Herein, we examine how the United States and the European Union use trade agreements to advance the free flow of information and to promote digital rights online. In the 1980s and 1990s, after US policymakers tried to include language governing the free flow of information in trade agreements, other nations feared a threat to their sovereignty and their ability to restrict cross-border data flows in the interest of privacy or national security.

In the twenty-first century, again many states have not responded positively to US and EU efforts to facilitate the free flow of information. They worry that the US dominates both the Internet economy and Internet governance in ways that benefit its interests. After the Snowden allegations, many states adopted strategies that restricted rather than enhanced the free flow of information. Without deliberate intent, efforts to set information free through trade liberalization may be making the Internet less free.

Finally, the two trade giants are not fully in agreement on Internet freedom, but neither has linked policies to promote the free flow of information with policies to advance digital rights. Moreover, they do not agree as to when restrictions on information are necessary and when they are protectionist.

The WTO Panel report on China – Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures on Broiler Products from the United States was circulated to Members on 2 August 2013. In the report, the Panel examined a variety of issues challenged by the United States under various provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, the Anti-dumping Agreement and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. The Panel upheld the United States' claims on the majority of the issues, which covered certain procedural aspects of the anti-dumping and countervailing investigations such as the right to disclosure of ‘essential facts', as well as the substantive determinations including costing issues, the imposition of the ‘all others' rate on the basis of ‘facts available’, the price effects' analyses, the sufficiency of the public notices, and others. Notably the costing issues that came up in the case, although decided mostly on procedural grounds, provide food for thought, and are likely to feature again in future disputes.

In this article, we explore the conditions under which firms engage in transnational lobbying and foreign venue shopping in the framework of WTO dispute settlement. Classical World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement cases mostly originate in domestic firms instigating their public authorities to bring a complaint against foreign trade barriers incompatible with WTO law. In recent years, however, we have witnessed the rise of WTO cases in which firms get a foreign government to file a case against its own authorities. By analysing transnational lobbying by EU firms in the WTO footwear case filed by China against the EU, and by US firms in the WTO gambling case Antigua brought against the US, we highlight the increasing resemblance between trade disputes and investment disputes.

This paper focuses on the variability of judicialization across preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and their impact on trade flows. We develop a categorization of PTAs that contrasts enforcement mechanisms with the level of trade policy discretion allowed by a trade agreement and the degree of flexibility allowed for members. Utilizing an original dataset of PTAs signed by countries in Asia, which has emerged as one of the most active regions of PTA formation and which exhibits wide variability in levels of judicialization, we compare the effects of trade policy discretion, flexibility provisions, and enforcement mechanisms in PTAs on trade flows. We examine the empirical strength of our theoretical framework distinguishing between discretion, flexibility, and enforcement using confirmatory factor analysis. The empirical analysis then goes on to examine their respective effects on trade flows. The results show that agreements with strong commitments, that is, those that remove more trade policy discretion from a government, lead to a greater expansion of trade between signatories. Enforcement and flexibility mechanisms, however, have mixed effects.

In this paper, we examine the theoretical rationale for WTO rules on the special and differential treatment (SDT) of developing countries. We describe a model of bilateral trade between a small country and a large trading partner, in which the small country suffers from a domestic commitment problem in trade policy. This problem arises because investors in the import-competing sector lobby the government to enact and maintain protectionist policies. We show that a reciprocal trade agreement, in which the large country lowers its tariffs conditionally on the small country doing the same, creates a ‘carrot and stick’ mechanisms that helps the small country to overcome its commitment problem. If capacity in the import-competing sector can only be reduced gradually, the agreement may need to allow the small country to delay the implementation of its trade liberalization commitments, in line with SDT provisions in the WTO. Our analysis suggests that, if reconciled with the principle of reciprocity, SDT can help developing countries to liberalize and improve their trading prospects.

Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have to be consistent with the WTO. Their monitoring at the multilateral level has failed so far for various reasons. The question arises what to do? Completion of the contract (‘legalization’) has failed repeatedly, and, in light of vested interests and incentives, there is no reason to believe it can succeed now. Judicialization can be discarded as well, since the incentives to enforce the WTO contract in this respect are lacking. The good arguments thus lie in favour of building bridges between the WTO and PTAs, and the weaker arguments with an effort to enhance enforcement against PTAs through either judicialization or legalization of the monitoring process.

