A future multilateral investment court (MIC) or multilateral appellate mechanism (MAM) will operate on a plurilateral basis, among States that become parties to the tribunal's constitutive instrument and grant it jurisdiction over disputes under their investment treaties. The creation of a MIC or MAM would involve a significant strengthening and centralization of dispute settlement institutions in the investment treaty regime, which is already overly dependent on law-development by adjudicators, reflected in well-established concerns about loss of State control. Thus, a key challenge in designing a MIC or MAM is to incorporate appropriate control mechanisms that will enable State input, without unduly undermining a MIC or MAM's independence. This article analyses control mechanisms in a MIC or MAM, considering a wide range of questions of institutional design. It highlights two fundamental tensions. One is the tension between independence and accountability. The other tension is between procedural multilateralism and substantive bilateralism. While the procedural law in a MIC or MAM will have been multilateralized, the substantive law the tribunal will interpret and apply will remain contained in mostly bilateral investment treaties, controlled by the parties to those agreements. This article addresses the challenges of designing a multilateral tribunal for a regime that lacks multilateral substantive law and contributes to wider debates over striking an appropriate balance between international judicial independence and Member State control.

Marine war risk insurance fundamentally contemplates casualties caused by international conflict. Curiously, however, standard clauses also exclude cover and automatically terminate war risk policies in the event of an outbreak of war between a select group of historically powerful States: China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Russia. This article aims to demystify the origins of this five-powers clause and evaluate its prospective application through the lens of an emerging breed of confrontation among the world's major powers.

On 22 June 2022 the Bill of Rights Bill to replace the Human Rights Act 1998 was introduced to the United Kingdom (UK) Parliament. Just over a year later, it was withdrawn. This was not a minor update, as claimed by the Conservative government, but a wholesale revision of a fundamental feature of UK constitutional arrangements. Given that the UK has no codified constitution, it is not out of the ordinary for constitutional change to proceed via ordinary Act of Parliament. But what was unusual was the informal methods used by the government in its attempt to push through its bill of rights. Searching for a word or phrase to capture what happened over this time in the UK is difficult, not only because of the absence of a conventional method for constitutional change. Most scholarship focuses on formal rather than informal processes for amendment. The purpose of this article is therefore to make a contribution towards filling this gap by introducing the phrase ‘autocratic method’ to describe a particular method of constitutional change as opposed to its substance. Using existing scholarship, and examples from other States, a preliminary definition and essential features of the autocratic method are set out. Further detail is gained through a study of the attempted replacement of the Human Rights Act. Whilst the Bill of Rights Bill is no longer going ahead, this episode in UK constitutional history contains important lessons not just for the UK but for any State embarking on a process of constitutional change.

The Parties to the Paris Agreement have committed to communicate successive ‘nationally determined contributions’ (NDCs) to the global response to climate change. Each NDC is expected to reflect the Party's ‘highest possible ambition’ (HPA) on the mitigation of climate change. This article envisages the possibility of taking HPA seriously: that is, of approaching it as an effective legal standard. It shows that, in some circumstances, the HPA standard can help to assess whether a State has complied with due diligence obligations on climate change mitigation.

In the past decade, the practice of investor–State arbitral tribunals addressing investment protection in the context of armed conflict and military occupation has expanded. This has prompted a growing interest in the relationship between international investment law and international humanitarian law (IHL), two regimes with markedly different relationships to war—IHL more pragmatic and international investment law more idealistic. This article argues that, while its lack of pragmatism might render international investment law ineffective in changing how war is conducted, it is the regime under which States are most likely to be held liable for the conduct of war. This is a result of its more robust primary obligations, more effective enforcement mechanisms and large awards of damages. Nevertheless, comparing international investment law and IHL does also reveal some similarities—the legacy, it is argued, of a time when the laws of war were more about protecting private property and neutral commerce than civilians. Putting these two regimes together in this way exposes international law's uneven distribution of protection in war.

