We can learn certain things from the Communist system, and one of the most important of these is the dependence of successful practice on theory. Theory serves to guide, integrate, and rationalize a series of actions, and without it those actions tend to be atomistic and fruitless.

Indeed, the classic failures of our confrontations with Communist countries can be traced at least in part fo a theoretical misperception of what the Communists were, and the lack of a guiding theory on our part. It is possible, for example, to interpret the unhappy decisions of the World War II period as resulting from a mismatch of opponents: the Soviet Union's inferior power position was more than compensated for by a relatively coherent and creative theory of the world, while the superior strength of the United States was substantially negated because this country followed a policy path that may be described as a kind of political existentialism.

The American liberal would, I am sure, indignantly reject any supposition that he looks down upon the non-white races and that in his heart of hearts he has contempt for the underdeveloped countries and their population. In his rather narrow view all that the “underdeveloped man,” in this case the South Vietnamese, wants is food and peace at any price; therefore American presence in Saigon, the liberal says, which is motivated by selfish imperialism, merely delays the desired and reasonable dénouement.

A similar contempt is apparent in President Johnson's offer of one billion dollar aid to Southeast Asia if only Peking and Hanoi show willingness to settle the war in Vietnam.

It is the continuing concern of worldview and its sponsoring organization, The Council on Religion and International Affairs, to probe the relationship among religion, ethics and foreign policy. Most of this concern seems to be directed toward analysis and evaluation of substantive policy issues, which are, of course, vitally important. But it may be equally important to investigate the process of religion-ethics- policy interaction, This essay examines one aspect of that process: how ethical consciousness can pervade the decision-making process. This problem will be approached by looking at three interrelated questions: a) what are the political responsibilities which flow to the individual in the free society? b) what is the character of those responsibilities? c) how can we best fulfill those responsibilities?

We are inclined to define the free society as one which provides a free condition for individuals and social groups.

There are a number of reasons to believe that fundamental changes are necessary in United States foreign policy, and some of these reasons have been developed in recent statements by Senator William J. Fulbright (Arkansas) of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Richard Russell (Georgia) of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Frank Church (Idaho), Senator Wayne Morse (Oregon) and others. In such a reconsideration, the basic objectives, the means for achieving them, and the limitations of American capability should be considered.

Since the beginning of our intervention in Vietnam there has been much criticism of our ill-fated policy there. Much of it, however, has been aimed at our tactics and techniques and therefore has not been very effective because, once the basic premises and assumptions of the government's policy in Vietnam are accepted, a good case can be made out by the Administration for the means employed. What should be criticized and attacked are the basic premises and assumptions, for these seem, in almost every instance, to be demonstrably false.

Before examining these basic premises, however, it may be well to say a few words about the climate in which all of our foreign policy since World War II has been conducted. The two words which most succinctly characterize this climate are fear and hate.

The relation of religion and politics in South Asia is a subject of unusual complexity, with a richness of phenomena which at once intrigues and embarrasses. In the West we are concerned chiefly with the major branches of the Christian church; in South Asia we find a compact geographical region which is the meeting place of three major world religions. The majorities in the three most important South Asian countries, India, Pakistan and Ceylon, profess respectively Hinduism, Islam and Buddhism. From a comparative point of view it is important to note that the three countries share a similar colonial background: all three were part of the British Empire. British policies with respect to religion in undivided India and in Ceylon were not identical, but they did follow the same general lines.

You are about to return to Rome, as this is written, for the most decisive session of the Second Vatican Council. Schema XIII on the Church in the Modern World is from a pastoral viewpoint, of such unique importance that one may believe the whole work of the Council stands or falls with it. You who have listened with patience to so many opinions will surely bear charitably with yet one more expression of Christian concern. It is written not in order to defend a merely partisan view, but to insure that the great work done by the previous sessions is not prejudiced by any ambiguity or hesitation in confronting one of the most crucial problems of our time.

For some time now the going has been rough. The crest of one crisis is hardly followed by the trough of false resolution when the next billow comes surging along to pitch us sharply once more. And in such turbulent waters it is, of course, hard for those up on the bridge to spend much time or energy giving us below reassurance about crew, compasses, routings, or destination. A nice but vague, flow of words, sounding suspiciously pre-recorded, and that is all.

But now and then one comes down from the bridge, relieved of duties up there, and from him there are impressions to be had. Such is the case with Mr. Dean Acheson, and the impressions are far from encouraging.