The development and use of clean technologies constitute a useful means of mitigating global warming. Although certain developing countries have become major emitters of greenhouse gases, they are not in a position to access the clean technologies that are prevalent in developed nations. In advocating technology transfers under the United Nations' climate change regime, developing countries argue that the intellectual property regime covering climate-related technologies must be ameliorated. In their proposals, they argue that compulsory licensing for clean technologies can be instrumental in furthering global access.

This paper examines the legal issues associated with granting compulsory licenses for clean technologies. I analyze the legal challenges to authorizing such licenses, particularly in light of WTO/TRIPS and of national practices.

An analysis of the previous practices surrounding the application of compulsory licensing reveals the severe hurdles facing competent national authorities and indicates the costs and burdens of such an action, which not every WTO member can afford. Jumping to the conclusion that the compulsory licensing of clean technologies is simply an illusory option may be premature; nevertheless, the legal barriers and burdens may dissuade developing nations from using such licenses injudiciously.

The EC–Seal Products case stemmed from complaints by Canada and Norway against European Union regulations that effectively banned the importation and marketing of seal products from those countries. The EU said it had responded to European moral outrage at the killing of seals. Canada and Norway challenged the regime under various provisions of the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement and the GATT. This article considers TBT aspects of the Panel and Appellate Body decisions. It discusses issues such as whether there is any bright line to be drawn between legitimate and illegitimate purposes in regulation, the proper legal meaning of a ‘technical regulation’, and the interpretation of TBT 2.1.

(1) The procedure connected to the Advance Sworn Import Declaration (Declaración Jurada Anticipada de Importación, DJAI), required by the Argentine Government since February 2012 for most imports of goods into Argentina; and (2) the imposition by Argentine authorities on economic operators of one or more trade-related requirements (TRRs) as a condition to import into Argentina or to obtain certain benefits.

This paper reviews several key implications of international investment and global supply chain fragmentation for the multilateral trading system. Based on existing economic research, I identify a two-fold challenge for policy makers: first, to leverage the trade-liberalizing potential of global fragmentation at the multilateral level; and, second, to counter the potential for opportunistic manipulation of behind-the-border policy instruments.

Plurilateral agreements in the WTO context allow sub-sets of countries to agree to commitments in specific policy areas that only apply to signatories, and thus allow for ‘variable geometry’ in the WTO. Current WTO rules make it much more difficult to pursue the plurilateral route than to negotiate a preferential trade agreement outside the WTO. We argue that this is inefficient from a global welfare and trading system perspective and that WTO Members should facilitate the negotiation of new plurilateral agreements on regulatory matters.

These compliance proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU concerned measures adopted by the United States to comply with the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) recommendations and rulings in US – COOL. In US – COOL, the DSB found that a certain US country-of-origin labelling (COOL) measure regarding muscle cuts of meat (the Original COOL Measure), and the administration of that measure, were inconsistent with certain aspects of the TBT Agreement and the GATT 1994. The United States' measure taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB consisted of an amendment to the Original COOL Measure (the 2013 Final Rule). In these compliance proceedings, the Panel and Appellate Body referred to the 2013 Final Rule, together with the Original COOL Measure, as the Amended COOL Measure. The Amended COOL Measure was the focus of these compliance proceedings.

Various aspects of 17 countervailing duty investigations conducted by the United States' Department of Commerce (USDOC) from 2007 through 2012.

US laws and practices related to the imposition of anti-dumping measures against imports of certain shrimp products from Viet Nam. In particular, the dispute concerned various aspects of certain administrative reviews and a sunset review regarding such measures. The dispute also concerned certain US laws regarding the implementation of DSB recommendations and rulings.

If WTO Members wish to launch a new round to follow Doha, setting the agenda will require a complex negotiation as in the past, however Doha ends. To reduce the serious information problems they face and prepare the way, advocates should commission an independent research team to produce a comprehensive negotiation analysis before they decide to move further. Reaching an agreement on an agenda will depend on the procedural rules that apply in the agenda negotiation and the subsequent Round. They should consider four rules that seem legitimate today and most likely to help Members find a joint-gain agenda. Reaching an agenda agreement could also depend in part on decisions by WTO chairs during this negotiation. Experience illustrates the potentials and possible pitfalls for them to avoid.

This dispute concerned India's import prohibition affecting certain agricultural products from countries reporting Notifiable Avian Influenza to the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). India maintains this import prohibition through certain legal instruments concerning Avian Influenza (AI) – the AI Measures.