I took office seven years ago as the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. Over those years, I have seen remarkable developments, the creation of a global judicial institution from scratch, the development of our operations in all regions of the world, mainly in conflict areas, the setting up of key jurisprudence on modes of liability, complementarity, criminal procedure as well as on victims' participation before the Court. Today I would like to focus on how the work of this Court can contribute to the prevention of massive crimes. Crimes we thought, over and over, would never happen again, only to see them occur, again and again, before our eyes: genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. How can we maximize the preventive impact of our work? How can we ensure that the crimes committed in Georgia during the summer of 2008, in Guinea in the fall of 2009 are not repeated? How can we stop current crimes in Darfur? How can we prevent a new cycle of violence during the next elections in Kenya scheduled for 2012? How can we support Colombia's efforts to end half a century of violence?

There is a widespread view that civilians are worse off in today' wars than ever before. Civilians are often deliberately targeted by belligerents or are victims of ‘collateral damage’. They form the majority of victims of landmines. They are used as human shields. They are displaced from their homes, even from their country. They are affected, often more than soldiers, by the pestilence, famine and displacement that wars bring in their wake. They are often particularly vulnerable in the types of war that are most prevalent in the world today – including civil wars and asymmetric conflicts. Children are forced to become soldiers. How can it be that the lot of civilians in war remains so dire, when so much attention has been paid to the protection of civilians in war – not just in international treaties, but in the work of international organizations and also that of numerous humanitarian bodies?

According to a bedrock principle of international law, the rules regulating the recourse to war and the rules regulating conduct during war must be kept conceptually and legally distinct. The purported independence of the two domains – the ‘separation principle’ – remains unstable despite its historic pedigree. This essay explores recent developments that threaten to erode the separation. The author analyzes, in particular, doctrinal innovations that result in the regulation of the recourse to war through alterations of jus in bello. International and national institutions have incentivized states to pursue particular paths to war by tailoring the rules that regulate conduct in armed conflict. Some warpaths are accordingly rewarded, and others are penalized. The article then explores potential consequences, first, on state behavior involving the use of force and, second, on state behavior involving the conduct of warfare. One significant conclusion is that these recent developments channel state behavior and justifications for using force toward security-based and strategic rationales. These efforts – whether intended or not – risk suppressing ‘desirable wars’ and inspiring ‘undesirable wars.’ These recent developments also undercut humanitarian protections by undermining the mechanisms for compliance with legal norms on the battlefield.

Despite the high density and sheer volume of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), there is considerable indeterminacy within its structure. Understanding the interpretive space generated through the rules/standards dichotomy as well as through the policy/law interface resident within this indeterminacy permits greater appreciation of how LOAC is used to advance strategic goals. The purpose of this article is to examine various interpretive approaches to LOAC and to reveal the significance of such approaches to questions of both legal validity and broader considerations of legitimacy. Positivism remains the dominant interpretive idiom, but it contains vulnerabilities in its assumptions, not least is the wide malleability of language. In the current operating environment, within the counter-insurgency (COIN) context in particular, it is becoming evident that standard canons of LOAC interpretation may not be sufficient to achieve the desired military and political goals sought. Indeed recent COIN guidance concerning interpretation of LOAC reflects an approach reminiscent of the US legal realist style of the early to mid 20th century. This results in a more overt demand for greater social and political appreciation of the use of law to modulate violence.

Unlike most other areas of international law which address only State responsibilities, the law of war assigns to individuals the responsibility to observe positive rules. The threat of being charged with a war crime, with all the attached opprobrium, is the chief means by which observance of the law of war is ensured. No one could rightly argue that war crimes prosecutions, even if they were always effectively prosecuted – and they are not – ensure perfect compliance with the law, but they are the best mechanism devised to date. Although war crimes trials has earlier antecedents, the prosecutions following World War II marked the beginning of the modern war crimes model.