As the human right to a healthy environment is codified around the globe, some systems still lag behind. One noticeable straggler is the Council of Europe, which is currently undergoing its fourth attempt to recognize the right. This article examines the proposals tabled within this system in light of overarching debates about climate justice and environmental rights, before focusing specifically on the spatial and temporal limits of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the institutional features of its Court. First, the article describes what the author sees as the current liminal moment in the development of human rights law, a time of transition in which established legal concepts can be questioned or reaffirmed. Second, it sketches recent proposals for locating and conceptualizing the right to a healthy environment within the Council of Europe. Evaluating different options, it makes the case for including this right in the ECHR. Third, the article discusses the right's potential to reshape the spatial and temporal limitations on legal subjectivity and Convention protections. These proposals come at a crucial time when the system's ability to protect human rights from environment-related impacts is being tested by climate litigation. The article understands these developments as interrelated and discusses whether current proposals could deliver on demands for climate justice by extending protection to future generations and for extraterritorial environmental impacts.

Global digital integration is desirable and perhaps even inevitable for most States. However, there is currently no systematic framework or narrative to drive such integration in trade agreements. This article evaluates whether community values can offer a normative foundation for rules governing digital trade. It uses the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Digital Trade Protocol as a case study and argues that identifying and solidifying the collective needs of the African region through this instrument will be key to shaping an inclusive and holistic regional framework. These arguments are substantiated by analysis of the regulation of cross-border data flows, privacy and cybersecurity.

This article offers a reconstruction of how the Court of Justice of the European Union (EU) justifies the territorial scope of application of EU law. Scholarship on this issue tends to advocate for an expansive projection of EU norms in the pursuit of global values, subject to the external limits of public international law. This article will develop a critique of this approach by pointing to its underlying assumptions as to the territorial dimension of the EU's rule, the insoluble practical issues that it leads to, and the need to consider differently the EU's spatial identity and relation to the wider world. It will also be argued that, in fact, other case law sometimes already reflects an alternative vision, by imagining the EU implicitly, not as a ‘global actor’ promoting universal values, but as a concretely situated and spatially bounded community. It will be shown that this is so with the methodological help of private international law, and in particular three doctrines that are traditional to this discipline—the localisation of cross-border relations, international imperativeness, and the public policy exception. This will ultimately allow for a more sophisticated understanding of the EU's territory to emerge—irreducible to the physical coordinates of its acts of intervention, or the mere sum of the physical spaces under Member State sovereignty, but as a distinct space of social relations, informed and delineated by the particular axiology and structure of the EU legal system.

The characterisation, legal status and future of islands are increasingly prominent in international and legal affairs. This emerging ‘legal era of islands’ demands a clearer understanding of the multiple distinctive legal issues that islands, whether as sub-national political units or as the territory of continental or mainland States, raise. This article conducts the first contemporary study of these issues by examining the international and constitutional legal status of island territories. It finds that although the relationship between islands and mainland States is characterised by incredible diversity, island territories are pursuing a range of innovative strategies to preserve and protect their autonomy.

In November 2023 the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and Security Council elected (in one case, re-elected) five judges to the International Court of Justice. The electoral system is considered to be overly politicized and to pay lip service to the requirements that judges must be elected on the basis of their qualifications, regardless of their nationality, and that in the body as a whole, the representation of the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world should be assured. Several amendments to the system of nominations and elections have been proposed that would require a reform of the Court's Statute. This article proposes four measures that could be adopted without amending the Statute or encroaching on the prerogatives of national groups, UN organs or Member States: (1) ensure the representation of the principal legal systems, in part by promoting regional diversity on the bench; (2) remove the use of nationality as a factor in casual elections; (3) establish a vetting process and public hearings; and (4) promote a single vote for Security Council members. It argues that the measures proposed would lead to a change in the present culture of nominations and elections towards one that favours the qualification of the judges over political considerations.

