All but one WTO member currently trade under one or more preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Despite the concern since the early 1990s that these agreements may be a stumbling block to multilateral trade liberalization (MTL) their numbers have risen at an increasing rate in the last 15 years. As preferential liberalization appears to become the rule rather than the exception, it is essential to ask whether there is evidence that it affects MTL. To do so we analyze recent empirical research that finds the US's and EU's PTAs were a stumbling block to their MTL in the Uruguay Round. We also propose new empirical work to answer more definitively whether PTAs are a stumbling block to worldwide MTL.

The rapid development of the Internet has led to a growing electronic cross-border delivery of services. While the WTO negotiations have not caught up to the reality of such service trade, the first GATS case dealing with the Internet, namely ‘United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services’, has advanced matters. This paper distils the substantive conclusions of the case and remaining questions in relation to Internet-supplied services and certain core concepts of the GATS. Moreover, it sheds light on the case's implications for the services negotiations under the ongoing Doha Development Agenda. It concludes that the second ever GATS case has provided an encouraging set of answers to the unresolved questions of the WTO's Work Programme on E-Commerce, mainly confirming the applicability of GATS commitments to electronically supplied services and shaping the concept of technological neutrality. While more work or dispute settlement cases are necessary to clarify the remaining questions, the rulings have paved the way for the GATS to be a more effective discipline for cross-border (electronic) trade. The paper also explains that a ‘chilling effect’ of the rulings on the Doha services negotiations is not warranted.

The GATT treaty's loophole for free trade areas in Article XXIV has puzzled and deceived prominent scholars, who trace its postwar origins to US aspirations to promote European integration and efforts to persuade developing countries to endorse the Havana Charter. Drawing from archival records, this article shows that in fact US policymakers crafted the controversial provisions of Article XXIV to accommodate a trade treaty they had secretly reached with Canada. As a result, the free trade area exemption was embedded in the GATT–WTO regime, even though neither the Havana Charter nor the US–Canada free trade agreement was ever ratified. Theoretically, the case is an important example of how Cold War exigencies altered the policy ideas of US officials.

The claim by global trade modelers that the potential contribution to global economic welfare of removing agricultural subsidies is less than one-tenth of that from removing agricultural tariffs puzzles many observers. To help explain that result, this paper first compares the OECD and model-based estimates of the extent of the producer distortions (leaving aside consumer distortions), and shows that 75% of total support is provided by market access barriers when account is taken of all forms of support to farmers and to agricultural processors globally, and only 19% to domestic farm subsidies. We then provide a back-of-the-envelope (BOTE) calculation of the welfare cost of those distortions. Assuming unitary supply and demand elasticities, that BOTE analysis suggests 86% of the welfare cost is due to tariffs and only 6% to domestic farm subsidies. When the higher costs associated with the greater variability of trade measures relative to domestic support are accounted for, the BOTE estimate of the latter's share falls to 4%. This is close to the 5% generated by the most commonly used global model (GTAP) and reported in the paper's final section.

The World Trade Organization provides a forum for the settlement of trade disputes arising between its 148 Members. Should consultations fail, the parties may choose to initiate formal proceedings in Geneva, and must do so in preference to taking unilateral action. The dispute settlement rules are presently under review with a view to their clarification and improvement, making this a natural time to ask whether the appropriate strategy has been identified. This article focuses on the functions of compensation in the overall context of WTO remedies. Particular attention is given to the prospects for new disciplines and increased practice connected with the granting of both trade compensation and financial compensation. Also considered is the extent to which financial compensation can and should be linked to reparation in the sense of correcting the injury caused by WTO violations. The discussion is informed by the general international law position, by proposals made during the on-going review process and by emerging dispute settlement practice.

Although developing countries vary significantly in terms of trading profiles, they generally face three primary challenges if they are to participate effectively in the WTO dispute settlement system. These challenges are: (i) a relative lack of legal expertise in WTO law; (ii) constrained financial resources, including for the hiring of outside counsel; and (iii) fear of political and economic pressure. We can roughly categorize these challenges as constraints of law, money, and politics. This article explores various strategies for responding to these challenges, none of which involves a modification of the rules of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding.

The dispute settlement system of the European Community (EC) is undeniably much more elaborate than that of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The reasons for this are evident. First, unlike the WTO the EC, being a supranational organization, has the competence to adopt legislative and administrative acts in its own right. Democratic principles require that the legality of these acts can be examined by a judicial body. Second, legislative and administrative acts of the EC frequently have a direct impact on EC citizens. It would be contrary to democratic principles if citizens affected by legislative or administrative acts of the EC were not able to have the legality of such measures examined by a judicial body. By way of contrast, the inter-State nature of WTO proceedings is such that its dispute settlement system is exclusively open to WTO Members. Third, the EC institutions are capable of beginning legal proceedings against each other and against EC Member States. In particular, if the EC Commission considers that an EC Member State has failed to fulfill an EC Treaty obligation, it may bring the matter before the ECJ. In WTO law, there is no opportunity for inter-institutional proceedings or proceedings between the WTO and its Members.

Building on earlier work by Estevadeordal (2000), we construct a synthetic index (R-index) intending to capture the restrictiveness of rules of origin in preferential trading agreements. The R-index is applied to NAFTA and the Single List of the EU's PANEURO system covering all of the EU's preferential trade agreements. The R-index highlights how a common set of rules of origin can affect countries differently depending on their export structures, and how their complexity varies across sectors. Having controlled for the extent of tariff preference at the tariff-line level, the R-index contributes to explain differences in the rate at which preferences are used. Finally, we compute estimates of the compliance costs associated with rules of origin under NAFTA and under PANEURO and find them to be between 6.8% of good value (NAFTA) and 8% (PANEURO).