World War II prosecutions were notable for the scale of atrocities alleged in the various indictments. Once the crimes were defined, and the architecture put in place to establish the various tribunals, proof of wrongdoing was rarely in doubt. There were expected legal issues to be sure: claims of ex post facto crimes, immunities for acts of state, and the defense of superior orders, among many others; but in general prosecutors fully expected convictions across the board. And many convictions did result, though there were several exceptions that resulted in full or partial acquittals.

Israel's military operation in the Gaza Strip from 27 December 2008 until 18 January 2009 raised a host of legal questions on status and the conduct of hostilities, many of which have been subjected to intense scrutiny. But perhaps the two most troubling questions that remain unresolved concern the appropriate legal regime that governed the conflict and the geographical reach of the law. Was this an international armed conflict? If so, who were the ‘contracting parties’ and what was the territorial scope of the conflict? Alternatively, was the armed conflict one between a state, Israel, and a non-state actor, Hamas, and thus subject to the rules that apply in non-international armed conflict? This latter position jars with our intuition not least because the codified law assumes non-international armed conflict takes place within the territory of a contracting state. The disquiet is apparent in the Israeli Supreme Court judgment of 2009, Physicians for Human Rights v. Prime Minister, in which the Court had to determine the legal regime governing the armed conflict between Israel and ‘the Hamas organization’. Describing the normative ‘arrangements’ as ‘complex’, it noted that ‘the classification of the armed conflict between the state of Israel and the Hamas organization as an international conflict raises several difficulties’.

This year in review will first discuss the major developments that contributed towards the formation or enforcement of international humanitarian law. Despite the many positive developments in the elucidation of international humanitarian law, 2009 witnessed the continuation of violent armed conflict around the world, not least in Sri Lanka where the long standing armed conflict came to a bloody conclusion amidst allegations of summary executions and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. Two other conflicts involving Israel/Gaza and Russia/Georgia which took place in 2008 and early 2009, resulted in the release of two influential international investigative reports, each of which alleged serious violations of international humanitarian law and called for the enforcement of criminal accountability. The election of Barack Obama marked a significant shift in the attitude of the United States to terrorism and detention with the new President immediately announcing on taking office, the closure of Guantánamo Bay.

The International Criminal Courts Round-Up reports on the most interesting judgements and decisions rendered by international(ized) criminal courts and tribunals during the reporting period. In addition, important developments within the various organs of the courts are highlighted, such as the appointment of new judges and significant amendments to the procedural rules of the courts. The Round-Up presently covers issues concerning the International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.

In a list of ‘desk side reminders’, allegedly originating with General Colin Powell, there is one towards the end which says ‘the window for changes is the first year’. It is unlikely President Obama follows these reminders, but it is nonetheless worthwhile to consider how his decisions – the decisions of the Commander in Chief of the sole remaining military superpower – impacted the application and development of international humanitarian law during the year when his window of opportunity was open.

President Obama's first year in office can be defined by two words: pragmatism and commitment. His pragmatism is reflected in the decision to continue to pursue the armed conflicts against transnational terrorism, and his refusal to abandon the legal and policy positions of his predecessor that lodge that struggle squarely within an armed conflict paradigm. His commitment is reflected both in his decision to continue the armed struggle against transnational terrorism, and in the actions he has taken to demonstrate US commitment to fundamental humanitarian principles of the law, and to abandon the policy of legal exceptionalism that defined his predecessor's ‘authority without obligation’ interpretation of the law as it applied to this armed conflict. Any doubt about these dual pillars of his approach to transnational terrorism was eliminated when he delivered his Nobel acceptance speech. In that speech, he challenged the international community to accept the continuing need to meet the threat of transnational terrorism with military force. However, he also emphasized that maintaining the moral high ground in the conduct of hostilities – even when confronting an immoral opponent – is at the very core of the American military tradition.