This article offers a reconstruction and assessment of the emerging rebellion of European constitutional courts against the exceptionless supremacy of European Union (EU) law. It presents the ontological theories of supremacy and how the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) overcame the first two major challenges of its history: the existential challenge of canonizing the general doctrine of supremacy and the Solange challenge of national fundamental rights. It provides an account of the emerging ultra vires challenge, including its root cause and evolvement, and provides an assessment and sets out proposals. The article demonstrates that the crux of the matter is not the primacy of EU law but the interpretive primacy of the CJEU. It argues that the rebellion was triggered by the perception that the CJEU case law features a declining normative and an increasing policy character. The debate about the CJEU's evolutionary interpretation, in a certain sense, parallels US constitutional law's debate between originalism and the living constitution, with the difference that the EU is a pluralist legal order.

The human right to leave any country protects an intrinsic interest in free movement and is also a vital pre-condition to seeking asylum. The right to leave attracts little academic interest, but it is quietly being eroded. Exit restrictions in States of origin or transit have become an instrument of extraterritorial migration control for European Union Member States seeking to prevent the arrival of unwanted migrants. This article first explores the revival of exit restrictions, focusing on agreements between European destination States and select African States of departure. It argues that the adoption of exit restrictions from one State to prevent entry to another creates the paradox of seamless borders, where regulation of exit and entry are harmonized and fused to serve the singular objective of preventing entry to the destination State. The article further argues that the political and discursive coupling of anti-smuggling and search-and-rescue regimes occlude the rights-violating character of exit restrictions and enables breach of the right to leave to hide in plain sight. Additionally, current approaches to jurisdiction and State responsibility in regional and international courts render the prospect of destination State liability uncertain in circumstances where the destination State does not exercise legal and physical control over enforcement. The article draws on ‘crimmigration’ and border criminology literature to identify the common element of carcerality that connects confinement of migrants to the territory of departure States with migrant detention inside the territory. Beyond lamenting the erosion of exit rights, the article concludes by querying whether the erosion of the right to leave is symptomatic of a larger trend toward the regulation of mobility itself.

The employment of cutting-edge technology in the European Union's external border management is transforming the way that States acquire control over seaborne migrants and deconstructing traditional conceptions of border and territory. This article sheds light on a new generation of human rights violations on the high seas, where people's rights become contingent on their geographical location which is increasingly traceable by monitoring bodies. Amidst the burgeoning phenomena of abandonment at sea and contemporary forms of migrant push-backs, this article contends that human rights jurisdiction ought to be reconceptualized in functional terms to capture new modalities of State power, that if and when exercised, can amount to effective control, triggering a State's human rights obligations.

For societies transitioning from conflict to peace, the phenomenon of child soldiers poses significant challenges. These include quandaries associated with assisting in the reintegration of serving child soldiers, determining how to prevent future recruitment of child soldiers, and pursuing accountability of those who utilize child soldiers. In addition, questions are also raised as to whether and how child soldiers responsible for crimes committed during conflict are to be held to account. While no one mechanism or response can adequately and sufficiently address the multifaceted issues that arise, peace agreements, as foundational documents that serve as the blueprint for peacebuilding and the post-conflict State, can make a useful contribution to some or all of them. Drawing on all references to child soldiers in 77 peace agreements signed between 1990 and 2022, this article examines the ways in which peace agreements address the issue of child soldiers.

This article examines reactions to the South China Sea and Chagos Marine Protection Area arbitrations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in particular concerns about the potential widening of Part XV jurisdiction and its impact on the dispute resolution system's consent basis. It argues that assessing the impact of such cases involves a characterization of both the function of Part XV and of international judges. Ultimately, it suggests that the best test of whether UNCLOS case law has gone too far is the reaction of States in designing dispute settlement under the new Agreement under UNCLOS on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction.

