The WTO is exposed to significant political risks deriving from both the abusive employment of the national security argument, as well as the use of the WTO dispute settlement system to address this problem. This article explores the implications of the first WTO panel decision, adopted in April 2019, in which the argument of ‘essential security interests’ was employed to justify trade restrictions. Article XXI of the GATT 1994 now tends to be invoked in other ongoing disputes, notably by the United States in the dispute settlement cases involving its barriers to steel and aluminum. The article argues that pathways other than WTO litigation should be explored to deal with trade barriers adopted under the argument of national security and, despite the absence of simple solutions, it considers some possible alternatives.

The dispute concerns a challenge by Ukraine of certain measures imposed by Russia concerning conformity assessment procedures for railway products, produced in Ukraine and exported to Russia. Ukraine alleged that the Russian measures prevented imports from Ukraine into Russia. For example, Russia was accused of suspending Ukrainian suppliers’ certificates of conformity, as well as refusing to process new certificate applications, due to alleged impossibility of carrying out required annual on-site inspections in Ukraine due to security concerns. These measures were subject to challenge by Ukraine under the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), which applies to WTO Members’ technical regulations and related conformity assessment procedures. Two of the Appellate Body's most noteworthy findings reversing the Panel are addressed below.

The lengthy and long-awaited WTO Panel Reports in Australia–Tobacco Plain Packaging contain a host of material for reflection, particularly in relation to the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. While two of the Panel Reports proceed to appeal, we consider with respect to the two adopted Panel Reports the Panel's reasoning in relation to Article 2.2 of the TBT, focusing on the meaning of trade-restrictiveness. This concept central to WTO law has been under-examined to date, and these Panel Reports demonstrate some of the complexities in identifying trade-restrictive measures, particularly where they are non-discriminatory. The Panel found that Australia's measures restrict trade because they contribute to their objective of reducing tobacco consumption. Therefore, any equally effective alternative will similarly restrict trade. This curious result under TBT Article 2.2 may be particular to non-discriminatory measures that target ‘socially bad’ products such as tobacco.

The dispute concerns a challenge by Canada of certain countervailing duty measures imposed by the United States on supercalendered paper from Canada. Canada brought multiple claims under the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement, including a challenge of an alleged unwritten measure, pursuant to which the US Department of Commerce (USDOC) applies adverse facts available (AFA) to find countervailable subsidies in relation to unreported programs that were discovered during an investigation. In USDOC subsidy investigations, exporters are asked to report information on the use of specifically identified subsidy programs as well as whether they obtained any ‘other forms of assistance’ (OFA). It is the USDOC's conduct in applying AFA in relation to programs not reported under the OFA question that Canada challenged as an ongoing conduct (the OFA-AFA measure).

This article explores economic and legal issues in the WTO dispute China–Broiler Products (Article 21.5–United States). In 2011, the US initiated a dispute against the conduct and results of China's 2009 trade remedy investigation into US broiler products (chickens). The Panel Report found that China had acted inconsistently with its WTO obligations. On the basis of a redetermination, China continued to impose duties and the United States initiated WTO compliance proceedings. The compliance Panel Report, circulated in 2018, concluded that China had failed to comply with its WTO obligations when allocating costs to construct US domestic prices for broiler products. However, China was found to have acted consistently with its WTO obligations with respect to two claims which raise some interesting legal questions. Ultimately, after almost a decade of litigation, China removed the antidumping and countervailing duties on US broiler products in 2018.

EU–Biodiesel (Indonesia) is the latest in two lines of cases. On the one hand, the case offers yet another example of the Dispute Settlement Body striking down creative interpretations of antidumping rules by developed countries. Applying the Appellate Body's decision in EU–Biodiesel (Argentina), the panel found that the EU could not use antidumping duties to counteract the effects of Indonesia's export tax on palm oil. On the other hand, the decision is another chapter in the battle over renewable energy markets. Both the EU and Indonesia had intervened in their markets to promote the development of domestic biodiesel industries. The panel's decision prevents the EU from using antidumping duties to preserve market opportunities created by its Renewable Energy Directive for its domestic biodiesel producers. The EU has responded in two ways. First, through regulations that disfavor palm-based biodiesel, but not biodiesel made from from other foodstocks, such as rapeseed oil commonly produced in the EU. Second, the EU has imposed countervailing duties on Indonesian biodiesel, finding that Indonesia's export tax on crude palm oil constitutes a subsidy to Indonesian biodiesel producers. The EU's apparently inelastic demand for protection raises two questions: First, when domestic political bargains rest on both protectionist and non-protectionist motives and policies have both protectionist and non-protectonist effects, what are the welfare consequences of restraining only overt protectionism? Second, under what circumstances may regulatory approaches be even less desirable than duties for addressing combined protectionist and environmental interests, and would the WTO have the right powers to discipline them in an environmentally sound way?

The dispute concerned anti-dumping duties imposed by Australia on two exporters of A4 copy paper from Indonesia which Indonesia claimed were inconsistent with several provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Australia imposed these duties, ranging between 30% and 40%, on the basis of a comparison of constructed normal values with export prices. Those constructed values were based, for certain input items, on substitute values – prices of pulp exported by Brazilian and South American producers to China and Korea – rather than on the actual costs recorded in those exporters' financial records. These kinds of ‘cost adjustments’ currently rank among the most controversial topics in contemporary WTO anti-dumping case law.

This article reviews the Appellate Body decision in the implementation phase of the EC–Aircraft dispute. Focusing on some of the key findings, we assess whether they are legally and economically correct. We conclude that (a) though still unclear, the test for establishing de facto contingency on import substitution subsidies is probably too demanding; (b) though legitimate, the interpretation of the remedy of removal of the adverse effects for actionable subsidies is the weakest and most deferential possible; (c) the hesitation in confirming that quantitative methods are the key tool to define the relevant market is unwelcome; and (d) the Appellate Body correctly recognize the importance for Panels to consider, in the context of the serious prejudice analysis, whether the like product of the complainant has been subsidized. Most importantly, the analysis of this case, set within the broader jurisprudence and practice, has led us to conclude that WTO subsidy disciplines are not particularly strong. The review of the main economic theories justifying subsidy control (strategic trade policy, terms of trade, private information, commitment theory) has shown that no single theory is able to fully account for subsidies and the need to control them. The key question is the definition of what we want to achieve by controlling subsidies, which is the main message sent to the policy-makers and negotiators that are currently considering law reform.