The ICRC, following extended discussions with a large group of experts, has adopted and issued a non-legally binding document entitled ‘Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law’ consisting of ten recommendations and about fifty pages of related commentary. The discussion process which preceded production of the Interpretive Guidance was contentious and no consensus was reached on the issue of Direct Participation in Hostilities. As the result, the ICRC, as it was entitled to do, issued its own interpretation of the applicable law. The author of this article, who was involved in all of the expert meetings, reviews and comments on the Interpretive Guidance and attempts to make an assessment of its general viability and of its acceptability to the wider IHL community.

In October 2008, upon the request of the Afghan government, NATO Defence Ministers meeting in Budapest agreed that ‘ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] can act in concert with the Afghans against facilities and facilitators supporting the insurgency, in the context of counternarcotics, subject to the authorization of respective nations’. In explaining the scope of the contemplated actions, NATO officials noted that drug producers and traffickers who aided the ongoing insurgency could now be attacked. NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), US General Bantz Craddock, justified the policy on the ground that the Taliban reaped over $100 million annually from the drug trade. US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates likewise defended the decision as sound strategy.

It soon became clear that other key figures were less enamoured with the new approach, or the subsequent guidance issued to effectuate it. On 5 January 2009, Craddock instructed General Egon Ramms, the German Commander of Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum, which overseas NATO operations in Afghanistan, ‘to attack directly drug producers and facilities throughout Afghanistan’. The threshold for engagement seemed to require little connection to the insurgency. According to SACEUR's guidance, it was ‘no longer necessary to produce intelligence or other evidence that each particular drug trafficker or narcotics facility in Afghanistan meets the criteria of being a military objective’ because the alliance ‘has decided that (drug traffickers and narcotics facilities) are inextricably linked to the Opposing Military Forces, and thus may be attacked’.

Growing concerns that PMSCs were operating in a legal vacuum led to increasing calls for further clarification on the role of such entities in conflict zones and to mounting pressure to develop a regulative framework under international law. In September 2008, 17 States endorsed the Montreux Document, an initiative sponsored by the Swiss government and the ICRC. The Montreux Document is a non-binding document aimed at identifying and reasserting the most relevant international legal obligations that govern the conduct of PMSCs during armed conflicts. It also provides for a set of guidelines on ‘good practices’ for States in regard to the operation of PMSCs in armed conflicts. Although it does not create any legal obligations, and only recalls existing ones, it is the first intergovernmental document to address international obligations in respect to the activities of PMSCs. It can thus be seen as a first step toward the establishment of a better regulative framework of PMSCs' activities in conflict zones. This article provides an overview of the process that led to the endorsement of this document and an analysis of its content. It also addresses some of the questions left unanswered by the Montreux Document.

Operation Cast Lead, the Israeli military operation in Gaza that began on December 27, 2008, demonstrated anew the challenges international humanitarian law faces in contemporary conflict. The Goldstone Report presented an opportunity to examine critically how the law applies in complicated modern warfare and how the law might be used to solve difficult problems such conflict poses.

This article analyzes the Goldstone Report's application of the law to the conduct of both parties in the conflict to examine how it applies and interprets the legal standards within the framework of the Gaza conflict. In particular, the article focuses on two main shortcomings in the Goldstone Report's application of IHL: areas in which the report could have benefitted from a greater sensitivity to the complexities of modern warfare, and areas in which its approach is questionable as a matter of law.

First, the article highlights the report's flawed examination of the challenges posed by contemporary conflicts in two fundamental areas of IHL: distinction and military objectives. Both require that military commanders and soldiers understand who is a civilian and who is a fighter or combatant, and which targets are military targets and which are civilian objects. Without a thorough and sophisticated understanding of how to make these determinations, military commanders, soldiers and policy makers will face grave difficulty in planning and carrying out military operations within the bounds of the law. The challenges presented in Operation Cast Lead are emblematic of some of the most difficult dilemmas modern warfare poses.

