantitative content, when they lobby. The data conform to our expectations. We also reason that lobbying may be more strongly related to ESG reporting when it is coupled with campaign contributions made by affiliated corporate political action committees, but the data do not support this expectation.

There has been a brewing argument on the effects of economic globalization on the repression of human rights. My argument in this article joins the optimistic perspective on the relationship between the globalizing economy and state repression. I argue that governments consider backlash from investors in their decisions about whether to use repression. Investors, motivated by international human rights norms and a fear of violent conflict, would prefer that governments not introduce brute force into a nonviolent protest. Thus, governments in countries that depend more on foreign direct investment (FDI) should be less likely to use violence against protesters than those that are less dependent on FDI. Using data analysis of protest events and inward FDI stock, I test this argument and find a negative relationship between these two variables.

An efficient allocation of talents through occupational choice is central to modern economic growth. Removing developmental barriers unfavorable to entrepreneurship and artificially imposed for political reasons (i.e., the cage theory) might be a plausible channel for China's superb economic performance. Using a newly compiled dataset on China's Super Rich Persons, the regression kink design reports supportive evidence on the politically induced structural change in the social composition of entrepreneurs using Deng Xiaoping's Southern Talks as an event shock. Consistent with a pro-market talent allocation framework, this article finds that (1) the share of super-rich entrepreneurs with state sector experience and a college degree declined, suggesting that the period of the Southern Talks opened a window of opportunity for venturing, and (2) the effects on the attributes of the parental father of the entrepreneurs are somewhat limited.