Countries can choose between a wide range of policy instruments to address climate change. While economists tend to argue for the efficiency of instruments such as environmental taxes, many countries are incorporating subsidies into their plans for limiting greenhouse gas emissions. However, these subsidies may conflict with World Trade Organization rules. This paper analyzes the potential benefits of using climate change subsidies in terms of addressing market failures as well as the risks of protectionism arising from such subsidies. It then examines World Trade Organization rules to determine whether they optimally differentiate between beneficial and harmful subsidy policies. It concludes that existing WTO rules do not provide adequate scope for legitimate subsidies and makes suggestions for reforming subsidies law.

This rubric is intended for occasional contributions from on-the-ground practitioners in Geneva and national capitals. Our hope is that this category will inspire other practitioners to submit notes and articles – typically in the range of 2,000 to 10,000 words – to the World Trade Review. As with all notes and articles submitted to the World Trade Review, manuscripts in this category will be reviewed by independent referees. However, the focus is intended to be practice oriented and at least one of the two referees will be a fellow practitioner.

We analyze the extent to which the EU-15 and 16 transition economies used the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to commit to service sector policy reforms. GATS commitments are compared with the evolution of actual policy stances over time. While there is substantial variance across transition economies on both actual policies and GATS commitments, we find an inverse relationship between the depth of GATS commitments and the ‘quality’ of actual services policies as assessed by the private sector. In part this can be explained by the fact that the prospect of EU accession makes GATS less relevant as a commitment device for a subset of transition economies. However, for many of the non-EU accession candidates the WTO seems to be a weak commitment device. One explanation is that the small size of the markets concerned generates weak external enforcement incentives. Our findings suggest greater collective investment by WTO members in monitoring and transparency is needed to increase the benefits of WTO membership to small countries.

Recent analyses suggest that the impact of agricultural trade liberalization on developing countries will be very uneven. The Doha Round focuses on tariff issues, but some developing countries currently have practically duty-free access to European and North American markets under preferential regimes. Multilateral liberalization will erode the benefits of these preferences, which are presently rather well utilized in the agricultural sector. While South American and East Asian countries should benefit from an agricultural agreement, African and Caribbean countries are unlikely to do so. The main obstacles to the exports of the sub-Saharan African and Least Developed Countries appear to be in the non-tariff area (sanitary, phytosanitary standards), which increasingly originate from the private sector and are not dealt with under the Doha framework (traceability requirements, etc.). An agreement in Doha is unlikely to solve these problems and open large markets for the poorest countries. While this is not an argument to give up multilateral liberalization, a more specific and differentiated treatment should be considered in WTO rules, and corrective measures should be implemented.

This chapter addresses the dispute brought to the World Trade Organization (WTO) by India concerning anti-dumping duties imposed by the European Communities (EC) on cotton-type bed linen. An earlier complaint brought by India challenged the anti-dumping duties on a number of points, including the EC practice of “zeroing” for the computation of dumping margins (which had the effect of assigning a negative dumping margin a weight of zero when computing a weighted average dumping margin). India prevailed in that dispute, and the EC responded with Council Regulation (EC) No. 1644/2001, amending the original anti-dumping measure on bed linen from India. India was of the view that the amended measure did not comply with EC obligations under the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement, and brought the proceeding under Art. 21.5 of the DSU that is the subject of this chapter.

Based on the notion that the needs of developing countries are substantially different from those of developed countries, the principle of special and differential treatment (S&D) in the World Trade Organization (WTO) allows a certain degree of discrimination in favour of developing countries. This article considers the potential of this principle in resolving disputes within the WTO. S&D developed in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947 and is today reflected in a series of provisions in various WTO agreements. The meaning of S&D as a broader principle could assist in interpreting such provisions. In addition, the principle of S&D could conceivably be used as part of the inherent jurisdiction of Panels and the Appellate Body in connection with procedural aspects of dispute settlement. However, the article concludes that, due to the incoherence of S&D, as well as the difficulties involved in distinguishing between developing countries and in advancing their interests as an amorphous group, S&D is presently of limited value as an independent principle in WTO dispute settlement.

This paper addresses the dispute brought to the World Trade Organization (WTO) by India concerning antidumping duties imposed by the European Communities (EC) on cotton-type bed linen. An earlier complaint brought by India challenged the antidumping duties on a number of points, including the EC practice of ‘zeroing’ for the computation of dumping margins (which had the e.ect of assigning a negative dumping margin a weight of zero when computing a weighted average dumping margin). India prevailed in that dispute, and the EC responded with Council Regulation (EC) No. 1644/2001, amending the original antidumping measure on bed linen from India. India was of the view that the amended measure did not comply with EC obligations under the WTO Antidumping Agreement, and brought the proceeding under Article 21.5 of the DSU that is the subject of this paper.

Various aspects of trade and investment in air transport services are regulated by a series of bilateral agreements in which rights of market access are exchanged. Industry commentators have identified this system and the associated national ownership rules as well as the prevailing attitude of competition authorities (on merger policy and on airport pricing) as the most important factors limiting adjustment in the international air transport industry. These ‘pillars of stagnation’ are examined here. Features of the bilateral agreements in aviation that are similar to those of other preferential trading agreements are noted and linked to the slow pace of policy reform in this industry. The three ‘pillars’ are not independent, and effective liberalization of trade and investment in air transport services depends on complementary regulatory reform. Options are presented on ways in which these changes might be designed and introduced, and in what sequence that might be done. Air transport services are currently excluded from the WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and an important enquiry is how multilateral commitments recorded in the GATS might support reform.