Second, the article highlights several areas in which the Goldstone Report's application of IHL is questionable, either because it uses the incorrect legal standard or because it applies the wrong law when more than one body of law applies. The report errs twice in its treatment of the principle of proportionality, first by approaching jus in bello proportionality retrospectively rather than prospectively, and second by conflating jus ad bellum proportionality with jus in bello proportionality. Additional problems arise in its analysis of the law governing precautions in attack and the treatment of prisoners of war, and its assessment of responsibility for specific crimes, including attacks on civilians, destruction of property and hostage taking.

‘Women, peace, security’ has now firmly emerged as a distinct category for attention by international law, international policy and programming approaches for governments and activists alike. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 is the pillar of this agenda and there is questionable evidence of whether the kind of reforms envisioned through SCR 1325 have truly taken place and whether progress, if any, has been made towards its implementation. High expectations are pinned to the more recent and related resolutions SCR1820 (2008), SCR1888 (2009) and SCR1889 (2009) recently adopted by the Security Council. Increasingly, the focus has been on the potential offered through the development of ‘action plans’ as possible ‘solutions’ to the current deficit. In this article action plans are examined and a snap-shot of the ways in which ‘National Action Plans for the implementation of SCR 1325’ are being developed and the increasing role they are playing in international debate on the theme of ‘women, peace and security’ is presented. The article argues that implementation of these resolutions requires reformist and radical interventions that create fundamental change. Factors affecting the potential of these plans to encompass this kind of approach are outlined, focusing on the process and content aspects of developing action plans. The article highlights that while action plans are generating positive incentives to compel states to act, caution is required before proclaiming them to be the ‘antidote’ to the existing gulf between the principles of the Resolution and effective policy response and implementation. Commentary on emerging trends and some suggestions on possible avenues for moving forward conclude the article.

On 24–25 September 2009, the Faculty of Laws, University College London and the International Humanitarian Law Project, London School of Economics held a conference in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross entitled ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law’.

Armed conflict situations (including belligerent occupations) have increasingly become the subject of litigation before national courts and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). As a result, there is now a substantial body of case-law on the application of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in armed conflict situations. The ECtHR has had to engage with questions involving situations of armed conflict and occupation since the Turkish intervention in Northern Cyprus in the 1970s. The increasing resort to the ECHR by claimants whose rights have allegedly been violated in contemporary armed conflicts and occupations, raise new and complex questions of law. To what extent does the ECHR, as a human rights legal regime, apply in such situations, especially when alleged violations have been perpetrated abroad? How does the ECHR interact with international humanitarian law (IHL)?

Correspondents' Reports is compiled and edited by Tim McCormack with the excellent assistance of James Ellis, Sasha Radin and Michelle Lesh primarily from information provided to the YIHL by its correspondents but also drawing on other sources. The section does not purport to be a fully inclusive compilation of all international humanitarian law-related developments in every state but represents a selection of developments during the calendar year 2009 that have come to the Yearbook's attention. Legal developments from early 2009 that were noted in volume 11 of the YIHL are not repeated here. Readers are thus advised to consult this section in conjunction with Correspondents' Reports in volume 11. We apologise for this inconvenience. Further, some 2008 humanitarian law-related developments came to our attention after volume 11 went to press and could not be noted there. For the sake of completeness, we have included them here. Reference is also included to a number of legal developments which are not strictly-speaking related to IHL but which are nonetheless interesting and relevant for our readers, in particular relating to justice issues, jurisdictional questions, jus ad bellum, state security, human rights, refugees and internally displaced persons, and terrorism. Where citations or dates or other details have not been provided, they were not available or obtainable. The YIHL is actively seeking new correspondents, particularly in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Interested persons and anyone who is willing to contribute information should contact the Report Editor at [email protected].

The YIHL features a comprehensive bibliography covering the most recently published books and articles focusing on international humanitarian law, international criminal law and related fields. While the focus is on literature in the English language, notable publications in French, German, Spanish, Italian and other languages are also listed.