The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War provides a practical and effective framework for the protection of civilians in international armed conflicts that has retained its relevance for 75 years since its adoption. As with all treaties, its ‘object and purpose’ has a concrete impact on how its terms are interpreted, giving insights into the ordinary meaning of the text and allowing the aim of the Convention to be fully realized. This article asks and answers a series of questions to elucidate the role of the object and purpose in treaty interpretation and how to identify the object and purpose of a given treaty before focusing on the specificities of international humanitarian law treaties. On that basis, it determines that the overall ‘object and purpose’ of the Convention is to protect civilians during armed conflict, including in circumstances where they are subject to permissible measures of control and security. The article then demonstrates how that ‘object and purpose’ assists with the resolution of specific, well-known interpretive dilemmas including the determination of protected status under the Convention and the application of provisions premised on the existence of a Protecting Power.

This article argues that the scope of the neutrality duties of non-assistance and prevention allows for an exception – a carve-out for assistance given to the victim State of an armed attack. Rather than weighing in on debates as to whether current State practice accepted as law suffices to establish this rule inductively, the article offers a different approach to grounding the argument for this exception in the methodology of the sources of international law, which thus far has been underexplored. The central argument of the article is that the exception or carve-out—and its contours—deductively flows from the structure of international law of peace and security and, in particular, the victim State's right to self-defence. The purpose of that right—enabling the effective termination of the armed attack—must not be undermined through prohibitions of military assistance and duties of prevention. These considerations define the scope of neutrality duties as revealed through systemic treaty interpretation. Such deductive reasoning equally determines the scope of customary neutrality duties, whether discerning that scope is framed as systemic interpretation or as identification of custom.

Since the 1960s sign languages have been identified as natural human languages and conceived of as a key feature of Deaf culture and identity. Eschewing the notion of disability, deaf advocacy organisations have connected the use of sign language to linguistic and cultural rights. Despite the clear preference of deaf advocates, the legal protection of sign languages remains uneven and somewhat difficult to grasp, being situated at the intersection of disability rights and linguistic rights. Few attempts have been made to identify the extent to which sign languages are recognised and enshrined within domestic legal systems. This article aims to propose a novel taxonomy that focuses on the normative conceptualisation of sign language and deaf people in national legislation. Based on a comparative analysis and focusing on European Union Member States, it identifies three main approaches: an explicit ‘minority’ approach—ie the express recognition of deaf persons as a linguistic minority; a more nuanced ‘cultural approach’—which acknowledges sign language as autonomous language and provides for promotional measures; and a ‘disability’ approach—which mandates and/or promotes the use of sign language primarily as an accessibility measure.

This article adopts a critical approach towards scholarship seeking to identify binding due diligence obligations for States in cyberspace. The article demonstrates that due diligence obligations are anchored in specific primary rules and are not a universal standalone source from which it is possible to derive binding obligations for all areas of activity. The consensus position of States in United Nations fora clearly determines that due diligence in cyberspace is a voluntary, non-binding norm of responsible State behaviour, and there is currently insufficient State practice and opinio juris to support the development of a customary rule containing binding due diligence obligations in cyberspace. Consequently, the article concludes that attempts to establish binding due diligence obligations in cyberspace constitute lex ferenda that may be understood as an interventionist attempt by scholars to fill what they perceive to be dangerous legal gaps.

The dichotomy between jurisdiction and admissibility developed in public international law has drawn much attention from arbitrators and judges in recent years. Inspired by Paulsson's ‘tribunal versus claim’ lodestar, attempts have been made to transpose the distinction from public international law to investment treaty arbitration, yielding a mixed reception from tribunals. Remarkably, a second leap of transposition has found firmer footing in commercial arbitration, culminating in the prevailing view of the common law courts in England, Singapore and Hong Kong that arbitral decisions on admissibility are non-reviewable. However, this double transposition from international law to commercial arbitration is misguided. First, admissibility is a concept peculiar to international law and not embodied in domestic arbitral statutes. Second, its importation into commercial arbitration risks undermining the fundamental notion of jurisdiction grounded upon the consent of parties. Third, the duality of ‘night and day’ postulated by Paulsson to distinguish between reviewable and non-reviewable arbitral rulings is best reserved to represent the basic dichotomy between jurisdiction and merits.