Let us begin with the obvious. A certain kind of “Europe” is taking shape. I put “Europe” within quotation marks. This “Europe” which is taking shape, is a “Europe” of institutions. It is a result of the achievements of the fifties rather than of the forties and of the sixties; of the Schuman Plan and of the Western European Union and of the Common Market, of WEU and EPU and ECSC and EFTA, of Europ and Euratom and Europlan and Eurovision, of OEEC and OECD and TEE.

There is nothing in history which is inevitable, and the history of no continent shows this better than the history of Europe: but certain things are irreversible (an interesting thought for philosophers: why, historically speaking, “inevitable” and “irreversible“ are not at all the same) and this development of “European” institutions is one of them.

President Johnson's policy in Southeast Asia and U.S, intervention in the Caribbean have been condemned by a number of leading American professors and journalists, a vocal minority of liberals in Congress, and some leaders of religious groups and the Civil Rights movement. “Teach-ins” on Vietnam have been held at many universities and colleges across the country, and were capped by the confrontations in Washington between supporters and critics of the Administration.

The frequency with which myths about the war in Vietnam are given some degree of credibility is an indication of the lack of real understanding on the part of many Americans, not only average citizens who might not be. expected to understand the nuances of international law and diplomatic wrangling, but also those often self-proclaimed “sophisticated observers” who, on occasion, seem to understand so much that they fail to grasp the central point at issue.

Men have invariably gone forward in history with the assumption that violent shifts in their relation to the world, or in their relations to other men, were subject to a limiting principle: to critique, to reason, to the review of memory. Barely during the event, more frequently after violence has spent itself, revolutions in the physical and moral order were understood to be subject to the judgment of the community that has brought them to pass, or of the civilized community as a whole. Revolutions brought new freedom in their wake, or they suppressed freedom; thev opened new geographical and spiritual horizons, or they cut them down. Sometimes the revolutions were predictable, often they were contained.

The carefully graduated increases in manpower and in the intensity of bombing attacks and the wellpublicized U.S. diplomatic efforts for negotiations, make it appear—at least as I write this—that the United States is conducting in Vietnam a well-controlled and limited military operation.

This impression of limitation and control, implying as it does the discriminating application of military power in the service of political ends, is morally soothing. It is nevertheless an illusory impression which cannot avoid being exposed as the war progresses. For the underlying fact of the U.S. commitment in Vietnam is that its objective is no longer the politics of South Vietnam.

The classic conflict in society is between liberty on one hand and order on the other. The conflict has been made more acute by the challenges we face in the contemporary world, whether the challenge be that of automation, the explosion of the new nations, or the problems associated with national defense in the nuclear age.

I wish to discuss some of the dilemmas that we face in military strategy, where—just as in the classic conflict between order and freedom—we are forced to choose between conflicting and sometimes incompatible objectives. The problem in both cases is to achieve the proper balance between desirable ends. It is my hope that by examining some of these hard choices, it will be possible to provide some insight into the considerations that enter into the development of national security policy.

We are slowly being conditioned to believe that with decolonization in the political sphere, the “third world” is getting rid of the Christian religion which had come to Asia and Africa—so the story goes—as an auxiliary force of white imperialism. This is a biased and false picture, born perhaps not so much of wishful thinking as of an erroneous logic of history.“ This logic concludes: if Asians and Africans come once again into their own, they ought to reassert their religious personality too.

My own observations as a traveler in Asia and Africa are inevitably personal and partial. Because I had more ready access to Catholic sources of information, for example, my comparisons and references most frequently involve Catholicism, although many of the generalizations would apply to Protestantism as well. In any case I found that, as always, the reality proved to be far more complex than the general assumptions.

To justify Nikita Khrushchev's removal from office, the new Kremlin leaders have cited this grievous fault: during the Aswan Dam celebrations in May 1964 he granted a Hero of the Soviet Union award to President Nasser of the United Arab Republic without first securing approval from the Supreme Soviet's Presidium. This example may or may not take a major place in the catalogue of Khrushchev's purported mistakes, but the award itself points up the attention Gamel Abdel Nasser still receives in world politics after a decade of controversy and uncertainty about his international status. Russian medals— and American corn—do not prove Nasser's arrival as a leader with significant standing, although great power recognition contributes to that status. That proof depends upon the rank he may gain as the leader of the nonaligned world.